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The two-way relationship between international migration and institutional 
quality is at the core of migration and development interconnections. Migration 
decisions are shaped by various types of institutions, and subsequently alter the 
quality of institutions in both home and host countries. This thesis empirically 
examines the two-way relationship between international migration and 
institutional quality at the country and cross-country levels. Three studies on the 
return decisions and intentions of Vietnamese migrants are presented, which 
elucidate the role of institutional quality in explaining migration. Subsequently, a 
panel analysis that involves across-country-and-time comparisons is presented 
that investigates the development role of migration in improving institutional 
quality in home countries.  
In the first study, binary and multinomial regression models are fitted to 
identify the determinants of Vietnamese return migrants‟ location choices when 
registering for permanent residency back in their home country. The analysis 
reveals that institutional quality at the local level has a positive role in these 
migration decisions. Moreover, the revealed effect differs with the characteristics 
of migrants: regions with better institutional quality are more attractive both to 
younger return migrants and to those who have returned from host countries with 
better institutional quality.  
The second study uses data from a web-based survey conducted in OECD 
countries in 2016 to examine determinants of the intentions to repatriate among 
Vietnamese migrants. Logistic regression results suggest that Vietnamese 
migrants who attach greater importance to the institutional quality in Viet Nam 
are less likely to have the intention to return than others. However, there is 
iii 
 
considerable heterogeneity by gender. The concern about institutional quality in 
Viet Nam is only statistically significant for males.  
The third study attempts to measure the implicit monetary value of 
institutional quality, elicited via the return migration channel using the contingent 
valuation method. More specifically, this study estimates the willingness to pay 
for an improvement in institutional quality in Viet Nam. Based on survey data on 
Vietnamese migrants living in New Zealand collected in 2016, the estimated 
willingness to pay for a one-unit improvement on a scale of institutional quality is, 
on average, NZD 79.80 per week, and positively associated with the respondents‟ 
age and the importance of institutional quality in Viet Nam to their repatriation 
intentions.  
The fourth study investigates the influence of diasporas in OECD countries 
on institutional quality in home countries. Particularly, the heterogeneity of 
diasporas is taken into account, in terms of their distribution across host countries 
and duration-of-stay. A modified measure of diaspora size, namely institutional-
quality-adjusted immigrant stocks, is developed to allow for variations in 
institutional quality between host countries. Duration-of-stay in the host country is 
utilized as an indicator of the strength of interaction with home countries. Cross-
sectional and panel analyses find a significant positive impact of diasporas in 
OECD countries on institutional quality in home countries. Remarkably, the 
diffusion of advanced institutions from developed host countries to home 
countries through the international migration channel is stronger with diasporas 
characterized by shorter duration-of-stay.  
In general, the empirical findings of this thesis underscore the important role 
of good institutional quality in governing migration for development.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
Spatial mobility is an entrenched characteristic of people. In the era of 
globalization, international migration has reached unprecedented levels and global 
diffusion. The worldwide stock of international migrants has surged by 49 per 
cent, from 173 million people in 2000 to 258 million people in 2017 (United 
Nations, 2017a). Overall, roughly 3.3 per cent of the world population are 
international migrants, but in many OECD countries migrants account for 15-25 
per cent of the population and up to 40 per cent of the population of gateway cities. 
Flows of international migrants have touched most parts of the world and 
generated impacts, positively and negatively, on the development of both home 
and host societies that involve demographic, cultural, social, economic, and 
political features (Kapur and McHale, 2012; Nijkamp et al., 2012; Orrenius and 
Zavodny, 2012; Bodvarsson and Van den Berg, 2013; Chiswick and Miller, 2015; 
Ozden and Rapoport, 2018). 
In the extant literature, the academic and policy debate on the impacts of 
migration has tended to become polarised into pessimistic and optimistic views 
(de Haas, 2010). For decades, the pessimistic views reflected the depletion of 
sending countries‟ human capital stock caused by the emigration of the highly 
educated population. However, since the 1990s, international migrants have been 
optimistically recognized as external factors for the national development of 
sending countries. In the recent literature, the emigration of high-skilled people 
has been shown to effectuate positive network externalities for sending countries 
(Docquier and Rapoport, 2012). Brunow et al. (2015) provided empirical evidence 
that the world will benefit economically in the long-run from greater cross-border 
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migration in response to various incentives and disequilibria. The positive 
contribution of migrants to sustainable development and the major relevance of 
migration for the development of sending and receiving countries were 
acknowledged in The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Migration 
(United Nations, 2015). Nonetheless, the debate on the links between migration 
and development may be cyclical, since the contemporary optimistic perspective 
has recently been critiqued by human geographers and scholars in related 
disciplines (Gamlen, 2014). One of the key arguments of the new pessimistic view 
is that the migration and development relationship is geographically dependent 
and has been partially driven by political and economic interests. 
In recent years, the interconnections between migration and development 
have been an active research area (Kapur and McHale, 2012). This body of 
scholarly research addresses the causes and consequences of migration in the 
migration and development framework. As proposed by Kapur and McHale 
(2005), international migration may alter the development of countries of origin 
through four principal channels: prospect, absence, diaspora, and return. The 
prospect channel refers to how the possibility of moving abroad drives the human 
capital investment decisions of prospective migrants. Wage differentials across 
countries induce prospective migrants to invest in skills that are expected to have 
higher returns in foreign labour markets. Consequently, human capital 
investments motivated by migration prospects gradually establish a sound 
foundation for the economic growth and development of sending countries in the 
long-run. In other words, the prospect channel emphasizes the positive 
externalities of high-skilled labour emigration. The absence channel focuses on 
the detriment to sending countries caused by the „brain drain‟. As the role of 
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human capital accumulation is central to sustained economic growth in the 
modern endogenous growth model (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988), reducing the 
high-skilled population impairs economic development, particularly in developing 
countries. The diaspora channel highlights the positive influence on countries of 
origin of their diasporic communities. Diaspora may be external inputs for 
development, facilitating trade, investment, remittances, tourism, knowledge 
exchange, etc. Finally, the return channel underlies the development role of 
international migrants when they repatriate and bring their human, financial, and 
social capital, and innovative norms acquired from abroad. Those resources are of 
enormous importance to national development. 
In the large literature examining the impacts of international migration on 
sending and receiving societies, migration has been assumed to be exogenous. 
However, the nature of the linkages between migration and development is 
reciprocal, rather than unidirectional; thus migration is an endogenous variable (de 
Haas, 2010). Theoretical studies and empirical analyses of the determinants of 
migration have suggested that the development context, represented by such 
structural factors as economic performance, institutional quality, unemployment, 
taxes and social insurance/welfare, or income inequality, are important drivers of 
migration. More specifically, the development context acts as a pull and/or push 
factor shaping migration propensity and decisions. Moreover, the possibility of 
international migrants having effects on the development in their home countries, 
and the intensity of the development improvement effects, are plausibly dependent 
on the prevailing development context. Therefore, recent theoretical models 
explaining migration have incorporated endogenous migration to fully account for 
both the causes and consequences of migration (Bodvarsson et al., 2015).  
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Among the structural factors associated with the development context of a 
country, the importance of institutional quality in the migration and development 
nexus has recently drawn scholarly and policy attention as fundamental to 
economic growth and development prospects, and an important determinant of 
migration decisions. In general, institutions are rules influencing how the 
economy works, and the incentives that motivate people; and institutions, both 
economic and political, fundamentally cause differences in economic performance 
between countries (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). The 
nascent but rapidly growing body of literature on migration and institutional 
quality identifies three main research questions: (i) do institutions shape migration 
decisions?; (ii) do international migrants contribute to institutional development in 
their countries of origin?; and (iii) do international migrants generate negative 
effects on institutional quality in their countries of destination?  
In responding to the first research question, researchers have empirically 
shown that good institutions may act as pull factors attracting migrants, while on 
the contrary, bad institutions may act as push factors triggering emigration 
incentives (Borjas, 1989; Rowlands, 1999; Karemera et al., 2000; Vogler and 
Rotte, 2000; Bertocchi and Strozzi, 2008; Ashby, 2010; Hatton and Williamson, 
2011; Ariu et al., 2016; Cooray and Schneider, 2016). The implications of these 
findings are that favourable institutions are essential for building and sustaining 
human resources for development and are important to both developed and 
developing countries. Empirical literature addressing the second research question 
has found evidence that international migration to institutionally advanced 
countries induces a positive effect on institutional development in home countries 
(Ammassari, 2004; Spilimbergo, 2009; Batista and Vicente, 2011; Pfutze, 2012; 
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Beine and Sekkat, 2013; Chauvet and Mercier, 2014; Docquier et al., 2016; Li et 
al., 2016; Barsbai et al., 2017). There are various channels through which 
international migration can improve home-country institutions, including the 
transfer of political norms, voting from abroad, financial remittances, return 
migration, and lobbying activities from abroad (Lodigiani, 2016). With respect to 
migrant-receiving countries, the apprehension natives have about the potentially 
negative impact of migrants on their well-being, fiscal health, and public security 
has generated considerable public and political scepticism about immigration. 
Therefore, answering the third research question has also been an ongoing 
concern of researchers and policy makers. Nonetheless, evidence of significant 
adverse effects of immigration on host-country economic and political institutions 
has not been found (Baudassé et al., 2018). 
Drawn from these strands of literature, it is obvious that international 
migration and institutional quality interact and ultimately demonstrate a 
bidirectional causality that is intrinsic to the migration and development nexus. 
International migration is an endogenous predictor of institutional quality in 
countries of origin due to the fact that migration may itself change over time 
under the influence of domestic and/or foreign institutional quality. This two-way 
relationship challenges empirical estimations of the influence of international 
migration on institutional quality. In addition, attempts to establish the causal 
relationship between international migration and institutional quality have also 
been impeded by problems of unobserved country-specific differences affecting 
both variables, and the self-selection attribute of international migrants along a 
wide range of dimensions, especially education. For instance, since high-skilled 
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migrants are more sensitive to bad quality of institutions (Olesen, 2002), they may 
self-select to migrate to countries with better institutional quality.  
To mitigate biased estimations of the influence of international migration on 
the quality of institutions caused by these problems, researchers have been 
employing external and/or internal instrumental variables. Conventional external 
instrumental variables are natural shocks, migration costs, and historical events, 
which are strongly correlated with the endogenous migration variable, but may be 
assumed to be uncorrelated with variation in institutional quality due to 
unobservable factors; internal instrumental variables are lagged values or time 
differences of the migration variable (see e.g. Docquier et al., 2016; Lodigiani, 
2016). Although instrumental variable methods have been widely used to tackle 
endogeneity, they have come under criticism for possible violations of the 
exogeneity and relevance conditions. Researchers have developed strategies to 
avoid invalid instruments and methods to cope with weak instruments (see 
Murray, 2006 for a review). The recent work of Conley et al. (2012) provides 
researchers with strategies to check the robustness of the instrumental variable 
estimates when violations of the exclusion restriction are allowed for. However, 
another challenge to the application of instrumental variable methods for 
identifying casual effects is that the instrumental variable estimates are, though 
consistent, not unbiased, especially when samples are small (Becker, 2016). 
Lee (1966) advanced the push – pull theory, which has been the foundation 
for incorporating structural factors pertaining to societies, such as development 
context, economic performance, institutions, policy regime, etc., in analysing 
migration decisions. However, it was not until the 2000s that institutions became 
salient to research on the spatial mobility of people. The interconnections between 
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international migration and institutional quality have been recognized as a novel 
research agenda, documented by a growing number of empirical studies in recent 
years. However, international migration is characterized by heterogeneous 
composition of migrant stocks, its disproportional distribution across regions and 
countries, and multi-faceted patterns in terms of multiple moves during a 
migratory life course. Therefore, this is also a challenging research agenda that 
urgently needs more theory-guided empirical studies (Rüland et al., 2009).  
The extant literature on institutions as determinants of migration decisions is 
limited to emigration as a single move. Nevertheless, migration is a dynamic 
phenomenon, and the temporariness of international migration has been observed 
around the world. The OECD (2008) estimated that roughly 20 to 50 per cent of 
long-term immigrants left the host country within five years after arrival, either to 
return home or to move to a different country; and the OECD (2017) recognized 
increasing temporary migration as a main migration trend in OECD countries. 
Various patterns, such as onward, circular, multiple, and transit migration, have 
been evolving as integral parts of the emergent trend. Researchers have been 
inspired to conduct empirical studies on the causes and consequences of these 
contemporary migration patterns and to suggest policy implications for both home 
and host countries to govern migration flows for development. So far, the efforts 
put into examining the role of institutional quality in onward migration patterns, 
and in particular return migration, have been hampered by the unavailability of 
appropriate data. Moreover, the temporariness of migration decisions marks a 
distinction between permanent and temporary migrants in terms of their 
motivations, and thereby triggers heterogeneity in migrants‟ behaviour and 
choices (Dustmann and Görlach, 2016). Hence, the growing extent of temporary 
8 
 
migration also necessitates further research into the impacts of international 
migrants on home-country institutions. However, the temporariness of migration 
has not been, to date, taken into account when establishing the institutional effects 
of international migrants on their home countries. 
1.2 Objectives and Research Questions 
The central objective of this thesis is to empirically examine the two-way 
relationship between international migration and institutional quality at the 
country and cross-country levels. Being inspired by the salience of institutional 
quality to migration decisions and the urgent need for empirical evidence that 
explains onward migration patterns, this thesis investigates the role of institutional 
quality in return migration decisions and return migration intentions. Being 
motivated by the necessity of elaborating the potential impact of temporary 
migration on institutional quality in home countries, this thesis also estimates the 
development effects of international migration on home-country institutional 
quality at the cross-country level, while taking into account the temporariness of 
migration. Furthermore, given that institutional quality is salient to migration 
decisions, this thesis also pioneers in quantifying the monetary value of migrants‟ 
intensity of preference for institutional quality improvement in their home country. 
Return migration is a type of migration pattern where migrants move back 
to their home countries. Two types of return migrants can be distinguished: forced, 
and voluntary. Forced returnees include migrants who have been denied further 
stay in the intended destination country; voluntary returnees, by contrast, 
encompass migrants who have a valid right to remain in the destination country, 
but choose to repatriate by their own volition (World Bank, 2017). Whereas 
forced return migration can be challenging for both home and host countries, 
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voluntary return migrants are often seen as development agents who bring their 
leveraged human, economic, and social capital, and import new norms and 
practices from institutionally developed countries when they repatriate (Pérez-
Armendáriz and Crow, 2010; Wahba, 2014, 2015a, 2015b; Hausmann and 
Nedelkoska, 2018). For many developing countries, voluntary return migration of 
their diasporas from developed countries has been recognized as a powerful 
external development factor. For that reason, extending the literature on what 
shapes voluntary return migration to promote repatriation for development is 
important, especially to developing countries characterized by large diasporas. 
This thesis elucidates the role of institutional quality in return migration by 
focusing on Viet Nam, which has been a migrant sending country with a 
considerable and heterogeneous international migrant stock living worldwide. 
Emigration from Viet Nam has been common for a long time. The vast majority 
of the Vietnamese diaspora left Viet Nam during the second half of the twentieth 
century as a result of war, conflict and revolution. After the end of the Second 
World War, Viet Nam was beset with continuous wars for over thirty years. The 
cross-border movements of Vietnamese people in those days were characterized 
by the mass exodus of refugees who fled the wars and their aftermath. Since the 
mid-1980s, the nature of Vietnamese migration has changed due to decades of 
economic reforms. Recent outflows of Vietnamese migrants are socially, 
politically and economically driven. Nowadays, the composition of Vietnamese 
emigrants is mostly guest workers, students, and migrant brides. Moreover, the 
era of globalization, along with technological advances in transportation and 
communication, has made transnational mobility of people easier and cheaper 
than ever. Consequently, the Vietnamese diaspora keeps expanding in terms of 
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quantity and spatial coverage. There were roughly 2.7 million Vietnamese 
international migrants living worldwide in 2017 (United Nations, 2017b), and 
Viet Nam, which has a 2018 population of about 95 million, is in the top 25 
countries in terms of the number of emigrants (Ratha et al., 2016). There has been 
an increase of roughly 17 per cent in the stock of Vietnamese migrants between 
2010 and 2013. Notably, according to the OECD, around 1.7 million Vietnamese 
migrants were residing in OECD countries in 2015. Viet Nam‟s international 
migration offers an interesting case study and empirical evidence of the impact of 
return migration to Viet Nam is still scarce. 
This thesis sheds new light on the two-way relationship between international 
migration and institutional quality by addressing the following five research 
questions. First, does institutional quality in the home country matter for 
return migration decisions? To address this question, a study was conducted to 
investigate the link between local institutional quality in the home country and 
locational choices of international return migrants. Using secondary data on 
locational choices of Vietnamese returnees to regions of Viet Nam in 2014, this 
study examines the impacts of institutional quality of regional destinations in Viet 
Nam on the locational choices of Vietnamese migrants when registering for 
permanent residency back in Viet Nam. Binary and multinomial analyses reveal 
that both individual-specific and region-specific variables are significantly related to 
these migration decisions. This study enriches the literature by showing that home-
country institutional quality at the local level has a statistically significant role in the 
decisions of return migrants, and also by illustrating the norm spill-over effect in 
these decisions, i.e. variation in host-country institutional quality also matters for 
the return migrants‟ locational choices upon return in their home country. 
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Second, does institutional quality in the home country matter for return 
migration intentions? To answer this research question, an empirical study was 
undertaken to investigate the importance of institutional quality in the home 
country to the return migration intentions of international migrants. This study 
blends institutional quality as a significant macro-level factor that drives 
migration decisions with the micro-level factors identified in the integration and 
transnationalism theoretical framework explaining the determinants of return 
intentions. Based on survey data of Vietnamese migrants living in OECD 
countries collected in 2016,1 logistic regression results suggest that the perception 
of institutional quality in Viet Nam does matter for Vietnamese migrants‟ 
willingness to repatriate. In other words, those migrants who attach greater 
importance to institutional quality in Viet Nam are less likely to intend to return 
than other Vietnamese migrants. 
Third, given the findings of the two preceding studies that institutional 
quality in the home country is important to migrants when they considering 
or deciding repatriation, what are migrants willing to pay for better home 
country institutions? A study applying the contingent valuation method to the 
return migration channel was designed to estimate the compensating variation, 
which is the most Vietnamese migrants living in New Zealand would be willing to 
pay for an improvement in institutional quality in Viet Nam. 2  The contingent 
valuation method is a survey technique that helps to reveal the economic trade-off 
a person would make concerning the value of non-marketed goods or services 
                                                   
1 This study was granted Ethical Approval for Research by the Waikato Management School 
Ethics Committee. A copy of the Ethical Approval and the questionnaire for Vietnamese migrants 
living in OECD countries are attached in the Thesis Appendix. 
2 This study was granted Ethical Approval for Research by the Waikato Management School 
Ethics Committee. A copy of the Ethical Approval and the questionnaire for Vietnamese migrants 
living in New Zealand are attached in the Thesis Appendix. 
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(Carson, 2012; Kling et al., 2012). Institutions in essence are intangible and only 
observable indirectly. Due to an increased recognition of the importance of 
institutions to national economic performance and individual decisions, in 
particular migration, researchers have developed numerous measures, either as a 
single index or as a set of indicators, to quantify the quality of institutions. 
Nonetheless, attempts to measure the monetary value of institutional quality are 
still absent. Based on compensating differentials, the willingness to pay for, or the 
implicit monetary value of, an improvement in institutional quality in Viet Nam is 
estimated. The estimated willingness to pay is, on average, NZD 79.80 per week 
(approximately 33 per cent of the average weekly wage in Viet Nam for the same 
period) for a one-unit improvement in institutional quality in Viet Nam, 
benchmarked against institutional quality in New Zealand as per the respondents‟ 
perception of the institutional quality gap between the two countries. The 
estimated willingness to pay is positively associated with the respondents‟ age and 
the importance that they place on institutional quality in Viet Nam when 
considering repatriation. 
Fourth, does international migration to developed host countries have a 
positive impact on institutional quality in home countries? To answer this 
question, a study using panel data was carried out to identify the relationship 
between institutional quality in home countries, measured as different indices, and 
immigrant stocks living in selected OECD countries. Immigrant stocks calculated 
from the Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) are used to 
measure the size of international migration to developed countries. The results of 
cross-sectional and panel analyses, using an instrumental variable to deal with the 
endogenous migration variable, attest to the positive impact of international 
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migration on institutional quality in home countries. This finding supports the 
argument that international migrants are agents of transnational norm diffusion. 
Since the norm-diffusion effects of international migration are more likely to be 
contingent on variations in host-country institutional quality, this study also 
attempts to test this hypothesis by means of two strategies. The first strategy 
develops a modified measure of the immigrant stocks, which is quality-weighted 
by the institutional quality of the selected OECD host countries, and then 
compares the institutional effect size of the simple immigrant stock measure with 
that of the modified one. The second strategy establishes two sub-samples: (1) 
immigrant stocks living in higher-institutional-quality countries; and (2) those 
living in lower-institutional-quality countries. The institutional effect sizes of the 
immigrant stocks related to the sub-samples are then compared. The second 
strategy provides evidence that having international migration to higher-
institutional-quality host countries has a stronger impact on home-country 
institutional quality. 
Fifth and finally, does the impact of international migration on 
institutional quality in home countries differ by migrants’ duration-of-stay in 
host countries? This research question addresses the concern about the 
heterogeneity in the home-country institutional effect of international migration 
caused by the distinction between temporary and permanent migration. 
Temporary migrants are more likely to have a shorter duration-of-stay in host 
countries, and those migrants with shorter duration-of-stay are more likely to 
maintain stronger links with their home countries. Consequently, immigrant 
stocks characterized by a shorter duration-of-stay might be expected to have a 
stronger impact on institutional quality in home countries than immigrant stocks 
14 
 
with longer durations-of-stay. The study examining the causal relationship of 
international migration on home-country institutional quality tests this hypothesis 
to answer the fifth and final question. By contrasting the institutional effect of 
immigrant stocks characterized by shorter duration-of-stay with that of immigrant 
stocks characterized by longer duration-of-stay, the study finds that immigrant 
stocks with shorter duration-of-stay demonstrate a stronger norm diffusion effect. 
1.3 Significance of the Thesis 
This thesis is a compilation of four interrelated studies endeavouring to shed 
new light on various aspects of the two-way relationship between international 
migration and institutional quality, in particular home-country institutions. Each 
study looks at a specific aspect of the two-way relationship of interest in light of 
the global surge of temporary migration. Although temporary migration has 
gained increased attention, this rapidly growing phenomenon has been 
understudied. Therefore, this thesis is timely and significant in several ways. 
First, this thesis extends investigation of the role of institutions in migration 
to the most important type of onward migration, i.e. return migration. While 
empirical evidence for the role of institutions in return migration is limited, this 
thesis provides novel studies pinpointing that home-country institutional quality 
does matter for the decisions of return migrants and the repatriation intentions of 
international migrants. Good institutions act as pull factors attracting return 
migrants, while weak institutions act as push factors for migration and thereby 
also discourage repatriation. These findings point to the importance of home 
country governments working towards greater institutional quality, if they wish to 
encourage a larger number of diaspora to return home. 
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Second, this thesis further illustrates the norm diffusion effects of 
international migration through the return and diaspora channels. With respect to 
the return channel, the novelty of the thesis arises by showing that the norm 
diffusion effects are reflected in the locational choices of return migrants upon 
returning to the home country, reinforcing previous evidence on the norm 
diffusion effects that has been found in the voting behaviour of returnees (e.g. 
Batista and Vicente, 2011). In particular, return migrants from institutionally 
developed host countries are more likely choose a destination with better local 
institutional quality in the home country. In regard to the diaspora channel, the 
novelty comes from blending the norm spill-over effects revealed from the 
locational choices of return migrants with the test for the norm diffusion effects of 
international migrants living in developed host countries on institutional quality in 
home countries. The attempt to account for the distribution of migrants in host 
countries characterized by varied institutional quality in estimating the causal 
relationship of international migration on home-country institutions is an 
extension to the extant literature. 
Third, this thesis also investigates the transmission of host-country 
institutional values to home countries in view of the argument that permanent and 
temporary migrants are different in terms of motivations, behaviours, and choices. 
Given that temporary migrants are characterized by shorter duration-of-stay and 
that duration-of-stay is plausibly an indicator of the strength of interaction with 
home countries, this thesis is among the first studies considering the duration-of-
stay of migrants in host countries in assessing the intensity of norm diffusion 
effects through the diaspora channel. Theoretically, whether migrants with shorter 
duration-of-stay or those with longer duration-of-stay have stronger institutional 
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transmission effects is contested. Based on the argument of assimilation theorists 
that deep integration in destination countries blurs homeland ties, migrants with 
longer duration-of-stay would be expected to be less able to transmit host-country 
norms and practice to home countries, whereas those with shorter duration-of-stay 
would be more able to do so through their strong homeland linkages. However, 
transnationalism and social network theorists argue that integration depth 
consolidates homeland linkages. Accordingly, migrants with shorter duration-of-
stay who are less embedded in destination countries would be less able to generate 
the transmission effects. Consequently, the difference in transmission effects 
between temporary and permanent migrants is an empirical matter. This thesis 
provides novel evidence that migrants with shorter duration-of-stay have stronger 
institutional transmission effects. This finding is interesting in the contemporary 
context of surging temporary migration, and helpful to policy makers of both 
home and host countries in designing migration-guiding policies for development. 
Fourth, this thesis endeavours to undertake an unprecedented exercise to 
measure the monetary value of institutional quality by means of the contingent 
valuation method. The novelty not only comes from the pioneering idea of 
quantifying institutional quality in units of money, rather than as conventional 
indices, but also from the initiative of applying the contingent valuation method to 
measure international migrants‟ intensity of preference for institutional quality, 
given that the quality of institutions is important to their migration decisions. These 
efforts per se are not just to come up with a number, but creatively underscore the 
importance of institutions to migrants by showing that migrants are willing to trade-
off part of their regular income for better institutional quality back home. 
Furthermore, these efforts provide practitioners of the contingent valuation method 
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with evidence of the potential for widening the scope of contingent valuation 
method applications. 
Fifth and finally, this thesis introduces interesting case studies unfolding 
aspects of return migration in Viet Nam, a topic which has been left rather 
untouched so far. These studies are expected to trigger further scholarly and 
policy attention to migration in Viet Nam. More importantly, the significant 
findings based on return migration in Viet Nam emphasize the indispensability of 
institutional reforms to attract external development factors and nurture a 
favourable context for the contribution of these factors.  
1.4 Thesis Outline 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a 
comprehensive review of the importance of political and economic institutions to 
the migration decisions of international migrants. The chapter begins by 
synthesising the main definitions and typologies of institutions and describing 
various measures of institutional quality conventionally used in studies of 
migration. This is followed by two sections successively discussing the theoretical 
and empirical literature on institutions as determinants of international migration. 
This review documents that political and economic institutions are significant 
push and pull factors that shape the migration decisions of international migrants. 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 follow to further illustrate and shed fresh light on key 
aspects of the strands of literature reviewed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 examines the 
role of local institutional quality in the home country as a pull factor affecting the 
locational choices of Vietnamese return migrants. Chapter 4 extends the 
investigation of the role of institutional quality in migration to the return 
intentions of international migrants with an empirical analysis of the return 
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intentions of Vietnamese migrants living in OECD countries. Chapter 5 measures 
the willingness to pay for an improvement in institutional quality in Viet Nam, 
elicited by the contingent valuation method based on survey data of Vietnamese 
migrants living in New Zealand. 
Chapter 6 identifies the influence of immigrant stocks in OECD countries 
on institutional quality in home countries. The chapter begins with a succinct 
review on the extant literature establishing the causal relationship between 
international migration and institutional quality in countries of origin. The main 
empirical studies at the micro and macro levels are highlighted to illustrate key 
aspects of this strand of literature. Cross-sectional and panel analyses follow to 
assess the diffusion of advanced institutions from developed host countries to 
home countries through the international migration channel. 
Chapter 7 is devoted to retrospect and prospect. This chapter summarizes 
the key findings and contributions of the thesis, and concludes with a discussion 
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Chapter 2: The Importance of Political and Economic Institutions to the 
Decisions of International Migrants3 
2.1 Introduction 
The global prevalence of international migration has generated a wide range 
of impacts, positively and negatively, on every pair of recipient and source 
countries. Therefore, encouraging and conducting research to understand 
thoroughly what shapes international migration decisions has been a key objective 
of researchers, policymakers, and politicians in the effort to govern migration 
flows to meet specific concerns of both receiving and sending countries. 
Economists have suggested a wide range of determinants of migration, including 
economic, demographic, and institutional factors. Especially, the importance of 
political and economic institutions has been recently underscored not only as 
being fundamental to economic growth and development prospects, but also as a 
rigorous driver of the spatial movement decisions of people.  
The attention paid to the quality of institutions as a factor that matters for 
decisions regarding migration was already rooted in the push – pull theory of Lee 
(1966). However, it was not until the 2000s that the interplay between institutional 
quality and migration became a separate research agenda, attracting the interest of 
academia. In recent years, researchers have empirically shown that countries with 
good institutional quality may be more attractive to immigrants, i.e. the pull 
mechanism is at play in those countries. On the other hand, countries with bad 
institutions are more likely to generate incentives for emigration, i.e. the push 
                                                   
3 This chapter is currently under review:  
Tran, N. T. M., Cameron, M. P., & Poot, J. (forthcoming). The Importance of Political and 
Economic Institutions to the Decisions of International Migrants. In K. Kourtit, K. B. Newbold, P. 
Nijkamp, & M. Partridge (Eds.), The Handbook on the Economic Geography of Cross-Border 
Migration. Springer Verlag. 
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mechanism is at play in those countries. The lesson learnt from these findings is 
that favourable economic institutions and sound political institutions are essential 
for building and sustaining human resources for economic growth and 
development. This is important to both developed and developing countries. For 
developing countries, institutional reforms are clearly essential to stem brain drain 
and encourage return migration for development. 
Although interest in this research area has been growing and the extant 
contributions of researchers are already helpful to formulate migration-assisted 
development policies, our understanding of the role of institutions in migration 
decisions is still limited. In the current chapter, we review the extant literature on 
institutions as determinants of migration decisions of international migrants and 
suggest some areas for future research to widen and deepen our knowledge in this 
research area. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 
assembles important definitions and typologies of institutions and describes 
different measures of institutional quality conventionally used in studies of 
international migration. Section 2.3 reviews the theoretical literature on 
institutions as determinants of international migration. Section 2.4 reviews the 
empirical literature on the importance of political and economic institutions to 
international migration decisions. Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 Institutions – Definition, Classification, and Measurement 
Economists are among scholars of a wide array of social sciences, including 
geography, philosophy, politics, and sociology, who integrate institutional 
analysis into their academic disciplines. Veblen (1919, p. 239), a founder of 
institutional economics, defined institutions as “settled habits of thought common 
to the generality of men”. According to North (1990, p. 3), the most influential 
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author of the new institutional approach to economics, “Institutions are the rules 
of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction”. He also emphasized that the implications of 
institutions encompass political, economic and social interactions.  
North (1991) classified institutions into formal rules and informal 
constraints. The former type includes constitutions, laws, and property rights; the 
latter comprises sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct. 
Subsequent discussions on institutions have offered distinctions between agent-
sensitive and agent-insensitive institutions (Hodgson, 2006), or between 
coordinating devices and regulating conflicts institutions (Vatn, 2006). Rodrik and 
Subramanian (2003) suggested, in a study on institutional quality as a „deep 
determinant‟ of income, four types of institutions called market-creating, market-
regulating, market-stabilizing, and market-legitimizing institutions. When 
studying the relationship between institutions and long-run economic growth, 
Acemoglu et al. (2005) distinguished between economic and political institutions. 
Economic institutions refer to property rights and market structure, which are of 
significant importance to the economic performance of and resource distribution 
within an economy. Political institutions are made up of political constraints and 
political incentives, such as the form of government and the extent of constraints 
on politicians. Political institutions, by means of generating institutional political 
power, determine economic institutions. Baudassé et al. (2018) synthesized a two-
level typology of institutions. The first level extends the typology of Acemoglu et 
al. (2005) to also include social institutions, which at the second level can be 
either formal or informal. The additional social institutions in this typology 
resemble the market-legitimizing institutions proposed by Rodrik and 
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Subramanian (2003), namely those that provide social protection, insurance, and 
redistribution. 
Although the concept of institutions is of pivotal importance to the 
institutional approach, institutions in essence are ambiguous with respect to 
definition and classification, and only observable indirectly. Hence, numerous 
measures, either as a single index or as a set of indicators, have been developed to 
quantify the quality of the various types of institutions. In this section, we 
describe some conventional measures employed by authors who have investigated 
the interconnection between institutions and migration.  
The quality of political institutions may be captured by the conditions of 
political and civil rights, political regimes, political stability, governance quality, 
and corruption prevalence. The conditions of political and civil rights have been 
assessed and reported by Freedom House in the Freedom in the World report,4 
where a country or territory is rated on two dimensions –political rights and civil 
liberties – by a rating running from one (the most free) to seven (the least free). 
Based on the average ratings of the two dimensions, Freedom House classifies each 
country or territory into three categories of freedom status: Free; Partly Free; or Not 
Free. The Polity IV Project5  provides a database of cross-country indicators of 
democratic and autocratic patterns of authority and regime changes. The most 
commonly used variable in the database is the Revised Combined Polity Score that 
ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). The Database of 
Political Institutions (Keefer and Stasavage, 2003) is a source of indicators that has 
been widely used in comparative studies on political economy and political 
institutions. This database covers institutional and electoral results data for roughly 





180 countries. Political stability is gauged by the political risk rating available in the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database.6 The ICRG assesses political 
stability across countries and produces a political risk rating. Risk points and 
weights assigned to political risk components are such that higher points 
representing lower risk, namely better conditions. The political risk components 
include government stability, socio-economic conditions, investment profile, 
internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, military influence in politics, 
religious tensions, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and 
bureaucracy quality. Governance quality is quantified by the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI), which was developed by Kaufmann et al. (1999) to 
reflect six broad dimensions of governance at the country level, namely: Voice and 
Accountability; Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism; Government 
Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; and Control of Corruption. Each 
indicator is measured in units of a standard normal distribution running from 
approximately -2.5 to 2.5, and in percentile rank terms ranging from zero to 100, 
with higher values corresponding to better governance. Corruption is also a proxy 
for the quality of political institutions and governance (see e.g. Rowlands, 1999; 
Ahmed, 2013). Corruption indices are available in the WGI dataset, the ICRG 
database, and the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) reports. The CPI reported by 
Transparency International7 has been widely credited as a measure that reflects the 
views of people in a country on its level of public sector corruption. While the 
ICRG corruption index ranges from a scale of zero (high corruption) to six (low 
corruption), the CPI runs from a scale of zero (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). 





 Economic freedom has been a conventional proxy for economic 
institutions. The Economic Freedom of the World index (EFW) compiled by the 
Fraser Institute 8  is one of the most influential and widely used measures of 
economic freedom. The EFW quantifies the consistency of a country‟s institutions 
and policies with economic freedom in five major areas, including size of 
government, legal system and security of property rights, sound money, freedom 
to trade internationally, and regulation. This index is placed on a scale from zero 
to ten, with higher scores representing a higher degree of freedom. The Index of 
Economic Freedom (IEF) by the Heritage Foundation9 has been recognized as an 
innovative barometer of economic freedom in 186 countries. The IEF covers 12 
constituent areas, which are grouped into four broad pillars: rule of law (property 
rights, government integrity, judicial effectiveness); government size (government 
spending, tax burden, fiscal health); regulatory efficiency (business freedom, 
labour freedom, monetary freedom); and open markets (trade freedom, investment 
freedom, financial freedom). Each component is graded on a scale from zero to 
100, with higher scores also corresponding to a higher degree of freedom. 
 From the preceding, we conclude that the quality of political and economic 
institutions is a complex concept and that there have been many initiatives to 
capture the quality of institutions by means of a range of, sometimes partially 
overlapping, indicators. In the following section, we review why and how 
institutions matter for migration decisions. We also discuss the indicators of 
institutional quality that have been used to empirically verify the relationship 
between migration and institutions. 





2.3 Theories of Institutions as Determinants of International Migration 
Economic analyses of the motivations for international (and internal) 
migration have been mostly developed within the framework of migration as 
human capital investment instituted by Larry A. Sjaastad (1962). Decision makers 
in the classic model of Sjaastad are rational in that they act in order to maximize 
utility and, given that more income yields greater utility, are driven by spatial 
differences in wages. Although the model remains fundamental to modern 
economic theories of migration, it oversimplifies the migration process by 
focusing narrowly on pecuniary factors related to the labour market as the sole 
determinants of migration. Hence researchers have been refining and extending 
this early basic model, by incorporating inter alia the quality of political 
institutions as a predictor of migration decisions in the static human capital model 
of international migration. The idea of accounting for contextual factors 
pertaining to pairs of the origin and destination countries in explaining migration 
flows stems from the push – pull theory of Lee (1966). In terms of economic 
modelling of international migration, the role of institutions was first documented 
in the study of Borjas (1989), who attributed the non-random selection of 
immigrants to economic and political conditions. 
Migration in the static human capital model is determined by exogenous 
wages and other factors, such as the economic costs of migration, immigration 
policy, self-selection, income inequality, credit and poverty constraints, 
unemployment, taxes and social insurance, and political institutions (see 
Bodvarsson et al., 2015 for a survey). To capture the effect of institutions, Hatton 
and Williamson (2011) included compensating differentials or non-economic 
costs of migration, representing the non-economic preference of a potential 
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migrant for the origin country. If institutional quality in the origin country is 
worse than that in the destination country, the compensating differential in the 
destination country could be negative, thereby increasing the utility of migration. 
Isolating the influence of wages, economic costs, and institutions, migration 
decisions depend on the utility gained from the after tax wage increase 
(purchasing power corrected) in the destination country compared with the origin 
country, net of economic costs of migration and preference for non-pecuniary 
attributes that include amenities and the quality of institutions. 
In the static human capital model, potential migrants are assumed to make 
only one permanent migration decision. However, migration is a process, rather 
than a single decision, and has a temporal dimension. More specifically, migrants 
may repeatedly engage in re-emigration to another country or return migration to 
their home country. Therefore, migration is more appropriately analysed in a 
dynamic framework. Within the dynamic framework, researchers have suggested 
various individualistic motivations for return migration, which can be 
distinguished into four main views: (i) return as failure, i.e. a corrective move 
after outcomes were not as anticipated; (ii) preference for consumption in the 
home country, that can be satisfied by post-migration accumulated wealth; (iii) 
achieving savings goals in the host country and returning home to invest; and (iv) 
human capital accumulation in the host country (see e.g. Cassarino, 2004; OECD, 
2008 for surveys). However, return migration decisions are unlikely to be 
exclusively driven by these individualistic motivations, independent of the 
contextual conditions, i.e. the social, economic, and institutional factors in the 
host and home countries. The structural approach to return migration emphasizes 
the contextual forces that act as pull and/or push factors influencing return 
33 
 
decisions. As argued by Cerase (1974), economic forces that push migrants to 
return, as well as the problems they face re-adapting to the home country, are 
crucial in explaining repatriation. Gmelch (1980) underscored the stronger effect 
of pull factors in the home country relative to push factors in the host country on 
return decisions. Contextual factors in the home country provide signals that allow 
prospective returnees to predict their post-repatriation future and such factors will 
therefore guide return decisions. Dustmann and Görlach (2016) accentuated the 
importance of home country circumstances in the economic modelling of 
temporary migration. They suggested that home country circumstances shape 
return plans, and thereby alter the behaviours of migrants in the host country. 
Thus, the quality of economic and political institutions, along with other 
circumstances in the host and home countries, can be expected to affect the 
migration decisions of return migrants. 
2.4 Empirical Review on Institutions as Determinants of International 
Migration 
2.4.1 Political Institutions 
As discussed previously, there are various measures that can be used as 
proxies for political institutions. This abundance provides flexibility to researchers 
in choosing the measures that best fit their research objectives and conceptual 
framework. Bergh et al. (2015) and Ariu et al. (2016) employed various indicators 
of governance to capture the quality of political institutions. Bergh et al. (2015) 
argued that institutional quality, rather than income levels, is the appropriate 
proxy for push and pull factors influencing migration. To support their argument, 
they fitted a gravity model where the dependent variable was the bilateral 
migration flows between 192 country pairs for the period 1990-2010, and the 
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independent variables of interest were the six governance indicators from the WGI 
dataset. Their analysis revealed that institutional quality in the home country, 
conditional on poverty levels, affects migration as a push factor. Notably, for most 
of the WGI dimensions, the push effect of bad institutions in the home country is 
greater than the pull effect of good institutions in the host country. 
Ariu et al. (2016) studied the effect of governance in both the home and host 
countries on the net and gross flows of migrants by education levels, in 195 
countries observed between 1999 and 2000. In their study, governance was 
indexed by the six individual WGI dimensions and by the standardized first 
principal component generated from Principal Component Analysis of the six 
dimensions. Net flows of migrants were simply the differences between inflows 
and outflows. Their random utility model analysis showed that better governance 
had a significant positive influence on the net flows of high-skilled migrants. To 
identify the push and/or pull effects, the authors examined the impact of 
governance in the sending and receiving countries on the gross flows of migrants 
separately, and found that the push and pull effects were simultaneously at play. 
High-skilled migrants were more likely to be steered away from countries with 
worse governance and pulled towards those with better governance. However, 
with respect to low-skilled migrants, while the push effect still matters for them, 
the pull effect was statistically insignificant. This finding is consistent with the 
main findings of Bergh et al. (2015). 
Instead of looking at all the dimensions of governance, some researchers 
have been specifically interested in corruption as a strong signal of defective 
governance, or more generally of bad political institutions in home countries. 
Although researchers have suggested different insights into the link between 
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corruption and migration, they have generally agree that corruption is a push 
factor that lowers the net present value of living in the home country relative to 
the host country. Rowlands (1999) argued that governance affects migration 
directly by facilitating or restricting the ability to emigrate through administrative 
formalities, and indirectly by altering the incentives to leave. His 1990 cross-
sectional analysis examined the emigration rate from 58 low and middle-income 
countries to a range of wealthier countries. He employed the corruption index that 
originated from the ICRG database as a narrow measure of governance, and the 
civil rights index by Freedom House to represent a wider concept of governance. 
These indices were included in the cross-sectional regressions, separately and 
simultaneously. The estimations using the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator 
suggested that corruption had a significantly negative influence on emigration. 
This may seem surprising, but the estimated net effect is dependent on the relative 
strength of the direct and indirect effects. When corruption is a prevalent problem, 
the direct effect that restricts emigration outweighs the indirect effect that 
encourages exit. As a result, the emigration rate increases in association with 
improvement in governance. This result was robust to the inclusion of the civil 
rights index. However, in both cases the relationship between the emigration rate 
and institutional quality was nonlinear. 
Dimant et al. (2013) argued that corruption tends to erode the returns to 
education by decelerating economic growth, aggravating unemployment, 
deepening inequality, and hindering social advancement. They hypothesized that 
corruption is a strong push factor that particularly matters for skilled migrants. 
They tested their hypothesis by examining the impact of corruption, measured by 
the corruption index from the ICRG database, on the migration rate for 111 
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countries between 1985 and 2000. They found that corruption had a significantly 
positive effect on skilled migration, and the effect was robust to the choice 
between the pooled OLS and fixed-effects estimators. According to Poprawe 
(2015), corruption is a push factor of migration because it is associated with 
worsening economic conditions, spreading insecurity, and lowering quality of life. 
Their results, estimated from a gravity equation using a dataset of bilateral 
migration stocks for 230 countries in 2000, suggested that corruption, primarily 
measured by the CPI, encouraged emigration and discouraged immigration. These 
results remained robust to alternative measures of corruption. Cooray and 
Schneider (2016) investigated a dataset on emigration rates covering 20 OECD 
host countries by 115 home countries between 1995 and 2000. Their panel 
analysis established that corruption, measured by the CPI or the indices from the 
WGI dataset and the ICRG database, was associated with higher levels of 
emigration. While the effect was linear for highly educated migrants, the 
emigration rate of individuals with medium and low levels of education increased 
when corruption was less of a problem and started to decrease beyond a threshold. 
Other papers underline the importance of political and civil rights, political 
regimes, and political stability in migration decisions. Solimano (2005) regressed 
the net migration rate of Argentina for the whole twentieth century on the 
democratic and autocratic patterns of authority in receiving countries. The 
regression results provided evidence that migrants are not attracted to host 
countries with totalitarian regimes. Bertocchi and Strozzi (2008) studied the 
determinants of the immigration rate in 14 developed countries for the 1870-1910 
period, with special attention paid to the role of the political environment, i.e. 
political institutions and migration policies. To gauge the quality of political 
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institutions, they used two indicators, including the index of democracy from the 
Polity IV database and the index of suffrage, measured as the fraction of 
registered voters in the total population. The coefficients associated with these 
indices were both significantly positive, revealing that better quality of political 
institutions acts as a pull factor. 
Hatton and Williamson (2011) estimated the impact of political institutions 
in the source country on the emigration rate to the United States from 62 source 
countries in the 1970s. They employed the indicators by Freedom House, and the 
authoritarian index and years of political transition from the Polity IV database, to 
capture the quality of political institutions and political stability. Two out of these 
three proxies had statistically significant effects. Countries with a higher degree of 
freedom in terms of civil rights had less emigration. Political transitions, i.e. less 
political stability, encouraged emigration. Dutta and Roy (2011) asked whether 
political stability, indexed by different political risk indicators from the ICRG 
database, matters for migration. Using the dataset on the emigration rate for 
skilled workers from 118 home countries to six OECD countries between 1895 
and 2003, they found that political instability exerted a push effect on the skilled 
labour force. More specifically, greater political risk, reflected by worsening 
government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, democratic 
accountability, internal conflict, and ethnic tensions, increases emigration. 
Finally, Karemera et al. (2000) and Vogler and Rotte (2000) are two studies 
that used the political rights and the civil liberties indices by Freedom House as 
their preferred measures of political institutions. The former studied the role of 
domestic political, economic, and social factors on the propensity to migrate to 
Canada and the United States from 70 home countries during from the period 
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1976 to 1986. The latter investigated migration to Germany from 86 Asian and 
African countries from 1981 to 1995. Both studies concluded that restricted 
freedom in the home country hinders migration, or putting it differently, more 
freedom facilitates migration. 
2.4.2 Economic Institutions 
A smaller number of papers have focused on the role that economic 
institutions play in guiding migration. Melkumian (2009) developed a gravity 
model to include contextual characteristics of pairs of source and destination 
countries, with special focus given to economic freedom in the source country. 
The IEF was used to gauge the degree of economic freedom. The empirical results, 
based on a balanced panel of data on stocks of the foreign-born in the United 
States from 101 source countries from 1996 to 2000, showed that the lower the 
degree of economic freedom in the source country, the higher the migration to the 
United States. Accordingly, they concluded that bad economic institutions in the 
source country play a role as push factors for international migration. 
Ashby (2010) and Nejad and Young (2016) considered both economic and 
political institutions. These authors used the EFW index to measure economic 
institutions. In the former study, political institutions were indexed by the average 
of the political rights and civil rights scores from Freedom House, whereas the 
latter employed the index from the Polity IV database and the checks and balances 
from the Database of Political Institutions. Both studies concluded that increases 
in relative economic freedom were appealing to migrants, with relative economic 
freedom defined as a ratio of economic freedom in each pair of source and 
destination countries. While the effect of economic institutions was robust, the 
effect of political institutions was more mixed. Using migration stocks across 58 
39 
 
countries in 2005, Ashby (2010) found that political freedom was only 
significantly positive when economic freedom and income were excluded from 
the specification. Surprisingly, the effect of political freedom became significantly 
negative when he analysed the panel data of migration flows to OECD countries 
from 58 countries of origin between 2001 and 2006. Based on a larger sample of 
net migration flows to OECD and non-OECD countries over the 1990–2000 
period, Nejad and Young (2016) also found that the significant impact of political 
freedom was not robust once economic freedom was controlled for. 
2.5 Conclusions 
The gap in institutional quality between countries is substantial and mostly 
persistent. It diverts migration flows departing from countries with weak 
institutions toward countries with favourable economic institutions and stable 
political institutions. In other words, economic and political institutions are 
significant push and pull factors that shape the migration decisions of 
international migrants. Principally, good institutions are attractive to immigrants; 
bad institutions, especially corruption, increase the incentives to emigrate when 
allowed to do so. Contributions of scholars in this area suggest an important 
policy implication that institutional improvement is an effective tool for the 
governance of migration flows to assist economic growth and development. 
Enhancing institutional quality is particularly important in developing countries, 
where institutions are presently still inadequate, because it may prevent further 
brain drain and encourage return migration for development. 
Moreover, conclusions on the role of institutions in migration decisions 
have to date mostly been drawn from investigating legal migration. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that the significant effect of political institutions is empirically less 
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robust than that of economic institutions when simultaneously accounting for the 
two types of institutions. We expect that the role of political institutions might be 
underestimated when irregular migrants and asylum seekers are ignored. Future 
work should account for undocumented migration to unfold further the potentially 
important role of political institutions. 
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Chapter 3: Local Institutional Quality and Return Migration: Evidence from 
Viet Nam10 
3.1 Introduction 
Migration is a complex and often repeated process. During an international 
migrant‟s life course, there can be re-migration to another destination country or 
return migration to the country of birth, and migration sequences can be repeated 
several times (OECD, 2008).11 The movement of emigrants back to their home 
countries can be either temporary or permanent but return migration typically 
refers to migrants who return home to settle permanently. 
The quality of political, economic, and other institutions is recognized as 
one of the many determinants of migration decisions (Borjas, 1989; Rowlands, 
1999; Karemera et al., 2000; Vogler and Rotte, 2000; Bertocchi and Strozzi, 2008; 
Ashby, 2010; Hatton and Williamson, 2011; Ariu et al., 2016; Cooray and 
Schneider, 2016). On the other hand, there is also evidence of potential impacts of 
international migration on the institutional quality of the home country 
(Ammassari, 2004; Spilimbergo, 2009; Batista and Vicente, 2011; Pfutze, 2012; 
Beine and Sekkat, 2013; Chauvet and Mercier, 2014; Docquier et al., 2016; Li et 
al., 2016; Barsbai et al., 2017). 
Despite its potential importance, the role of institutional quality in return 
migration has not been properly assessed at the level of individual migrants‟ 
decisions. Work done so far in this research domain has been mostly at the macro 
level, which provides average generalized results across countries. However, when 
                                                   
10 This chapter is published as: 
Tran, N. T. M., Cameron, M. P., & Poot, J. (2018). Local Institutional Quality and Return 
Migration: Evidence from Viet Nam. International Migration. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12451 
11 The host country and the home country are interpreted from the viewpoint of a migrant who is 
making a return decision. The host country is where a return migrant comes from. The home 
country is where a return migrant goes to, and is also the country where they were born. 
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making migration decisions, migrants must also consider specific locations at which 
to reside in the chosen destination country, and take local conditions into account. 
Hence, the question arises whether local institutional quality in the home country 
affects locational choices of return migrants. In the extant literature, evidence that 
addresses this question is limited. Although regional or provincial indicators of 
institutional quality are available in many countries, these have been under-utilized 
in analysing migration decisions. In this article, we therefore endeavour to enrich 
the migration literature by investigating the role of local institutional quality in 
migration decisions, specifically in the case of return migration. 
In net migration terms, Viet Nam is a sending country that offers a case 
study of particular interest given its considerable international migrant stock 
living worldwide and the heterogeneous composition of emigration flows. 
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam (2012), there were 
roughly 4 million Vietnamese migrants and their descendants living in more than 
100 host countries in 2012.12 However, empirical evidence on return migration to 
Viet Nam is still sparse. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no previous 
analysis that sheds light on the sub-national locational choice decisions of 
Vietnamese return migrants. Therefore, our article provides the first empirical 
evidence of the linkage between local institutional quality in the home country 
and the locational choices of Vietnamese return migrants. In the extant literature, 
good institutional quality is known as a „pull‟ factor for migration (Bertocchi and 
Strozzi, 2008; Poprawe, 2015; Ariu et al., 2016; Nejad and Young, 2016) and our 
findings derived from a Conditional Logit Model are consistent with the a priori 
perception of the attractor role of institutional quality in migration decisions. We 
                                                   




find that regions with better local institutional quality are indeed more likely to 
attract return migrants. 
Naturally, migrants are heterogeneous in terms of their demographic 
attributes, education level, income, motivation for initial migration, duration of 
living abroad and migration experience, all of which might affect return migrants‟ 
locational choice in the home country. Additionally, such factors may also interact 
with the extent to which return migrants value institutional quality. Initially, we 
include age, gender and institutional quality in logistic regression models as 
determinants of the locational choices. We find significant evidence that older and 
male returnees are more likely to locate away from the big central city (Ho Chi 
Minh City). 
Migrants at different stages of their life course might return to their country of 
birth for different purposes. Depending on the motivation to return, they might 
place different weights on the contextual conditions in their home country. We find 
that local institutional quality in the home country matters more for younger 
returnees, who are more likely to return for motivations other than retirement. 
Additionally, living abroad can expose migrants to good institutional quality in 
developed host countries. The process of integration may affect migrants‟ 
perceptions of good institutional quality, and this might be reflected in their 
expectation for the region of residency after returning to the home country. As we 
would expect, migration experience acquired in host countries with a high degree of 
freedom steers the returnees to regions characterized by relatively good institutional 
quality. Whereas having lived in a democratic host country has already been 
shown to have a positive impact on the likelihood of returnees participating in 
elections (Batista and Vicente, 2011; Pfutze, 2012; Chauvet and Mercier, 2014; 
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Barsbai et al., 2017), we show that migration experience also matters for the 
extent to which return migrants take institutional quality in the home country at 
the local level into account in their locational choices. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the 
role of institutions in migration decisions. Section 3.3 presents the methods used 
to investigate the links between local institutional quality and return migrants‟ 
locational choice. Section 3.4 describes the data. Section 3.5 reports the results of 
our analysis and Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 The Salience of Institutions in Migration Decisions 
The classic theoretical model of migration developed by Sjaastad (1962) 
mainly focuses on economic incentives as the sole determinants of migration 
decisions. Migration theorists have also suggested a variety of non-economic 
motivations for the spatial movement of people, such as amenities, kinship, 
migration networks, taxes, welfare, immigration policies, institutions, etc. (see e.g. 
Bodvarsson et al., 2015 for a recent survey). The importance of individual 
perceptions of contextual factors in explaining the currents of human mobility has 
been embodied in migration theory since the early 1960s. Initiated by the push-
pull model of Lee (1966), this strand of literature examines inherent factors in 
receiving and sending places that might affect the volume of migration between 
the two places. Each place is characterized by push factors that constitute 
incentives to leave, pull factors that attract and retain migrants, and neutral factors. 
Decision makers are thought to take into account push and pull factors pertaining 
to pairs of places when engaging in spatial movement. In recent years, institutions 
have been included as major factors that act as both push and pull forces. 
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Douglass C. North (1991, p. 97) defined institutions as “the humanly 
devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They 
consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and 
codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights).” 
Authors of the institutionalist approach have developed different typologies of 
institutions that are not limited to the traditional distinction between formal and 
informal institutions as mentioned in North‟s definition. Combining the typologies 
established by Rodrik and Subramanian (2003) and Acemoglu et al. (2005), 
Baudassé et al. (2018) suggested a two-level typology. The first level 
distinguishes between political, economic and social institutions, which at the 
second level can be either formal or informal.  
An emerging body of literature underlines the role of institutions, with 
abundant empirical evidence showing that institutions of various types explain 
migration decisions. Since institutions are not observed, a wide range of measures 
have been developed to capture institutional quality. Political institutions may be 
measured by indices of political freedom, civil liberties, political stability, 
totalitarianism, or governance. Economic freedom and corruption indices are 
conventional proxies for economic institutions. 
The extant empirical works are mostly econometric studies investigating 
the impacts of various institutions at the national level on migration measured as 
either stock or flows of migrants to explore the pull and/or push mechanism(s) at 
play. Better institutions in host countries appeal to immigrants (Bertocchi and 
Strozzi, 2008; Poprawe, 2015; Ariu et al., 2016; Nejad and Young, 2016). Worse 
institutions in home countries foster emigration pressure (Rowlands, 1999; Dutta 
and Roy, 2011; Ariu et al., 2016), but may also deter the exit possibility of 
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potential migrants through constraints imposed on political and civil freedoms 
(Karemera et al., 2000). More specifically, skilled migrants appear to be more 
sensitive than unskilled migrants to the prevalence of corruption, a significant 
push factor (Dimant et al., 2013; Cooray and Schneider, 2016). By contrast, better 
institutions in home countries are considered to have the opposite effect on the 
volume of emigration, by simultaneously reducing incentives to exit and 
loosening restrictions on the migration of residents (Rowlands, 1999; Vogler and 
Rotte, 2000).  
At the local level, institutions are known for their key roles in shaping 
socio-economic development (Charron et al., 2014), economic performance 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo, 2015), or innovative capacity (Rodríguez-Pose 
and Di Cataldo, 2015). A recent study by Ketterer and Rodríguez-Pose (2015), 
which is of relevance for the current article in terms of investigating the role of 
local institutional quality in migration decisions, employed a new sub-national 
data set of institutional quality to estimate the impact of local government quality 
on the regional attractiveness for migrants of 254 European regions. Their panel 
analysis posited that local institutional quality matters for attracting immigrants to 
European regions.  
Institutional quality clearly matters for migration decisions, but the question 
of whether it matters for return migration specifically remains under-researched. 
The extant literature on the determinants of return migration identifies four main 
theories: (i) return as failure; (ii) preference for home consumption; (iii) achieving 
savings goals and returning to invest; and (iv) human capital accumulation (OECD, 
2008). The dominant arguments of these theories that underpin the motivations for 
return migration centre on the success versus failure experience, which solely 
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embraces individual decisions of the returnees themselves without accounting for 
individual perceptions of contextual conditions. While there is evidence that 
institutions matter for emigrants, they also matter for return migrants. If individuals 
choose to emigrate in part because they are disappointed with the institutional 
quality in their home countries, an appropriate improvement in institutional quality 
back home may induce them to return. Furthermore, institutions in home countries 
are important to the re-integration process of return migrants, especially for those 
migrants who are at the early stages of their life course and return with capital 
acquired from abroad. As argued by Cerase (1974), apart from individualistic 
motivations for repatriation, it is crucial to understand the economic forces that push 
migrants to return as well as the problems they will face to re-adapt in the home 
country. Gmelch (1980) claimed that pull factors in home countries have more 
influence on return decisions than push factors in host countries. However, there has 
to date been insufficient research that considers the association between local 
institutional quality and return migration. By bridging this gap, our article not only 
provides a novel contribution to the literature on the link between institutional 
quality and migration, especially return migration, but also accentuates the salience 
of institutions as a driving force for international migration. 
3.3 Research Method 
This article examines the impacts of individual attributes of Vietnamese 
return migrants and characteristics of regional destinations in Viet Nam on the 
locational choices of Vietnamese returnees by applying binary and multinomial 
regression models. The locational choices of Vietnamese migrants who returned 
in 2014 to the south central and the south regions of Viet Nam are used as the 
dependent variable in our models.  
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First, a logistic regression model is fitted to identify the impacts of 
individual-specific variables on the choices of returning to Ho Chi Minh City (the 
largest city in Viet Nam) versus somewhere else in the south central or south of 
Viet Nam. In most countries, migrants are disproportionally drawn to the largest 
city, which tends to have the best international connectivity as well as the largest 
labour market. The model can be written as: 
  
    
      (1) 
where 
  
    
 is the odds ratio in favour of choosing a destination other than Ho Chi 
Minh City for return migrant i, Xi is a vector of individual-specific variables (age, 
gender and institutional quality of the host country), and   is a vector of 
coefficients to be estimated. Taking the natural logarithm of Equation (1), we 
obtain the log odds ratio, which is a linear function of the migrant‟s characteristics: 
  (
  
    
)      (2) 
By estimating Equation (2), we aim to determine what makes a migrant choose a 
destination other than Ho Chi Minh City. 
Second, as a robustness check, we re-examine the impacts of individual-
specific variables using a Multinomial Logit Model (MLM), with locational 
choices based on four geographical regions – South Central Coast, Central 
Highlands, South East Region, and Mekong River Delta – with Ho Chi Minh City 
again as the “default” choice. Technically, Ho Chi Minh City is a part of the 
South East Region. However, more than 40 per cent of the return migrants 
selected Ho Chi Minh City as their destination. There is no doubt that Ho Chi 
Minh City should be treated as an important alternative for the returnees to choose 
against other regions. The MLM can be written as: 
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∑             
 (3) 
where     is the probability that return migrant i chooses region j. In order to 
estimate the probability of choosing a particular region, Ho Chi Minh City is again 
chosen as the base region. The model can alternatively be expressed as the log of 
odds ratios for the odds of each region versus the base region: 
  (
   
   
)          (4) 
Third, we fitted a Conditional Logit Model (CLM) to additionally examine 
the impacts of region-specific variables, including local institutional quality. We 
fit the CLM with the five regions defined for the MLM described above. The 
CLM can be written as: 
    
       
∑            
 (5) 
where     is the probability that return migrant i chooses region j and Zij contains 
values of region-specific independent variables (local institutional quality, 
population size, physical distance to Ho Chi Minh City) that determine the 
probability migrant i chooses destination j (as in the logistic and MLM models, 
the actual observation for any individual is simply “1” if a particular destination 
has been selected, and “0” otherwise). Local institutional quality is the key 
variable of interest. Additionally, population size and physical distance to Ho Chi 
Minh City enter the model, as suggested by the gravity model of migration. 
Analogous to Newton‟s gravitational force concept, Zipf (1946) hypothesized that 
the migration volume between pairs of communities is positively related to the 
product of the two communities‟ population sizes and negatively related to the 
distance between the origin and destination communities. The population sizes 
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represent the opportunities faced by potential migrants, while distance is used as a 
proxy for migration costs. These two variables have also been employed as key 
indicators of agglomeration that potentially have influence on the locational 
choices of decision makers (see e.g. Ciccone and Hall, 1996; De Groot et al., 
2016). Zipf‟s idea inspired the later empirical work of other migration researchers 
(see e.g. Poot et al., 2016 for a recent review). As a result, the extended gravity 
model nowadays includes other variables representing socio-economic, political, 
cultural, and demographic characteristics of both the origin and destination 
communities (Karemera et al., 2000; Clark et al., 2007; Lewer and Van den Berg, 
2008; Morettini et al., 2012; Fitzgerald et al., 2014; Cameron, 2018). Basically, 
migration flows between pairs of countries are inversely related to the socio-
economic, political, and cultural distances between countries. 
The CLM can alternatively be expressed as the log of odds ratios for the 
odds of region j versus region k: 
  (
   
   
)             (6) 
In this case,   represents a vector of coefficients that demonstrates the effects of 
region-specific variables on the log of odds-ratios for the odds of selecting region 
j versus region k. Furthermore, we endeavour to demonstrate the link between 
individual attributes and regional characteristics through the use of two interaction 
terms in Equation (6), i.e. through defining          in which    is a 
characteristic of individual i and    is a characteristic of destination j. The first 
interaction term is between age and local institutional quality. Migrants at 
different states of their working lives are known to have different motivations for 
return and, therefore, the impacts of region-specific factors – local institutional 
quality in particular – in the home country on locational choices upon return are 
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expected to be age dependent. The second interaction term is between institutional 
quality in the host country and local institutional quality in the home country. This 
idea emerges from the gravity theory, suggesting that the migration flow from 
country o to country d is impaired not only by physical distance but also by socio-
economic, political or cultural distance. This interaction term is employed to 
capture this non-physical distance. Accordingly, migrants from a host country 
with higher institutional quality are expected to be more likely to choose a region 
upon return that has higher local institutional quality. Therefore, our a priori 
expectation is that this interaction should have a positive sign. 
Finally, we consider both sets of independent variables (individual-level and 
region-level) simultaneously by incorporating individual-specific variables in the 
CLM to create a Mixed Logit Model (MXL). Since the effect of age is captured in 
the first interaction term, we only control for gender by interacting this individual-
specific variable with regional dummies excluding the base region (Ho Chi Minh 
City), and incorporating these interaction terms in the CLM. We use the MXL 
mainly as a robustness check, in terms of consistency with the results derived 
from other specifications. 
3.4 Data 
To return permanently to Viet Nam, Vietnamese migrants have to apply for 
permanent residency. Records of Vietnamese returnees who have been granted the 
right of permanent residence are kept at relevant government authorities, such as 
Vietnamese Diplomatic Missions, Viet Nam Immigration Department and 
Overseas Vietnamese Committees. Data on the locational choices of Vietnamese 
return migrants used in the current article were obtained from the database of 
Vietnamese return migrants assembled by the Overseas Vietnamese Committee of 
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Ho Chi Minh City. This data set records information on date of birth, gender, host 
country and provincial destination choices of 654 Vietnamese migrants who 
returned to provinces and cities in the south central and the south of Viet Nam in 
2014. The availability of host country information in the data set, which is 
unavailable in other national data sources such as Census or the Viet Nam 
Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS), allows us to analyse the role of 
institutional quality in the returnees‟ former host countries. We remove some 
outliers from our analysis, such as returnees whose ages were recorded as being 
over 100 at the time of their return. We also remove those who were under age 18, 
because they were unlikely to have been the decision-maker in the migration 
decision. This leaves a sample of 628 Vietnamese returnees. A statistical 
summary across regions is presented in Table 3.1. Nearly 87 per cent of the 
Vietnamese returnees chose Ho Chi Minh City, the rest of the South East Region, 
or the Mekong River Delta to reside upon return, whereas the South Central Coast 
and the Central Highlands attracted just 13 per cent of the returnees. 











Non-Ho Chi Minh City 61.27 356 56.69 56.69 
 South Central Coast 64.72 67 10.67 10.67 
 Central Highlands 69.53 15 2.39 13.06 
 South East Region 59.52 61 9.71 22.77 
 Mekong River Delta 60.10 213 33.92 56.69 
Ho Chi Minh City 59.02 272 43.31 100.00 
Total 60.30 628 100.00 100.00 
 
Individual-specific independent variables in the data set include age, gender, 
and institutional quality in the host country. Age is calculated based on the reported 
date of birth. This variable appears in the models in natural logarithm (lnage). The 
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mean age of Vietnamese returnees in the sample at the time of their return was 
roughly 60 years. Gender (gender) is a dummy variable taking the value of one if a 
return migrant is male, and zero otherwise. In regards to host country institutional 
quality, we employ the following five indicators reported by Freedom House, the 
Fraser Institute, and the POLITY IV project, as alternative measures at the national 
level. The first indicator is the freedom status (freedom_host) of a country. This 
information is acquired from the Freedom in the World annual report on political 
rights and civil liberties by Freedom House,13 where each country is classified into 
three categories: free, partly free, or not free. Freedom status enters our analysis as a 
dummy variable taking the value of one if a country‟s freedom status is “free”, and 
zero otherwise. The next two indicators are the global political rights index (pr_host) 
and civil liberties index (cl_host); both also from the report published by Freedom 
House. In these measures, each country is rated by a score that ranges from one (the 
most free) to seven (the least free). This score is reverse coded for convenience in 
interpreting the results (with a higher value of each indicator corresponding to 
higher institutional quality). The fourth indicator is the Economic Freedom of the 
World Index (efw_host) calculated by the Fraser Institute.14 This annual index is 
comprised of factors that make a country economically free, and is scored out of ten, 
with higher scores indicating a higher degree of freedom. The last indicator is the 
combined polity score (polity2_host) from the POLITY IV project, computed by 
subtracting the Institutionalized Democracy score from the Institutionalized 
Autocracy score to come up with a unified polity scale that ranges from +10 
(strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). 15  Table 3.4 in the Chapter 
Appendix provides summary statistics for these measures. Most of the returnees in 






our sample were from developed host countries with relatively high institutional 
quality. 
Region-specific independent variables encompass regional institutional 
quality, regional population, and physical distance to Ho Chi Minh City (summary 
statistics are provided in Table 3.5 in the Chapter Appendix). Regional 
institutional quality is proxied by the population-weighted average of the 
Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI – labelled pci).16 This index, which has 
been published annually since 2005 by the Viet Nam Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (VCCI) with the support of the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), measures the economic governance of provincial 
authorities in Viet Nam in creating a favourable business environment for the 
private sector (Malesky, 2013). PCI is constructed as the weighted mean of ten 
sub-indices, including: (1) entry costs; (2) land access and security of tenure ; (3) 
transparency and access to information; (4) time costs and regulatory compliance; 
(5) informal charges; (6) policy bias; (7) proactivity of provincial leadership; (8) 
business support services; (9) labour and training; and (10) legal institutions. Each 
sub-index is built using business survey data (60 per cent) and published 
secondary data (40 per cent). PCI is a composite index scored out of 100, with 
higher scores representing a better quality of local economic institutions. Better 
local economic institutions might signal a positive local development future that 
matters for the locational choices of decision makers. Moreover, although 
institutions of various types have been identified as predictors of migration 
decisions, the significant influence of economic institutions appears to be more 
robust than that of political institutions (Ashby, 2010; Nejad and Young, 2016). 
                                                   
16 http://orgeng.pcivietnam.vn/ 




Consequently, PCI is a valid proxy for local institutional quality in Viet Nam that 
fits the intention of our article. 
Figure 3.1 maps the PCI scores of all provinces in Viet Nam. Some patterns 
in the south central and the south areas of Viet Nam are apparent. Although no 
province reached the threshold denoting excellent performance, not a single 
province was in the „mid-low‟ or „low‟ categories. Most of the high performers 
are located in the south central and the south areas. Nine out of 17 provinces in 
the Mekong Delta, which may be considered the most “dynamic” region, have the 
highest institutional quality. Meanwhile, there was no province in the „high‟ 
category found in the Central Highlands. PCI scores vary locally since provinces 
and cities in Viet Nam are heterogeneous in terms of economic, demographic and 
geographic factors. Those factors have been identified as determinants of 
institutional quality (Alesina et al., 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004; Acemoglu et al., 
2008; Spilimbergo, 2009; Docquier et al., 2016). 
As a robustness check, the Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public 
Administration Performance Index (PAPI – labelled papi) 17  is used as an 
alternative measure to PCI. PAPI captures the quality of provincial governance by 
means of six dimensions, including: (1) participation; (2) transparency; (3) 
vertical accountability; (4) control of corruption; (5) public administrative 
procedures; and (6) public services. This index is constructed from data obtained 
through surveys and in-depth interviews. PCI and PAPI are the only two indices 
measuring local institutional quality in Viet Nam, but the former is more popular 
for its longer establishment and wider coverage of the performance of provincial 
governments.  




Figure 3.1: PCI Ranking of Provinces in Viet Nam, 2012 
 
Notes: PCI score for each tier: Excellent: PCI score ≥ 65; High: 60 ≤ PCI score 
< 65; Mid-high: 53 ≤ PCI score <60; Average: 51 ≤ PCI score < 53; Mid-low: 
45 ≤ PCI score < 51; Low: PCI score < 45. 




Regional population (lnpop) is the natural logarithm of total provincial 
population in each region, measured in thousands of people, assembled from the 
database of the General Statistics Office of Viet Nam (GSO). 18  Inter-regional 
distance is defined as the population-weighted average of distance measured in 
kilometres of road travel from each region to Ho Chi Minh City, obtained from 
Google Maps. Because the value of distance associated with Ho Chi Minh City to 
itself is zero, this variable enters the models as the natural logarithm of one plus 
the distance (lndistance). 
It is worth noting that Vietnamese migrants who decided to return 
permanently to Viet Nam have to first complete a permanent resident registration 
formality that takes a couple of years. Consequently, all the independent variables 
capturing the national and regional characteristics used in this article contain 2012 
data (i.e. data that would have been available or potentially known to the return 
migrants at the time of their decision to migrate in 2014). 
Finally, some limitations are worth noting. The data set is not nationwide, 
and is limited to a single year of data from return migrants in 2014. Other personal 
information, such as education level, income, ethnicity, birthplace, migration 
history and duration of stay in the host country, which could potentially contribute 
to the explanation of the return decisions of Vietnamese return migrants, are not 
available in the data set. These limitations are due to the unavailability of 
systematic migration data in Viet Nam, especially data on return migration. In 
regard to the measure of local institutional quality, it is acknowledged that PCI 
estimation is subject to measurement and sampling errors, despite being the most 
popular sub-national governance index in Viet Nam. 




3.5 Results and Discussion 
3.5.1 Logit and Multinomial Logit Models with Individual-specific Variables 
Table 3.2 displays the estimates corresponding to Equation (2), i.e. the 
logistic regression model. Each of the five regressions uses a different measure of 
host country institutional quality. The estimated coefficients for age are 
statistically significant in all models, suggesting that the locational choices of 
Vietnamese return migrants differ significantly by age. Since the values of the 
odds ratios associated with age are greater than one, holding other variables 
constant, an increase in age is associated with lower odds of returning to Ho Chi 
Minh City (and higher odds of returning to other regions). In other words, while 
younger migrants were more likely to choose Ho Chi Minh City to reside in upon 
return, older migrants were more likely to prefer other destinations. This outcome 
might result from the variation in return motivations between different generations 
of migrants. Returnees who are at a later stage of their working lives at the time of 
their return might be attracted to locationally-fixed features in their original home 
towns, where they probably enjoy living near their relatives and benefit from 
higher utility gained from local consumption. Thus, it is plausible that large urban 
centres are possibly not their priority. In contrast, younger migrants are more 
likely to return to invest their capital acquired abroad. Thus, they tend to choose 
locations where more opportunities are available for them to develop their 
potential, as is the case in Ho Chi Minh City. 
Likewise, we observe a significant difference between male and female 
migrants in their choices of return location. More specifically, all other things 
being equal, men were less likely to choose to return to Ho Chi Minh City than 
women. This result may be explained by the practice of ancestor worship in
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Table 3.2: Estimates for Logit Model with Individual-Specific Variables 
Alternative measures of institutional quality 











lnage 2.1108** 2.1113** 2.1525*** 2.0959** 2.1041** 
 (0.6199) (0.6198) (0.6348) (0.6184) (0.6179) 
      
gender 1.5728*** 1.5645*** 1.5783*** 1.5613*** 1.5705*** 
 (0.2635) (0.2618) (0.2643) (0.2607) (0.2626) 
      
Institutional quality in the host country 0.2543* 0.7998 0.8039 0.8284 0.9326 
 (0.2007) (0.1217) (0.1320) (0.2915) (0.0642) 
      
Log Likelihood -421.5439 -422.1802 -422.4763 -423.3078 -422.8866 
Notes: Factor change in odds of Non-Ho Chi Minh City versus Ho Chi Minh City. Exponentiated coefficients. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. N = 628. 






Vietnamese traditional culture. Almost every Vietnamese family has an altar to 
commemorate their ancestors and deceased family members. Beyond psychic 
beliefs, this is an important traditional value that strengthens the kinship among 
family members and relatives. Traditionally, men who are heads of families are 
responsible for taking care of ancestor worship. Therefore, it is understandable 
that Vietnamese male migrants (as well as older migrants) are more prone to 
returning to their original home towns where the worship practice takes place. 
Institutional quality in the host country has an odds ratio of less than one, 
which implies that Vietnamese migrants who returned from the host countries 
with a high degree of freedom status or with a high score of institutional quality 
were more likely to choose Ho Chi Minh City. However, this coefficient is only 
statistically significant for one of the five measures of host country institutional 
quality. This may result from the fact that a small sample size of around 600 is 
underpowered to identify any effect when there are not large cross-country 
variations in the measures of institutional quality of host countries. 
The estimates for Equation (4) are summarized in Table 3.6 in the Chapter 
Appendix. These results demonstrate that older return migrants prefer returning to 
the South Central Coast and Central Highlands regions over Ho Chi Minh City, 
while male migrants prefer the South East Region and the Mekong Delta. Host 
country institutional quality is only statistically significant for the South East 
Region, which explains the inconsistent results in Table 3.2. The differences in 
effects between regions suggest that region-specific variables are likely to be an 




3.5.2 Conditional Logit Models with Region-specific Variables 
Table 3.3 summarizes the results of the Conditional Logit Models with 
region-specific variables. Table 3.3 reports the results using freedom_host as the 
measure of host country institutional quality, while Tables 3.7 and 3.8 in the 
Chapter Appendix provide full details of the results obtained with the alternative 
measures of host country institutional quality. Column (1) of Table 3.3 presents 
the estimates for Equation (6). All of the coefficients are statistically significant, 
and the p-value of the log likelihood chi-square statistic indicates that our model 
fits the data well. The estimates reveal a positive link between local institutional 
quality in the home country and the locational choices of Vietnamese return 
migrants. More specifically, increasing the PCI score for any of the regions would 
increase the odds of returning to that region, holding the PCI scores of the other 
regions as well as other variables constant. This result provides convincing 
empirical support for the role of institutional quality at the local level as a „pull 
factor‟ for migration decisions. The direction of the effects of population and 
distance are consistent with the predictions from gravity models of migration. The 
larger the population size, the more inviting the region. The significant odds ratio 
of distance of less than one suggests that Vietnamese return migrants are less 
likely to choose to locate in a region the further it is from Ho Chi Minh City. 
In column (2) we report results that include interaction terms between local 
institutional quality and both age and institutional quality in the host country. The 
inclusion of these interaction terms not only reinforces the impacts of the key 
region-specific variables, but also reveals some interesting insights about these 
impacts. First, the significant odds ratio on the interaction term between PCI and 
age shows that the higher the age, the less positive the effect of PCI on the   
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Table 3.3: Estimates for Conditional Logit Model with Region-Specific 














pci 1.2878*** 5.2278*** 6.0562*** 
 (0.1232) (3.0369) (3.7543)  
lnpop 2.6670*** 2.4282*** 2.8523**  
 (0.7544) (0.6972) (1.4411)  
lndistance 0.8469*** 0.8662*** 0.8146**  
 (0.0450) (0.0472) (0.0783)  
[lnage]x[pci]  0.6652*** 0.6408*** 
  (0.0881) (0.0877)  
[freedom_host]x[pci]  1.3737* 1.4031*  
  (0.2416) (0.2464)  
[gender]x[South Central Coast]   1.9868**  
   (0.5462)  
[gender]x[Central Highlands]   2.2834  
   (1.3506)  
[gender]x[South East Region]   1.5465*  
   (0.3600)  
[gender]x[Mekong River Delta]   1.3828*  
   (0.2591)  
Log Likelihood -807.0541 -801.0016 -796.7043 
Notes:  Factor change in odds of region j versus region k. Exponentiated 
coefficients. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. N = 628.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
locational choices of returnees. Specifically, older migrants are less concerned 
about the local institutional quality than are younger migrants. This is probably 
because of differences in motivation for return migration between older and 
younger migrants, with older migrants returning to their home village for 
retirement, while younger migrants return to Ho Chi Minh City for investment 
purposes. Second, those who returned from a country with higher institutional 
quality were more likely to choose a region with a higher PCI score. This finding 
demonstrates the link between international migration and institutional quality in 
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the home country through the return channel. Specifically, migrants who have 
experienced higher quality institutions in the host country may be more likely to 
value higher quality institutions on their return to Viet Nam. 
Column (3) of Table 3.3 shows the results of the Mixed Logit Model fitted 
to include both individual-specific and region-specific variables. After controlling 
for gender, the estimates for the region-specific variables and the interaction terms 
remain consistent with those of the Conditional Logit Models in Columns (1) and 
(2). Moreover, the estimates for the interaction terms between gender and region 
dummies are also consistent with those of the Multinomial Logit Model in Table 
3.6 in the Chapter Appendix. 
The results obtained from different specifications discussed in this sub-
section are strongly robust across different measures of institutional quality in the 
host country (see Tables 3.7 and 3.8 in the Chapter Appendix). Importantly, the 
variable of interest – PCI – is positive and statistically significant unless we use 
efw_host as the indicator of host country institutional quality. Although the 
interaction term between PCI and institutional quality in the host country loses its 
significance when using measures of institutional quality other than freedom 
status, they are still consistent in terms of their direction. 
Tables 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11 in the Chapter Appendix report the results of the 
CLM and MLM models using PAPI as an alternative measure to PCI. These 
results are qualitatively similar to those using PCI in terms of sign. However, only 
the coefficient associated with PAPI obtained from the simplest CLM model in 
Column (1) of Table 3.9 is statistically significant. The less robust significant 
influence of local institutional quality measured by PAPI thereby reinforces our 




Earlier work has documented the role of institutional quality as a pull factor 
affecting the migration decisions of international migrants. This study is the first 
to extend this idea to the locational choices of return migrants. We use data on the 
locational choices of Vietnamese return migrants to investigate this issue. We 
found that younger and female returnees were more likely to choose to reside in 
Ho Chi Minh City rather than other regions, and that regions with better 
institutional quality attracted more returnees. In addition, the impact of local 
institutional quality on the locational choices of Vietnamese return migrants is 
related to their age and their migration experience. While local institutional 
quality has a significant role in return decisions of Vietnamese return migrants, 
younger returnees appear to be the most concerned about the institutional quality 
of the regions they were returning to.  
Most importantly, migrants from host countries with higher levels of 
institutional quality were more likely to choose to return to regions with higher 
local institutional quality. This finding not only reinforces the role of institutional 
quality as a determinant of migration decisions, but also contributes to the norm 
diffusion literature. Owing to the process of integration and assimilation, migrants 
are exposed to and adopt favourable attributes of institutional mechanisms in 
developed host countries, and they are expected to transfer their absorbed norms 
to the home country through inter alia the return channel (Batista and Vicente, 
2011; Pfutze, 2012; Chauvet and Mercier, 2014; Barsbai et al., 2017). Norm 
diffusion derived from migration can be observed at different levels. As mapped 
out by Rüland et al. (2009), there are three pathways of norm diffusion: changes 
of attitudes at the individual level; collective action; and institutional change at the 
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national and global levels. Our results provide convincing evidence of changes in 
attitudes at the individual level towards institutional quality reflected in the 
locational choices of Vietnamese return migrants upon returning to the home 
country. In particular, return migrants from host countries with higher institutional 
quality highly value local institutional quality. 
 Drawing from our findings, we observe a two-way relationship between 
migration and institutional quality. The locational choices of return migrants are 
shown to be dependent on local institutional quality. On the other hand, these 
choices intriguingly imply changes in return migrants‟ attitudes toward 
institutional quality. These attitudinal changes are of decisive importance in terms 
of underpinning the further potential of return migrants to act as norm remitting 
agents at higher levels that induce influences on institutional quality in the home 
country. 
Our findings also suggest that better local institutional quality may attract 
return migrants, who have high potential to contribute to regional development. In 
regard to policy implications, our results provide compelling evidence for 
policymakers in Viet Nam (and potentially other similar developing countries that 
have large diasporas and large numbers of return migrants) that improving local 
institutional quality is a significant measure for attracting potential resources, 
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics for Individual-Specific Independent Variables 
 Obs. Mean Median SD  Min Max Freq. Per cent Cum. 
Age 628 60.30 59.5 15.98 23 97    
Gender 628 0.61 1 0.49 0 1    
Male       386 61.46 61.46 
Female       242 38.54 100 
Freedom status in 
the host country 
628 0.98 1 1.23 0 1    
Free       617 98.25 98.25 
Not-free       11 1.75 100 
Global political 
rights index  
628 6.91 7 0.63 1 7    
Civil liberties index  628 6.90 7 0.55 2 7    
Economic Freedom 
of the World Index  
628 7.73 7.81 0.23 5.9 8.98    













Table 3.5: Summary Statistics for Region-Specific Independent Variables, 2012 








Ho Chi Minh 
City 
Regional population (1,000)  9,008.60 5,363.30 7,470.40 17,379.60 7,660.30 
 Average 
PCI score 58.67 54.12 57.77 60.46 61.19 
PAPI score 36.24 35.81 36.33 35.57 36.65 
Distance to Ho Chi Minh City (km)  604.75 394.60 95.12 185.35 0.00 
 Population-weighted average 
PCI score 58.91 54.77 58.94 60.53 61.19 
PAPI score 36.48 35.54 35.86 35.47 36.65 





Table 3.6: Estimates for Multinomial Logit Model with Alternative Measures of Institutional Quality in the Host Country 
Alternative measures of institutional quality  


























4.0327*** 4.0052*** 4.0944*** 3.9523** 3.9188** 
 (2.1537) (2.1376) (2.1926) (2.1200) (2.0891) 
gender 1.7621* 1.7427* 1.7589* 1.7326* 1.7363* 
 (0.5156) (0.5086) (0.5139) (0.5047) (0.5062) 
Institutional quality in the host country 0.1946 0.7792 0.7738 0.8189 0.9568 














18.3213** 18.3329** 17.0153** 20.8764** 15.8647** 
 (21.7318) (21.7360) (20.3056) (25.2842) (18.6688) 
gender 1.9010 1.9165 1.8753 1.9406 1.8705 
 (1.0918) (1.1008) (1.0784) (1.1165) (1.0760) 
Institutional quality in the host country 56323.1148 36762.8805 106953.5219 0.5011 345565.5866 















1.6396 1.6487 1.7319 1.7206 1.6409 
 (0.8680) (0.8727) (0.9201) (0.9182) (0.8695) 
gender 1.9764** 1.9484** 1.9932** 1.9316** 2.0056** 
 (0.6147) (0.6039) (0.6186) (0.5957) (0.6250) 
Institutional quality in the host country 0.0941*** 0.6582** 0.6230** 0.3513** 0.8414** 















1.6769 1.6788 1.6883 1.6323 1.6742 
 (0.5539) (0.5547) (0.5604) (0.5421) (0.5539) 
gender 1.4259* 1.4229* 1.4276* 1.4213* 1.4237* 
 (0.2692) (0.2686) (0.2698) (0.2682) (0.2687) 
Institutional quality in the host country 0.4774 0.8897 0.9203 1.2057 0.9777 
 (0.4389) (0.1594) (0.1828) (0.5091) (0.0842) 
Log Likelihood  -791.4577 -792.5059 -792.3775 -793.1693 -792.2402 
Notes: Factor change in odds of a certain region versus the base region (Ho Chi Minh City). Exponentiated coefficients. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. N=628. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 3.7: Estimates for Conditional Logit Model with Alternative Measures of Institutional Quality in the Host Country 
Alternative measures of institutional quality 











pci 5.2278*** 4.7741*** 4.6801** 1.6452 5.8116*** 
 (3.0369) (2.8700) (2.8970) (1.7422) (3.4096) 
lnpop 2.4282*** 2.4426*** 2.4498*** 2.4378*** 2.4640*** 
 (0.6972) (0.7003) (0.7019) (0.6988) (0.7052) 
lndistance 0.8662*** 0.8651*** 0.8645*** 0.8655*** 0.8633*** 
 (0.0472) (0.0470) (0.0469) (0.0470) (0.0468) 
[lnage]x[pci] 0.6652*** 0.6643*** 0.6623*** 0.6545*** 0.6681*** 
 (0.0881) (0.0882) (0.0881) (0.0879) (0.0886) 
[Institutional quality in the host country]x[pci] 1.3737* 1.0603 1.0652 1.2192 1.0186 
 (0.2416) (0.0409) (0.0508) (0.1582) (0.0201) 
Log Likelihood -801.0016 -801.3634 -801.5490 -801.2111 -801.9078 
Notes: Factor change in odds of region j versus region k. Exponentiated coefficients. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. N=628.  








Table 3.8: Estimates for Mixed Logit Model with Alternative Measures of Institutional Quality in the Host Country 
Alternative measures of institutional quality 











pci 6.0562*** 5.4458*** 5.2418**  1.8325  6.5664*** 
 (3.7543)  (3.4641)  (3.4008)  (1.9739)  (4.0897)  
lnpop 2.8523**  2.8992**  2.9065**  2.9179**  2.9289**  
 (1.4411)  (1.4610)  (1.4646)  (1.4684)  (1.4758)  
lndistance 0.8146**  0.8115**  0.8110**  0.8104**  0.8096**  
 (0.0783)  (0.0777)  (0.0777)  (0.0774)  (0.0775)  
[lnage ]x[pci] 0.6408*** 0.6414*** 0.6384*** 0.6331*** 0.6452*** 
 (0.0877)  (0.0878)  (0.0876)  (0.0875)  (0.0881)  
[Institutional quality in the host country]x[pci] 1.4031*  1.0635  1.0725  1.2242  1.0217  
 (0.2464)  (0.0411)  (0.0506)  (0.1593)  (0.0202)  
[gender]x[South Central Coast] 1.9868**  1.9829**  1.9949**  1.9819**  1.9893**  
 (0.5462)  (0.5452)  (0.5485)  (0.5450)  (0.5469)  
[gender]x[Central Highlands] 2.2834  2.2101  2.2398  2.1577  2.2134  
 (1.3506)  (1.2997)  (1.3191)  (1.2646)  (1.3051)  
[gender]x[South East Region] 1.5465*  1.5377*  1.5458*  1.5348*  1.5387*  
 (0.3600)  (0.3576)  (0.3597)  (0.3568)  (0.3578)  
[gender]x[Mekong River Delta] 1.3828*  1.3816*  1.3842*  1.3820*  1.3826*  
 (0.2591) (0.2589)  (0.2594)  (0.2590)  (0.2590)  
Log Likelihood -796.7043 -797.1431 -797.2490 -797.0362 -797.6582 
Notes: Factor change in odds of region j versus region k. Exponentiated coefficients. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. N=628. 





Table 3.9: Estimates for Conditional Logit and Mixed Logit Models Using PAPI as a Measure of Local Institutional Quality in Viet Nam 
 (1) 
Conditional Logit Model 
(2) 
Conditional Logit Model 
with Interactions 
(3) 
Mixed Logit Model 
papi 1.6018*** 4.4544    5.5962    
 (0.2482)    (5.3201)    (6.8939)    
lnpop 7.4120*** 7.4010*** 9.0126*** 
 (1.2635)    (1.2615)    (2.7768)    
lndistance 0.7748*** 0.7750*** 0.7381*** 
 (0.0180)    (0.0180)    (0.0294)    
[lnage]x[papi]  0.6987    0.6731    
  (0.1852)    (0.1802)    
[freedom_host]x[papi]  1.5556    1.5968    
  (0.8703)    (0.8958)    
[gender]x[South Central Coast]   1.6201*   
   (0.4657)    
[gender]x[Central Highlands]   1.6681    
   (0.7887)    
[gender]x[South East Region]   1.8754**  
   (0.4744)    
[gender]x[Mekong River Delta]   1.4257*   
   (0.2692)    
Log Likelihood -806.4509 -805.2675 -801.0330 
Notes: Factor change in odds of region j versus region k. Exponentiated coefficients. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. N = 628. 




Table 3.10: Estimates for Conditional Logit Model with Alternative Measures of Institutional Quality in the Host Country Using PAPI 
as a Measure of Local Institutional Quality in Viet Nam 
Alternative measures of institutional quality 











papi 4.4544    3.7915    4.3961    6.7769    5.1905    
 (5.3201)    (4.9752)    (5.9361)    (17.3376)    (6.1484)    
lnpop 7.4010*** 7.4013*** 7.4028*** 7.4040*** 7.4028*** 
 (1.2615)    (1.2615)    (1.2618)    (1.2620)    (1.2618)    
lndistance 0.7750*** 0.7750*** 0.7750*** 0.7750*** 0.7750*** 
 (0.0180)    (0.0180)    (0.0180)    (0.0180)    (0.0180)    
[lnage]x[papi] 0.6987    0.6972    0.6956    0.7064    0.6989    
 (0.1852)    (0.1850)    (0.1853)    (0.1886)    (0.1855)    
[Institutional quality in the host country]x[papi] 1.5556    1.0913    1.0698    0.9961    1.0291    
 (0.8703)    (0.1270)    (0.1432)    (0.3168)    (0.0585)    
Log Likelihood -805.2675 -805.2978 -805.4545 -805.5809 -805.4530 
Notes: Factor change in odds of region j versus region k. Exponentiated coefficients. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. N=628. 




Table 3.11: Estimates for Mixed Logit Model with Alternative Measures of Institutional Quality in the Host Country Using PAPI as a 
Measure of Local Institutional Quality in Viet Nam 
Alternative measures of institutional quality 











papi 5.5962 4.7927 5.2649 8.4908 6.4644 
 (6.8939) (6.4562) (7.2728) (21.9650) (7.8813) 
lnpop 9.0126*** 9.0140*** 9.0164*** 9.0194*** 9.0155*** 
 (2.7768) (2.7773) (2.7781) (2.7791) (2.7778) 
lndistance 0.7381*** 0.7381*** 0.7380*** 0.7380*** 0.7381*** 
 (0.0294) (0.0294) (0.0294) (0.0294) (0.0294) 
[lnage ]x[papi] 0.6731 0.6719 0.6685 0.6808 0.6725 
 (0.1802) (0.1801) (0.1799) (0.1835) (0.1804) 
[Institutional quality in the host country]x[papi] 1.5968 1.0939 1.0828 0.9992 1.0333 
 (0.8958) (0.1276) (0.1456) (0.3196) (0.0585) 
[gender]x[South Central Coast] 1.6201* 1.6197* 1.6206* 1.6196* 1.6203* 
 (0.4657) (0.4655) (0.4658) (0.4655) (0.4657) 
[gender]x[Central Highlands] 1.6681 1.6649 1.6707 1.6635 1.6692 
 (0.7887) (0.7872) (0.7900) (0.7865) (0.7892) 
[gender]x[South East Region] 1.8754** 1.8727** 1.8771** 1.8708** 1.8757** 
 (0.4744) (0.4737) (0.4749) (0.4732) (0.4745) 
[gender]x[Mekong River Delta] 1.4257* 1.4225* 1.4274* 1.4202* 1.4262* 
 (0.2692) (0.2685) (0.2696) (0.2679) (0.2693) 
Log Likelihood -801.0330 -801.0853 -801.2081 -801.3825 -801.2159 
Notes: Factor change in odds of region j versus region k. Exponentiated coefficients. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. N=628. 




Chapter 4: Return or Not Return? The Role of Home-country Institutional 
Quality in Vietnamese Migrants’ Return Intentions 19 
4.1 Introduction 
The debate on why some international migrants return to their home country 
has centred on the impact of migrants experiencing failure versus success in the 
host country (Cassarino, 2004). Advocates of the view that returnees are 
successful migrants emphasize their positive contributions to further development 
of the home country. On the other hand, those who believe that returnees have 
often experienced failure in the host country expect a less positive impact on 
home countries. In all cases, return migrants are known as development agents 
who bring with them human capital, financial capital, and advanced norms 
attained in the host country (Wahba, 2014). Therefore, promoting voluntary return 
migration for development has been a key objective of policy makers in 
developing countries characterized by large diaspora. 
In every voluntary return movement, return intentions and return decisions 
are inseparable (Caro et al., 2016). Albeit having a desire to return does not 
guarantee an ex post realization, voluntary return decisions are naturally grounded 
in return intentions. Theoretically, it has been argued that return intentions may 
signal that such migrants could positively affect the home country (Dustmann and 
Görlach, 2016). Empirically, return intentions are found to be associated with a 
higher probability to remit to, invest in, and participate in the political processes 
of the home country (Dustmann and Mestres, 2010; Wolff, 2015; Chabé-Ferret et 
                                                   
19 This chapter is currently under review: 
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al., 2016). Therefore, understanding what shapes migrants‟ return intentions is 
necessary in order to design well-targeted development policies that evoke, 
sustain, and materialize the willingness to return among migrants. However, while 
huge academic and political attention has already been paid to observed return 
migration (e.g. OECD, 2008), research on return intentions has to date been rather 
scattered and context-specific – predominantly due to a lack of appropriate data. 
Extant work examining the determinants of return intentions has been 
mainly developed within the integration and transnationalism theoretical 
framework. More specifically, in this framework the relative strength of 
attachment to the host country and engagement with the home country both matter 
for the return intentions of migrants, independent of individual heterogeneity 
(Carling and Pettersen, 2014). Notably, the return intentions of migrants vary 
across countries of origin (Alberts and Hazen, 2005; Carling and Pettersen, 2014; 
Caro et al., 2016), and migrants from less developed countries are more likely to 
have a lower propensity to return (Jensen and Pedersen, 2007). This variation is 
attributed to the macro-level context in the home country, which has long been 
argued to be fundamental to the re-adaptation process of returnees (Cerase, 1974). 
Notwithstanding this, empirical models examining what predicts return intentions 
are consistently inclusive of individual-specific variables, but often exclude 
macro-level factors. 
In recent years, literature has been emerging on institutional quality as a 
significant macro-level factor that drives migration decisions. Institutions affect 
the spatial movement of people in opposite directions, depending on whether a 
„pull‟ or „push‟ mechanism is at play. As migrants are assumed to be rational and 




away from countries with worse institutions (see Baudassé et al., 2018 for a recent 
review). Particularly, Cassarino (2004) argued that the development potential of 
return migration is contingent on the willingness and readiness of migrants to 
return home, which in turn depends on their perceptions of the institutional, 
economic, and political conditions in the home country. So far, there is to our 
knowledge no empirical evidence that links the theoretically discussed role of 
institutional quality to the self-reported return intentions of migrants.  
This paper aims to contribute to filling this literature gap by providing an 
empirical analysis of the return intentions of Vietnamese migrants living in OECD 
countries. We apply a logistic regression model including both micro-level and 
macro-level determinants of return intentions. Our novel contribution is the 
inclusion of the perceptions of Vietnamese migrants of institutional quality in Viet 
Nam as a determinant of return intentions. This extends the role of institutional 
quality in migration research to the under-exploited area of studying ex ante return 
decisions. The data used in this analysis were derived from a web-based survey 
that we conducted in OECD countries in 2016.  
Viet Nam is a net migrant sending country with a diaspora of roughly 2.7 
million people in 2017 (United Nations, 2017), and was ranked among the top ten 
remittance receiving countries in 2015 (Ratha et al., 2016). The Vietnamese 
diasporic community has been asserted in statutory provisions of Viet Nam as an 
inseparable part of the nation. Accordingly, the Vietnamese government has 
launched a variety of policies and action plans to strengthen the connection with 
the Vietnamese diasporic community and to encourage their return for 
development. However, these efforts appear to have had limited effectiveness. 




has not yet been realized (Pham, 2011). Given that institutional quality remains 
much higher in OECD host countries than in Viet Nam, the low return rate of 
Vietnamese migrants may be at least partially attributed to institutional quality in 
Viet Nam remaining relatively low. We test this empirically using a logit 
regression model of return migration intentions.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the 
main determinants of return intentions. Section 4.3 presents the data and the applied 
research method. Section 4.4 reports and discusses the results. Section 4.5 concludes. 
4.2 The Determinants of Return Intentions 
Both micro-level and macro-level factors may shape the return intentions of 
migrants (Paparusso and Ambrosetti, 2017). Micro-level factors encompass 
integration in the host country, ties with the home country, migration history, and 
the individual demographic characteristics of migrants. Social, economic, 
institutional, and other conditions pertaining to pairs of host and home countries 
represent the macro-level factors. In this section, we review these main 
determinants of migrants‟ return intentions. 
Integration and transnationalism are two pivotal concepts in the theoretical 
framework for examining return intentions. While the strength of engagement 
with the home country is predicted to have a positive correlation with return 
intentions (de Haas and Fokkema, 2011), views on the relationship between 
integration in the host country and the wish to return have diverged (Anniste and 
Tammaru, 2014). Assimilation theorists suggest a negative relationship due to 
integration in the host society substituting for homeland ties. In contrast, 
transnationalism and social network theorists assume a complementarity between 




integration facilitating return migration. We conclude that, since integration and 
homeland engagement mutually drive return intentions, these concepts should be 
simultaneously considered. Carling and Pettersen (2014) developed the 
integration–transnationalism matrix that allows four different possibilities for the 
relative strength of attachment to pairs of home and host countries. Their bivariate 
analysis predicts that migrants characterized by strong transnationalism and weak 
integration demonstrate the highest likelihood of returning. The matrix‟s 
prediction was confirmed by their empirical investigation of the return intentions 
of immigrants in Finland, and more recently by other research on immigrants in 
the Netherlands (Bilgili and Siegel, 2017), and Moroccans in Italy (Paparusso and 
Ambrosetti, 2017). Researchers have employed a wide range of indicators, 
separately or as an index, to measure these two concepts. Legal status, 
employment, dependants living in the host country, language fluency, host 
country media and cultural consumption, friends among native citizens, 
organizational engagement, voting participation, property ownership, investment 
in the host country, satisfaction, and sense of belonging are conventional 
indicators of integration. Dependants living in the home country, origin country 
media and cultural consumption, sending remittances, visiting home, 
organizational engagement, property ownership, and investment in the home 
country have been widely employed to reflect ties with the home country. 
Duration-of-stay is the most commonly used indicator of migration history; 
however, its effect on return intentions is controversial. Duration-of-stay was 
found to have an insignificant impact on the return intentions of migrants from 
Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, Ghana, and Senegal living in Italy and Spain (de Haas 




Uzbekistan living in Russia (Agadjanian et al., 2014), and migrants from Estonia 
living in Finland (Anniste and Tammaru, 2014). In contrast, Moroccans in Europe 
have been found to be more prone to returning to the home country when their 
duration-of-stay extends (de Haas et al., 2014; Paparusso and Ambrosetti, 2017). 
As explained by de Haas et al., (2014), Moroccan migrants are more likely to 
return for retirement. But, Waldorf (1995) and Güngör and Tansel (2014) found a 
negative relationship between duration-of-stay and the likelihood of intending to 
return, among guest workers in Germany and Turkish professionals living abroad, 
respectively. This negative relationship reflects the cumulative inertia effect, 
originally discovered in internal migration research (e.g. Morrison 1967), but 
subsequently extended to cross-border migration where it has been found that 
living longer in the host country tends to facilitate assimilation and thereby deter 
repatriation (e.g. Waldorf and Esparza, 1991). 
Demographic characteristics of migrants, such as age, gender, marital status, 
and education are included as conventional control variables in quantitative 
analyses of return intentions. Whereas a number of studies have found no 
significant impacts of age (de Haas and Fokkema, 2011; Agadjanian et al., 2014; 
de Haas et al., 2014), gender (Waldorf, 1995; de Haas and Fokkema, 2011; 
Anniste and Tammaru, 2014; de Haas et al., 2014; Bilgili and Siegel, 2017), 
marital status (Waldorf, 1995; Agadjanian et al., 2014; Bilgili and Siegel, 2017), 
or education (Agadjanian et al., 2014; Anniste and Tammaru, 2014) on the 
willingness to return, others have reported a significant influence for these factors. 
An increase in age has been found to have a positive impact on the likelihood of 
intending to return (Waldorf, 1995; Carling and Pettersen, 2014; Bilgili and Siegel, 




Güngör and Tansel (2014). Males may be more prone to wishing to return than 
females (Carling and Pettersen, 2014; Güngör and Tansel, 2014; Paparusso and 
Ambrosetti, 2017). Married migrants may be more tied to the host country 
(Paparusso and Ambrosetti, 2017). Higher levels of education attainment have 
been associated with higher likelihood of willingness to return (de Haas and 
Fokkema, 2011; de Haas et al., 2014; Paparusso and Ambrosetti, 2017). 
Conversely, Carling and Pettersen (2014) reported a nonlinear effect of education 
attainment on return intentions. Migrants with very low or very high levels of 
education have the lowest odds of intending to return. 
Moreover, studies using datasets of migrants from many different countries 
have also included country of origin as a predictor of return intentions, in order to 
account for origin-country-specific heterogeneity. Return intentions have indeed 
been found to be heterogeneous between migrants from different origin countries, 
and this variation has been attributed to the origin-country-specific contextual 
factors (Alberts and Hazen, 2005; Agadjanian et al., 2014; Carling and Pettersen, 
2014). These arguments reinforce the need to consider the social, economic, 
political, and institutional conditions in the origin country, and the interactions 
between contextual and micro-level factors, in order to understand return intentions. 
Notwithstanding this need, few studies consider these important factors. Güngör 
and Tansel (2014) included individual perceptions of economic instability and 
uncertainty in the origin country as a push factor in their econometric model and 
found it had a strong negative effect on the return intentions of Turkish migrants. 
Unfavourable economic conditions in Turkey, as perceived by Turkish 
professionals residing abroad, encouraged non-return. Bilgili and Siegel (2017) 




multivariate analysis. They found that higher levels of trust in the origin country 
economy were associated with higher likelihood of permanent return among 
Afghan, Burundian, Ethiopian, and Moroccan migrants living in the Netherlands. 
So far, attempts to account for macro-level factors in the origin country have 
focused only on economic conditions. The current paper adds the quality of 
institutions to the range of origin country characteristics to be considered. 
4.3 Data and Research Method 
Data for this study were collected using a web-survey of Vietnamese migrants 
living in OECD countries conducted in 2016. We designed a questionnaire to 
collect data on individual background characteristics, migration history, integration 
in the host country, ties with Viet Nam, evaluation of institutional quality in pairs of 
host and home countries, and the importance of institutional quality in Viet Nam to 
the respondents‟ return intentions. The questionnaire was completed as either a 
web-survey (n=130) or a written survey (n=29). The respondents were recruited 
through posts on Facebook pages of Vietnamese associations in OECD countries 
(web-survey), or directly through Vietnamese associations in New Zealand 20 
(written survey). Our usable sample contains 159 respondents aged between 21 and 
75 years living in 18 host countries. A response rate cannot be calculated as the 
number of people who visited the Facebook pages or were contacted by the 
Vietnamese associations is unknown. 
The dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator of whether or not a 
respondent intends to return to the home country (Viet Nam). Respondents were 
asked if they intend to return to Viet Nam permanently or for a period of at least 
                                                   
20 New Zealand is the country where the current study was conducted and it was therefore possible 
to conduct a written survey. Hard copies of the questionnaire were distributed to Vietnamese 




12 months or longer. They were offered four options: Yes, No, Not sure, and I 
have never thought about this. The frequencies for each of the four response 
options are 27, 79, 43, and 10, respectively. Those who chose Yes are classified as 
having a return intention. The proportion of this group in the sample is 17 per cent 
(see Table 4.1). The rest constitutes the group of not having return intention. 
Hence, having an intention to return to Viet Nam is a dichotomous variable 
(yes=1, otherwise=0). 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics on Categorical Variables and Regions of 
Host Country 
 Full sample Having return intention 
 N N Per cent 
Total 159 27 17.00 
Gender    
Male 82 19 23.17 
Female 77 8 10.39 
Marital status    
Married or in a long-term relationship 111 16 14.41 
Otherwise 48 11 22.92 
Education    
Postgraduate 75 15 20.00 
Otherwise 84 12 14.29 
Region of host country    
North America 49 6 12.24 
Europe 23 7 30.43 
Asia and Oceania 87 14 16.09 
Notes: North America includes Canada and the United States of America. Europe 
includes Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Asia 
and Oceania include Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. 
 
The independent variables include individual demographic characteristics, 
migration history, integration in the host country, ties with Viet Nam, and the self-
perceived importance of institutional quality in Viet Nam – the variable of interest. 




(male=1, female=0), marital status (married or in a long-term relationship=1, 
otherwise=0), and education (having a postgraduate degree=1, otherwise=0). 
Following other studies, migration history is proxied by duration-of-stay in the 
host country (years). Age and duration-of stay are continuous variables calculated 
from date of birth and date of first emigration, respectively. Based on the 
proportions shown in Table 4.1, we see that Vietnamese migrants who are men, or 
who have a postgraduate degree, or who are neither married nor in a long-term 
relationship, are more likely to intend to return. 
Table 4.2 presents the mean values of each continuous variable for the full 
sample, and for those with and without return intentions. It shows that those who 
wish to return have a higher mean age and longer mean duration-of-stay in the 
host country. However, neither the mean values of age nor the mean values of 
duration-of-stay are significantly different by return intentions. 
Table 4.2: Mean Values of Continuous Variables, by Return Intentions 
 
Full sample 
Return intentions t-test for equality 
 of mean values 
(p-values) 
 Yes No 
Age 39.29 42.17 38.70 0.146 
Duration-of-stay 12.91 14.00 12.69 0.586 
Integration 0.00 -0.73 0.15 0.020 
Ties 0.00 0.80 -0.16 <0.001 
VA 0.00 -1.27 0.26 0.004 
PV 0.00 -0.65 0.13 0.068 
GE 0.00 -0.65 0.13 0.053 
RQ 0.00 -0.37 0.08 0.264 
RL 0.00 -0.87 0.18 0.020 
CC 0.00 -0.66 0.13 0.053 
Q 0.00 -1.89 0.39 0.016 
Notes: The acronyms are the first principal components indicating the importance 
of different dimensions of institutional quality in Viet Nam to the return intentions 
of Vietnamese migrants. VA: Voice and Accountability. PV: Political Stability 
and Absence of Violence/Terrorism. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: 
Regulatory Quality. RL: Rule of Law. CC: Control of Corruption. Q: overall 




Integration is the first principal component of the following ten indicators of 
attachment to the host country: (1) Employment in the host country (employed or 
self-employed=1, otherwise=0), (2) Legal status in the host country (permanent 
residency or citizenship=1, otherwise=0), (3) Having close family member(s)21 in 
the host country (yes=1, no=0), (4) Host country language fluency (yes=1, no=0), 
(5) Having friend(s) born in the host country (yes=1, no=0), (6) Member of 
association(s)22 in the host country (yes=1, no=0), (7) Voting participation in the 
host country (yes=1, no=0), (8) Owning real estate in the host country (yes=1, 
no=0), (9) Owning a business in the host country (yes=1, no=0), and (10) Having 
investment project(s) in the host country (yes=1, no=0). 
Ties is the first principal component of seven indicators of engagement with 
the home country: (1) Having close family member(s) in Viet Nam (yes=1, no=0), 
(2) Visiting Viet Nam (yes=1, no=0), (3) Member of association(s) in Viet Nam 
(yes=1, no=0), (4) Remitting money to Viet Nam (yes=1, no=0), (5) Owning real 
estate in Viet Nam (yes=1, no=0), (6) Owning a business in Viet Nam (yes=1, 
no=0), and (7) Having investment project(s) in Viet Nam (yes=1, no=0).  
Integration and ties are measured by a score with a mean of zero. Higher 
scores for integration represent higher levels of attachment to the host country, 
while higher scores for ties represent a stronger linkage with Viet Nam. As reported 
in Table 4.2, the mean scores of integration and the mean scores of ties are 
significantly different by return intentions at least at the five per cent level. The 
mean score of integration among migrants intending to return is negative, but is 
positive among those who want to stay. This disparity implies that Vietnamese 
                                                   
21 Close family members include spouses, dependent children, grown-up children, and parents. 
22 Associations can be transnational associations, professional associations, community 




migrants wishing to return have a weaker attachment to the host country. In contrast, 
the mean score of ties is positive among migrants who intend to return, but negative 
among those who are prone to staying. Therefore, Vietnamese migrants having 
return intentions demonstrate stronger engagement with Viet Nam. 
The main focus of the questionnaire survey is to explore whether or not the 
quality of institutions in Viet Nam matters for the return intentions of Vietnamese 
migrants living in OECD countries. Because institutional quality is a multi-
dimensional concept, we asked the respondents six sets of questions pointing to 
the respondents‟ perceptions of the different dimensions of institutional quality 
developed by Kaufmann et al. (1999). These dimensions include Voice and 
Accountability (VA), Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PV), 
Government Effectiveness (GE), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Rule of Law (RL), and 
Control of Corruption (CC). All of these questions were answered by means of 
five-point Likert scales. Initially, the respondents were asked to successively 
evaluate each dimension of institutional quality in their host countries and in Viet 
Nam. The purpose of these preliminary questions was to explore their perceptions 
of the disparity in institutional quality between the host and home countries. 
Analysing these answers, we found a robust consistency among the respondents 
regarding the divergence of institutional quality between their host countries and 
Viet Nam, where Viet Nam was perceived to have relatively lower quality of 
institutions.23 Then, to collect data for the variable of interest, we designed sets of 
                                                   
23 The respondents were asked to evaluate 30 items pointing to the six dimensions of institutional 
quality in their host countries and in Viet Nam by means of five-point Likert scales (Very poor, 
Poor, Acceptable, Good, and Very good). To capture the perceived gap of institutional quality 
between their host countries and Viet Nam, we constructed an index that ranges from -30 (Viet 
Nam was perceived to have relatively lower quality of institutions across the items) to 30 (Viet 
Nam was perceived to have relatively higher quality of institutions across the items). The index 




questions relating to each of the six dimensions of institutional quality, which 
asked respondents to state how important each of the dimensions of institutional 
quality in Viet Nam is to their return intentions. Thereby, we have six respective 
sets of answers – one set for each dimension. For each of the answer sets, we 
calculate the first principal component and interpret this principal component as 
an indicator of the importance of that dimension of institutional quality in Viet 
Nam. This procedure produces six first principal components (labelled VA, PV, 
GE, RQ, RL, and CC), which are all subjective measures of different dimensions 
of institutional quality as perceived by the migrants. We also use the first principal 
component calculated from the answers to all six sets as a summary measure of 
institutional quality overall (labelled Q). These seven indices are each measured 
as a score with a mean of zero. The higher the scores, the more importance 
Vietnamese migrants say that they place on institutional quality in Viet Nam when 
considering returning home. Given the respondents‟ perceptions of the relatively 
lower institutional quality in Viet Nam, the positive mean values of VA, PV, GE, 
RQ, RL, and Q found among migrants with no return intention in Table 4.2 imply 
that institutional quality in Viet Nam is likely to be a push factor. The mean 
values of six out of these seven indices, namely VA, PV, GE, RL, and Q, are 
significantly different by return intentions at least at the ten per cent level. 
We acknowledge that our dataset has some limitations. First, there are some 
missing values associated with age, duration-of-stay, frequency of sending 
remittances to Viet Nam, real estate ownership in Viet Nam, and the Likert scale 
                                                                                                                                           
decreases by one unit if an item was reported to be better in the host countries. The index remains 
unchanged if an item was reported to have no distinction between the host countries and Viet Nam. 
“Don’t know” and missing answers do not alter the value of the index. According to our 
calculation, the index has a skewed-right distribution with a mean of -22.81. Moreover, 97.48 per 
cent of the index values are below zero, indicating that most of the respondents perceived that Viet 




answers relating to the respondents‟ perceptions of institutional quality. Missing 
values of age and duration-of-stay were replaced with their respective means. 
Missing values of other categorical variables were replaced with their respective 
medians. To signal imputation, we include missing data dummies in our 
regression models. Second, our sample size is small and excludes Vietnamese 
migrants living in non-OECD countries. Moreover, the respondents are self-
selected as a result of the convenience sampling method and this reduces the 
representativeness the sample. Caution should therefore be taken when 
interpreting the results.  
With our dataset in hand, we then use a logistic model to identify the 
relationship between return intentions and the importance of institutional quality in 
the home country, while controlling for the other main determinants of return 
intentions. Since the likelihood of having return intention varies across host country 
regions (see Table 4.1), we account for this heterogeneity in our logistic regressions 
by means of clustering standard errors at the host country regional level. 
4.4 Results and Discussion 
Table 4.3 reports the logistic regression results in odds ratios. Columns (1) 
to (6) refer to six regressions of the return intentions of Vietnamese migrants, in 
which each uses a single different dimension of the importance of institutional 
quality in Viet Nam as the variable of interest. In column (7) Q is used as an 
overall summary index capturing the importance of all six dimensions. The results 
generally demonstrate that Vietnamese migrants who place more importance on 
institutional quality in Viet Nam when considering repatriation, are less likely to 
wish to return. The odds ratio is less than one in all cases, but is only statistically 




Viet Nam does matter for the willingness of repatriation among the respondents, 
given the gap in institutional quality between the host countries and Viet Nam. 
Institutions are rules influencing how the economy works, and the incentives that 
motivate people (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Therefore, the quality of 
institutions signals an important aspect of the conditions that migrants will face 
upon return. If migrants are mindful of institutional quality and perceive that 
institutional quality in the home country is not conducive to their post-repatriation 
future, they are less willing to return. This finding not only underlines the 
importance of institutional quality in migration studies, which has been 
recognized in research on the ex post outcomes of migration process, but also 
extends its significant role to return intentions of migrants. 
The interpretation of the coefficients associated with the importance of 
institutional quality is based on the assumption that respondents‟ perception of the 
importance of institutional quality is uncorrelated with the errors in the logistic 
regression model. The inclusion of the two self-reported variables, which are 
return intentions and the importance of institutional quality, in the regression 
might raise the concern about circularity caused by reverse causality. More 
specifically, if respondents first evaluated the institutional quality gaps and 
declared that institutional quality in the home country matters, they were more 
likely to feel compelled to indicate that they do not wish to return. However, our 
questionnaire was designed to avoid such a survey reporting bias. In particular, 
respondents were asked to state their return intentions (Question 13 in Part 2) 
before answering questions on institutional quality evaluation and the importance 
of institutional quality (Questions 40-57 in Part 5). The sequence of the 




Table 4.3: Estimates for Logit Model 
Different dimensions of (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
institutional quality VA PV GE RQ RL CC Q 
Age 1.069 1.068 1.064** 1.060** 1.076* 1.075* 1.075* 
(0.052) (0.044) (0.032) (0.028) (0.041) (0.045) (0.047) 
Gender 3.238 3.542 2.965 3.101 3.566 3.250 3.414 
 (4.722) (5.366) (3.684) (3.734) (5.283) (4.496) (5.108) 
Marital status 0.341** 0.354*** 0.413*** 0.437*** 0.370*** 0.390*** 0.351*** 
 
(0.150) (0.118) (0.096) (0.108) (0.049) (0.086) (0.075) 
Education 1.511 1.206 1.100 0.939 1.015 0.942 1.147 
 
(0.785) (0.630) (0.678) (0.587) (0.598) (0.694) (0.682) 
Duration-of-stay 1.000 0.997 1.007 1.008 0.997 1.000 0.994 
 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.010) (0.012) (0.017) (0.023) (0.024) 
Integration 0.592* 0.583* 0.577* 0.572* 0.574 0.579* 0.593 
 
(0.176) (0.172) (0.169) (0.174) (0.204) (0.179) (0.193) 
Ties 1.886* 2.019** 1.823*** 1.989** 2.056* 1.940** 1.992** 
 
(0.621) (0.669) (0.398) (0.552) (0.760) (0.584) (0.685) 
The importance of institutional quality 0.724* 0.723 0.797** 0.816* 0.711* 0.741 0.847 
in the home country (0.124) (0.155) (0.072) (0.096) (0.135) (0.137) (0.088) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -50.699 -52.372 -53.928 -54.240 -51.227 -52.803 -51.485 
Notes: Factor change in odds of having return intention versus no return intention. Exponentiated coefficients. N = 159. Miss ing data 
indicators are included. Clustered standard errors by three regions of current host country (North America, Europe, and Asia and Oceania) are 
reported in parentheses.  




Regarding the other determinants of return migration intention, we see in 
Table 4.3 that the integration variable has an odds ratio that is consistently less 
than one. This suggests that a deeper level of integration in the host country is 
associated with a lower likelihood of intending to return. This effect is statistically 
significant in five out of seven specifications. In contrast, the odds ratios of ties 
are all greater than one and are statistically significant. They demonstrate a 
positive relationship between the level of attachment to Viet Nam and the 
willingness to return among the respondents. Putting it differently, those who 
have stronger linkages with Viet Nam, socially and economically, are more likely 
to report that they intend returning. In general, Vietnamese migrants who are 
weakly integrated in the host country and strongly tied with the home country are 
more likely to have repatriation intentions. These results are in line with the 
prediction of the integration–transnationalism matrix developed by Carling and 
Pettersen (2014). 
Among the demographic control variables, age and marital status have 
significant impacts on the return intentions. Older migrants are more likely than 
younger migrants to want to return. Migrants who are married or in a long-term 
relationship are less likely than others to wish to return. The odds ratios of 
education are greater than one in five out of seven specifications, indicating that 
migrants with a postgraduate degree are more likely to intend to return. The 
contrast by gender is even greater, with the odds ratios suggesting that the odds of 
males returning are three times those of females. However, in the case of both 
education and gender, these odds ratios are not statistically significant. The effects 




We conducted several robustness checks. Firstly, we replaced the 
integration and ties variables by simple aggregations of their respective 
dichotomous indicators, rather than the first principal components. As reported in 
Table 4.6 in the Chapter Appendix, these additional results are qualitatively 
similar to the results presented in Table 4.3. Secondly, we re-estimated the logit 
model with a “No” response versus all other responses. Finally, we fitted an 
ordered logit model with ordinal outcomes (“No” = 1, “I have never thought about 
this” and “Not sure” = 2, and “Yes” = 3). The additional results obtained from 
these specifications (not shown here but available upon request) do not make any 
difference to the interpretation of the above discussed results. 
The odds ratios associated with gender in the baseline regressions in Table 
4.3 are notable for their large sizes and huge standard errors. As reported in Table 
4.1, males have a much greater probability of intending to return than females (23 
per cent versus 10 per cent respectively). This difference could potentially be due 
to heterogeneity by gender in the multivariate migration intentions model. To test 
this, we re-estimated the model with two sub-samples, one for each gender (82 
males and 77 females). Table 4.4 shows that there is indeed considerable 
heterogeneity by gender. Remarkably, for females none of the odds ratios are 
statistically significant, while for males they are virtually all statistically 
significant. The odds ratios for age, marital status, integration, ties, and the 
importance of institutional quality estimated with the sub-sample of males are 
qualitatively similar to those obtained with the pooled data. Additionally, the odds 
ratios of duration-of-stay, which are not significant when using the pooled data, 
become consistently statistically significant for the males-only sub-sample. All 




likely to report an intention to return to Viet Nam. This finding is in line with the 
widely known cumulative inertia effect in the migration literature. The effect of 
education remains inconclusive. 
To tease out the unexplained return intentions of Vietnamese female migrants, 
we deconstruct integration and ties into separate dimensions, including social 
integration, structural integration, social ties, and economic ties. These indices are 
measured as simple aggregations of their respective dichotomous indicators. We 
follow several studies in the literature (Anniste and Tammaru, 2014; de Haas et al., 
2014; Paparusso and Ambrosetti, 2017), and posit that social integration 
encompasses legal status, having close family member(s) in the host country, 
language fluency, having friend(s) born in the host country, member of 
association(s) in the host country, and voting in the host country. With respect to 
structural integration, we assume that this comprises employment, owning real 
estate or a business in the host country, and having investment project(s) in the 
host country. Social ties are reflected in having close family member(s) in Viet  
Nam, visiting Viet Nam, sending remittances to Viet Nam, and being a member of 
association(s) in Viet Nam. Finally, economic ties are measured by owning real 
estate or a business in Viet Nam, and having investment project(s) in Viet Nam. 
As reported in Table 4.5, significant predictors of the return intentions of female 
migrants are structural integration and economic ties. The more that female 
migrants are structurally integrated in the host country, the less likely they are to 
report an intention to return. On the other hand, economic ties with Viet Nam 
increase the likelihood of having return intentions. The direction of the effects of 
these predictors are consistent with those of integration and ties found in the 




Table 4.4: Estimates for Logit Model by Gender 
Different dimensions 





























 Male Female 
Age 1.265*** 1.198*** 1.203*** 1.206*** 1.259*** 1.231*** 1.271*** 0.983 0.986 0.987 0.989 0.994 0.995 0.991 
(0.085) (0.020) (0.045) (0.060) (0.059) (0.076) (0.088) (0.013) (0.030) (0.014) (0.018) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) 
Marital status 0.039*** 0.066*** 0.083** 0.072** 0.030*** 0.060*** 0.028** 0.555 0.619 0.617 0.673 0.697 0.616 0.626 
 
(0.046) (0.025) (0.087) (0.086) (0.035) (0.063) (0.040) (0.499) (0.690) (0.705) (0.816) (0.940) (0.718) (0.750) 
Education 1.304 0.816 0.665 0.583*** 0.558*** 0.532 0.716 1.983 1.768 1.834 1.686 1.909 1.789 1.915 
 
(0.544) (0.269) (0.173) (0.065) (0.030) (0.219) (0.181) (1.615) (1.358) (1.598) (1.217) (1.639) (1.428) (1.653) 
Duration-of-stay 0.903*** 0.924** 0.935*** 0.928*** 0.910*** 0.922** 0.896*** 0.992 0.987 0.988 0.985 0.982 0.990 0.988 
 
(0.028) (0.034) (0.005) (0.019) (0.011) (0.034) (0.027) (0.078) (0.070) (0.067) (0.060) (0.048) (0.056) (0.062) 
Integration 0.569*** 0.581*** 0.562*** 0.556*** 0.581** 0.563*** 0.612** 0.665 0.645 0.643 0.642 0.637 0.646 0.652 
 
(0.087) (0.106) (0.082) (0.101) (0.153) (0.093) (0.141) (0.319) (0.303) (0.338) (0.328) (0.342) (0.334) (0.332) 
Ties 3.096*** 3.264*** 2.702*** 3.309*** 3.969*** 3.221*** 3.687*** 1.421 1.405 1.395 1.451 1.429 1.435 1.428 
 
(0.551) (0.900) (0.152) (0.478) (0.887) (0.792) (0.947) (0.449) (0.456) (0.423) (0.482) (0.487) (0.488) (0.462) 
The importance of 
institutional quality 
0.541*** 0.565* 0.673*** 0.693* 0.550*** 0.624* 0.724** 0.889 0.973 0.951 0.891 0.848 0.831 0.935 
(0.068) (0.178) (0.088) (0.135) (0.119) (0.179) (0.104) (0.229) (0.294) (0.117) (0.124) (0.229) (0.222) (0.135) 
N 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 
Log pseudo-likelihood -22.569 -26.020 -27.620 -28.119 -24.704 -26.875 -24.277 -21.631 -21.859 -21.845 -21.747 -21.499 -21.515 -21.647 
Notes: Factor change in odds of having return intention versus no return intention. Exponentiated coefficients. Missing data indicators are not included. Clustered standard errors by three regions of 
current host country (North America, Europe, and Asia and Oceania) are reported in parentheses.  






Table 4.5: Estimates for Logit Model using Deconstructed Integration and Ties Variables 
Different dimensions 





























 Male Female 
Age 1.231*** 1.167*** 1.175*** 1.174*** 1.213*** 1.201*** 1.224*** 0.974* 0.979 0.981 0.980 0.985 0.985 0.982 
(0.082) (0.009) (0.037) (0.052) (0.055) (0.043) (0.071) (0.014) (0.034) (0.021) (0.023) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) 
Marital status 0.047** 0.076*** 0.094** 0.087* 0.042** 0.066*** 0.039** 0.609 0.671 0.671 0.692 0.724 0.636 0.670 
 
(0.066) (0.049) (0.101) (0.117) (0.053) (0.069) (0.055) (0.537) (0.680) (0.738) (0.796) (0.886) (0.673) (0.748) 
Education 1.131 0.737 0.642 0.558* 0.553** 0.492* 0.680 2.708 2.411 2.561 2.372 2.639 2.450 2.599 
 
(0.696) (0.207) (0.296) (0.166) (0.167) (0.207) (0.298) (2.467) (2.019) (2.434) (1.900) (2.544) (2.040) (2.447) 
Duration-of-stay 0.916*** 0.938*** 0.948*** 0.945*** 0.928*** 0.935*** 0.916*** 1.004 0.989 0.993 0.989 0.989 1.000 0.996 
 
(0.025) (0.023) (0.004) (0.017) (0.003) (0.014) (0.014) (0.088) (0.063) (0.047) (0.047) (0.035) (0.044) (0.055) 
Social integration 0.841 0.849 0.807 0.804 0.815 0.837 0.853 0.926 0.902 0.907 0.898 0.895 0.926 0.917 
 
(0.388) (0.334) (0.237) (0.224) (0.341) (0.269) (0.384) (0.429) (0.422) (0.487) (0.468) (0.451) (0.472) (0.446) 
Structural integration 0.475 0.460* 0.466* 0.444* 0.531 0.440 0.526 0.464** 0.480*** 0.471*** 0.482*** 0.475** 0.460** 0.469** 
 
(0.279) (0.190) (0.200) (0.217) (0.287) (0.232) (0.307) (0.177) (0.133) (0.137) (0.121) (0.142) (0.155) (0.158) 
Social ties 2.188*** 2.369*** 2.096*** 2.284*** 2.368*** 2.239*** 2.264*** 1.418 1.424 1.432 1.413 1.381 1.395 1.410 
 (0.250) (0.275) (0.061) (0.036) (0.237) (0.139) (0.322) (0.451) (0.499) (0.477) (0.494) (0.423) (0.445) (0.439) 
Economic ties 3.481*** 3.834*** 3.218*** 3.982*** 4.646*** 4.119*** 4.308*** 1.291 1.250 1.231*** 1.269** 1.279* 1.315** 1.288* 
 (0.633) (0.864) (0.613) (0.781) (0.531) (0.162) (0.240) (0.204) (0.189) (0.066) (0.132) (0.170) (0.165) (0.180) 
The importance of 
institutional quality 
0.573*** 0.617* 0.721*** 0.776 0.615** 0.657** 0.764** 0.877 0.982 0.931 0.957 0.874 0.843 0.940 
(0.079) (0.158) (0.083) (0.162) (0.125) (0.129) (0.090) (0.280) (0.344) (0.120) (0.124) (0.227) (0.215) (0.142) 
N 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 
Log pseudo-likelihood -23.463 -26.618 -27.993 -28.598 -25.994 -27.168 -25.421 -21.317 -21.587 -21.547 -21.572 -21.335 -21.278 -21.408 
Notes: Factor change in odds of having return intention versus no return intention. Exponentiated coefficients. Missing data indicators are not included. Clustered standard errors by three 
regions of current host country (North America, Europe, and Asia and Oceania) are reported in parentheses.  




female migrants are unrelated to the extent to which they are concerned about the 
lower institutional quality in Viet Nam, whereas the difference in institutional 
quality between the home and host country matters a lot to the males. 
4.5 Conclusions 
In this paper, we extend the salience of institutional quality in international 
migration to an under-researched aspect: return intentions. Previous work has 
shown how important institutional quality has been ex post when analysing return 
migration to Viet Nam (see Tran et al., 2018). The current study enriches the 
literature by providing empirical evidence that institutional quality in the home 
country also matters for return migration ex ante. By examining the return 
intentions of Vietnamese migrants living in OECD countries, we find that 
Vietnamese migrants who report that institutional quality in Viet Nam (which has 
been relatively lower than that in OECD countries) is more important to them are 
less likely to intend to return to Viet Nam. The perception of unfavourable 
institutional quality back home reduces their willingness to repatriate. In line with 
the prediction of the integration–transnationalism matrix, Vietnamese migrants 
with weaker attachment to the host country and stronger linkages with the home 
country are more likely to intend to return. Notably, the effect of homeland ties is 
larger than the effect of host country integration. Therefore, our findings suggest 
that Vietnamese policy makers can potentially boost return migration by 
promoting homeland engagement among the Vietnamese diaspora. Facilitating 
home ownership and encouraging business activities by the diaspora in Viet Nam, 





More generally, the effectiveness of any policy measures implemented to 
promote return migration for development is naturally dependent on the 
contextual factors in the home country. In developing countries where there are 
still constraints to creating better institutions, policies that aim to encourage return 
migration are less likely to be effective since low institutional quality is acting as 
a push factor. Consequently, it is of pivotal importance to combine policies 
encouraging return migration with institutional reforms to make the home country 
more attractive to potential returnees. 
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Table 4.6: Estimates for Logit Model using Integration and Ties Measured as Simple Aggregations 















Age 1.060 1.058* 1.057** 1.050** 1.065** 1.065* 1.065*  
(0.041) (0.033) (0.025) (0.021) (0.029) (0.035) (0.035)   
Gender 3.082 3.353 2.880 2.947 3.267 3.080 3.188   
 (4.413) (5.027) (3.652) (3.561) (4.608) (4.184) (4.604)   
Marital status 0.361*** 0.375*** 0.422*** 0.446*** 0.383*** 0.397*** 0.369*** 
 
(0.126) (0.097) (0.075) (0.087) (0.031) (0.064) (0.056)   
Education 1.596 1.281 1.205 1.072 1.149 1.062 1.241   
 
(0.945) (0.749) (0.794) (0.690) (0.713) (0.795) (0.800)   
Duration-of-stay 1.006 1.005 1.012 1.016 1.004 1.007 1.002   
 
(0.020) (0.018) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018)   
Integration 0.683* 0.676* 0.675** 0.668** 0.679* 0.677* 0.689*  
 
(0.142) (0.142) (0.135) (0.137) (0.155) (0.141) (0.150)   
Ties 1.753 1.878* 1.722** 1.830** 1.855* 1.799* 1.826*  
 
(0.628) (0.688) (0.456) (0.543) (0.672) (0.582) (0.660)   
The importance of institutional quality 0.735** 0.744 0.808*** 0.865 0.745** 0.766* 0.862*  
in the home country (0.115) (0.152) (0.066) (0.087) (0.109) (0.118) (0.076)   
Log pseudo-likelihood -52.070 -53.852 -55.148 -55.836 -53.149 -54.307 -53.176   
Notes: Factor change in odds of having return intention versus no return intention. Exponentiated coefficients. N = 159. Missing data 
indicators are included. Clustered standard errors by three regions of current host country (North America, Europe, and Asia & 
Oceania) are reported in parentheses. 




Chapter 5: What are Migrants Willing to Pay for Better Home Country 
Institutions?24 
5.1 Introduction 
Institutions of various types have been recognized as important drivers of 
the spatial mobility of people. The quality of institutions not only shapes 
emigration (Baudassé et al., 2018), but also matters for return migration decisions 
(Tran et al., 2018a) and return migration intentions (Tran et al., 2018b). The 
persistent gap in institutional quality between countries encourages individuals 
and families to emigrate from countries governed by weak institutions, and steers 
them to destinations with advanced institutions. The literature on the motivations 
for return migration argues that migrants have an intrinsic preference for the home 
country, and that positive homeland amenities are strong pull factors influencing 
return migration decisions (Gmelch, 1980). Because migrants might gain higher 
utility from consumption in the home country, some of them would be willing to 
give up positive wage differentials and higher living standards in developed host 
countries to return to less developed home countries to maximize their life-course 
utility (OECD, 2008). However, return migration is also sensitive to the home-
country social and institutional context (Cassarino, 2004). Empirically, poor 
quality of institutions in the home country acts as a negative pull factor, reducing 
the willingness of migrants to return (Tran et al., 2018b). 
Given migrants‟ preference for the home country and the importance of 
institutional quality in return migration decisions, migrants would be better off if 
                                                   
24 This chapter is currently under review: 
Tran, N. T. M., Cameron, M. P., & Poot, J. (forthcoming). What are Migrants Willing to Pay for 




the institutional quality gap was reduced or eliminated. A question arises as to 
how strong the preferences of diasporas are for home-country institutional quality. 
In other words, are migrants living in a host country with higher institutional 
quality willing to pay for an improvement in the institutional quality in their home 
country? The current study addresses this question by estimating the 
compensating variation, which is the maximum that Vietnamese migrants living 
in NZ would be willing to pay for better institutional quality in VN, using the 
contingent valuation method (CVM). The CVM is a survey technique that has 
been widely used to elicit the economic trade-off a person would make when 
presented with a hypothetical choice, and is frequently used to estimate the value 
of non-market goods or services (Carson, 2012; Kling et al., 2012). This study 
pioneers the measurement of the implicit monetary value of an improvement in 
institutional quality by means of the CVM applied to the return migration channel. 
Notably, this is the first application of the CVM to measuring the willingness to 
pay for institutional quality, using a survey of migrants. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 5.2 establishes 
the theoretical background. Section 5.3 describes the research design and data. 
Section 5.4 reports the results. Section 5.5 concludes. 
5.2 Theoretical Background 
In the static human capital model, migration is determined by exogenous 
wages, economic costs of migration, and inter alia the quality of institutions (see 
Bodvarsson et al., 2015). Chiswick (1999) broadly defined migration costs to 
include the fixed monetary costs of moving and the full costs (monetary and 
psychic) of relocating in, and adjusting to, the destination. The full costs of 




preference for the home country, and contextual conditions in both the home and 
host countries (Clark et al., 2007; Grogger and Hanson, 2011; Hatton and 
Williamson, 2011). To capture the effects of institutions, Hatton and Williamson 
(2011) used the compensating differential to represent the non-economic 
preference of a potential migrant for the home country. If institutional quality in 
the home country is worse than that in the host country, the compensating 
differential in favour of the home country will be negative, thereby increasing the 
net benefit of migration. Isolating the influence of wage differences, migration 
costs, and institutional quality, migration decisions depend on the net benefit 
gained from the before tax wage change (purchasing power corrected) in the host 
country compared with the home country, net of migration costs and the 
compensating differential for institutional quality in the home country. 
Theoretically, migration decisions depend on both the after tax wage difference 
and the tax difference, with the tax “buying” utility-yielding public goods. 
Therefore, it is possible to refer to the before tax wage difference in this 
identification by assuming that the income-adjusted level of public goods in both 
countries is the same and funded by the tax rate multiplied by the gross wage. 
Institutional quality can then be interpreted as measuring the quality of the public 
goods. 
Appling the static human capital framework to the return migration 
decisions of Vietnamese migrants living in NZ, the net benefit gained by an 
individual with skill i when considering returning from NZ to VN permanently 
(labelled        
 ) is given by: 
       
     
     
         
         





  is the before tax wage rate of an individual with skill i in country j = 
{NZ,VN},        
  represents net return migration costs (corrected for the 
psychic costs of living abroad and the difference in amenities between the two 
countries) incurred when an individual with skill i returns from NZ to VN, and 
       
  denotes the compensating differential in favour of institutional quality in 
NZ of an individual with skill i (i.e.        
    . All variables are measured for 
the same time period, i.e. interpreted as costs or benefits per period. Note that for 
most Vietnamese migrants living in NZ,   
     
 , and       
     which 
renders        
   . Since there is some return migration actually observed, 
       
    for those migrants and the following would hold:        
  
   
     
         
 . An individual is indifferent between residing in NZ and 
returning to VN when        
  in Equation (1) is equal to zero, which implies 
that: 
   
     
         




       
     
     
         
  (3) 
Estimates of the differential in favour of institutional quality in NZ, 
       
 , can be obtained by means of Equation (3). The higher Vietnamese 
migrants living in NZ perceive institutional quality in NZ to be relative to that in 
VN, the greater        
  will be, thereby decreasing the net benefit of returning to 
VN. Consequently, they would require a much higher wage rate in VN,    
 , 
                                                   
25 It is possible that   
     
 , but for most people who are actually indifferent    
     
 . 
Equation (2) still holds because        
  is negative and        
  is positive.        
  is 
negative because        
  is the difference between the monetary costs of return migration and 
the psychic costs of staying in NZ. The psychic costs are much larger than the monetary costs. If 
that were not the case, there is no single person who is indifferent, i.e. Equation (2) applies to no-
one because   
     
    but         
         




relative to their current wage rate in NZ,    
 , to offset the perceived gap in 
institutional quality between the two countries in order to be indifferent between 
living in NZ and repatriating to VN. 
The required wage rate in VN may be elicited by means of contingent 
valuation (CV) questions. The discrepancy between the required wage rate in VN 
and the current wage rate in NZ establishes a wage differential known as an 
equivalent variation for a potential unfavourable change in institutional quality 
resulting from repatriation, given the expected migration costs, psychic costs and 
the amenities available in NZ and VN. This wage differential can then be used as 
a starting point when comparing hypothetical scenarios that involve varying 
institutional quality in VN, controlling for other differences between VN and NZ. 
5.3 Research Design and Data 
This study scrutinizes primary data collected using a survey of Vietnamese 
migrants living in NZ in 2016. The multi-purpose questionnaire included two CV 
questions designed to establish the compensating differentials that make the 
respondents indifferent between living in NZ and returning to VN. The two CV 
questions, which took the form of payment cards with ascending categories, 
allowed the respondents to choose required income intervals. Each CV question 
was followed by an open-ended question, asking the respondents to state an exact 
amount of income within their chosen intervals. If the respondents did not answer 
the open-ended questions, the mid-point method was applied to transform the 
required income intervals into continuous variables. Before answering the CV 
questions, the respondents were asked several questions related to their 




evaluation of institutional quality in the two countries, and the importance of 
institutional quality in VN to their repatriation intentions. 
The first CV question – “Given your perceptions of the difference in 
institutional quality between NZ and VN, what would be the smallest level of 
weekly income before tax in VN where you would be happy moving back to VN 
permanently?” – was designed to establish the weekly income in VN that would 
make the respondents indifferent between living in NZ and moving back to VN 
permanently. This income then compensates for the perceived differences in 
institutional quality and other amenities between the two countries, as well as 
migration costs. Hence: 
     
     
         
         
  (4) 
where      
  is the smallest weekly income in VN that renders        
  in 
Equation (1) greater than zero.      
  indicates the required income elicited by 
means of the first CV question. 
 The second CV question – “Now imagine that the institutional quality in 
VN changed so that it was equal to NZ in all ways (and everything else remained 
the same). If this happened, what would be the smallest level of weekly income 
before tax in VN where you would be happy moving back to VN permanently?” – 
was designed to determine the weekly income in VN that would make the 
respondents indifferent between residing in NZ and returning to VN permanently, 
given a hypothetical scenario where the institutional quality gap between the two 
countries was eliminated, i.e.        
  = 0, but all other differences between the 
countries remained the same. As a result of holding institutional quality in both 




the perceived costs of return migration from NZ to VN, also accounting for 
differences in amenities and psychic costs. Substituting,        
  = 0 in Equation 
(4), we get: 
     
     
         
  (5) 
where      
  denotes the smallest level of weekly income before tax in VN that 
renders        
  in Equation (1) greater than zero under the assumption that 
there is no loss in institutional quality when migrating from NZ to VN.      
  
exhibits the required income elicited by means of the second CV question. 
 By subtracting      
  from      
 , we establish the weekly compensating 
differential for the perceived difference in institutional quality between NZ and 
VN, ceteris paribus: 
     
       
     
         
         
     
         
           
  (6) 
 This compensating differential can be referred as the respondent‟s 
willingness to pay (WTP), i.e. the maximum amount of money that the respondent 
would be willing to give up per week, during the rest of his or her working life, 
for an improvement in institutional quality in VN that is enough to offset his or 
her perceived gap in institutional quality between the two countries. Since    
  
and       
  in Equations (4) and (5) cancel out as a result of the subtraction, the 
WTP is the difference between the required amounts of income elicited by means 
of the CV questions, given by: 
        
       
       
  (7) 
A major strength of the WTP calculation in Equation (7) is that it is independent 
of respondents‟ current income in NZ, which might subject to measurement error 




independent of return migration costs and psychic costs, which are hard to capture 
in a survey. 
 However, the perceived gap in institutional quality between the two 
countries will vary across respondents. Hence, a metric for institutional quality 
needs to be designed in order to define the WTP for a one-unit improvement in 
institutional quality. The latter can be calculated by dividing the left-hand side of 
Equation (7) by the individually perceived gap in institutional quality in 
predefined units. The respondents‟ perceptions of the disparity in institutional 
quality between NZ and VN were explored by means of questions asking the 
respondents to successively evaluate 30 items pointing to different dimensions of 
institutional quality 26  in the two countries. These questions were answered by 
five-point Likert scales (Very poor, Poor, Acceptable, Good, and Very good). The 
Likert scales were assigned scores ranging from one to five, where higher scores 
corresponded to better institutional quality, as subjectively perceived by the 
respondents. The perceived gap within an item is the score of that item in NZ 
minus the score of the same item in VN. For instance, if an item was scored five 
(Very good) in NZ and three (Acceptable) in VN, the perceived gap of that item is 
two units. Since there are 30 items, the overall perceived gap in institutional 
quality between the two countries is the average value of 30 perceived gaps, 
rounded to the nearest integer. 27  As a result, the marginal willingness to pay 
         
  is calculated as: 
                                                   
26  These dimensions were developed by Kaufmann et al. (1999), including Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. 
27 Items with “Don’t know” answers do not contribute to the overall average perceived gap. If a 
respondent gave a score for institutional quality in NZ and consistently chose “Don’t know” when 
evaluating institutional quality in VN, the overall perceived gap of institutional quality between 




         
          
            
   (8) 
where          
   is the index of an individual‟s perceived institutional quality 
difference between NZ and VN, calculated as outlined above. Equation (8) 
measures the WTP for a one-unit improvement in institutional quality in VN. The 
estimated MWTP of individuals represents the implicit monetary value of an 
improvement in institutional quality in VN by one unit, benchmarked against 
institutional quality in NZ as per the perception of the respondents, elicited via the 
return migration channel. Finally, we run multivariate regressions using the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator to identify the determinants of the 
estimated MWTP. 
 Table 5.1 describes the variables of the multivariate analysis and provides 
descriptive statistics for our sample characteristics. Our useable sample contains 
64 respondents who completed the questionnaire distributed to Vietnamese 
individuals and associations in NZ as either a web-survey (n=37) or a written 
survey (n=27). The respondents were recruited through posts on Facebook pages 
of Vietnamese associations in NZ (web-survey), or directly through Vietnamese 
associations in NZ (written survey). A response rate cannot be calculated as the 




Table 5.1: Description of Variables and Sample Characteristics 
Variable Description N Mean SD Min Max 
MWTP The willingness to pay for a one-unit of improvement in institutional quality in VN benchmarked against 
institutional quality in NZ, as per the perception of the respondents (New Zealand dollars - NZD) 
64 79.8 216.91 -500.31 700 
Age Years from the reported date of birth to 1 January 2017 64 37.84 10.16 23 70 
Gender Male=1, female=0 64 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Marital status Married or in a long-term relationship=1, otherwise=0 64 0.63 0.49 0 1 
Education Having a postgraduate degree=1, otherwise=0 64 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Current income Weekly income before tax in NZ (NZD) in 2016 64 609.14 328.71 0 1,385 
Duration-of-stay Years from the reported date of first emigration to 1 January 2017 64 11.39 9.23 1 38 
Legal status Permanent residency or citizenship in NZ=1, otherwise=0 64 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Return intention Yes=1, otherwise=0 64 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Integration The first principal component of nine indicators: (1) Employment in NZ (employed or self-
employed=1, otherwise=0), (2) Having close family member(s) in NZ (yes=1, no=0), (3) English 
fluency (yes=1, no=0), (4) Having friend(s) born in NZ (yes=1, no=0), (5) Member of 
association(s) in NZ (yes=1, no=0), (6) Voting participation in NZ (yes=1, no=0), (7) Owning real 
estate in NZ (yes=1, no=0), (8) Owning a business in NZ (yes=1, no=0), and (9) Having 
investment project(s) in NZ (yes=1, no=0) 
64 0 1.63 -2.82 2.6 
Ties The first principal component of seven indicators: (1) Having close family member(s) in VN 
(yes=1, no=0), (2) Frequency of visiting VN (yes=1, no=0), (3) Member of association(s) in VN 
(yes=1, no=0), (4) Frequency of remitting money to VN (yes=1, no=0), (5) Owning real estate in 
VN (yes=1, no=0), (6) Owning a business in VN (yes=1, no=0), and (7) Having investment 
project(s) in VN (yes=1, no=0) 
64 0 1.48 -1.54 5.77 
The importance of 
institutional quality 
The first principal component of 30 five-point Likert-scale answers, presenting the self-reported 
importance of institutional quality in VN to the respondents‟ return intentions  
64 0 4.31 -10.46 6.80 
Notes: Close family members include spouses, dependent children, grown-up children, and parents. Associations include transnational associations, professional 
associations, community associations, religious associations, and political parties. Integration, ties and the importance of institutional quality are measured by a score with a 
mean of zero. Higher scores for integration represent higher levels of attachment to the host country. Higher scores for ties represent a stronger linkage with VN. Higher 
scores for the importance of institutional quality indicate that the respondents placed more importance on institutional quality in VN when considering repatriation. Missing 






As report in Table 5.1, the estimated MWTP is, on average, 79.80 NZD per 
week. This is about 13 per cent of the income a Vietnamese migrant earned per 
week on average in NZ in 2016 but is roughly 33 per cent of the average weekly 
wage in VN.28 This is the compensating variation that the respondents would be 
willing to give up per week for the rest of their working lives in exchange for an 
improvement in institutional quality in VN by one unit benchmarked against 
institutional quality in NZ as per the perception of the respondents. This 
compensating variation represents the implicit monetary value of a positive change 
in institutional quality in VN elicited by means of the CV questions administered to 
Vietnamese migrants living on NZ. 
Table 5.2: Pearson's Correlations of MWTP and Continuous Variables 
 MWTP 
Age 0.30** 




The importance of institutional quality 0.20 
Notes: N=64. ** p < 0.05. 
 
To identify the determinants of the estimated MWTP, we initially conduct 
bivariate analyses. Table 5.2 reports Pearson's correlation coefficients between 
MWTP and the continuous variables. Although MWTP is positively correlated with 
all of the continuous variables, only age and duration-of-stay have a statistically 
significant correlation with MWTP at the five per cent level of significance. Table 
                                                   
28 The average weekly wage in VN was 243.72 NZD in 2016. This number was calculated from 
the Labour Market Reports published by the Ministry of Labour – Invalids and Social Affairs of 
VN (MOLISA) and converted to NZ dollars at the 2016 purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange 
rate of 5,113.55 VN dongs per NZ dollar, calculated using data on the Implied PPP Conversion 





5.3 examines whether mean values of MWTP vary across the categorical variables. 
Due to the high standard deviation (SD) in MWTP (see Table 5.1), there is no 
evidence of significant differences in mean values of MWTP by gender, marital 
status, education, and return intentions of the respondents. Mean values of MWTP 
differ significantly by the respondents‟ legal status in NZ at the five per cent level.  






Full sample 64 79.80  
Gender    
Male 30 114.98 
0.226 
Female 34 48.76 
Marital status    
Married or in a long-term relationship 40 73.93 
0.782 
Otherwise 24 89.58 
Education    
Postgraduate 21 111.71 
0.415 
Otherwise 43 64.22 
Legal status in NZ    
Permanent residency or citizenship 45 114.72 
0.047 
Otherwise 19 -2.91 
Return intention    
Yes 11 102.55 
0.706 
Otherwise 53 75.08 
 
Since our sample size is small, we allow only two independent variables to 
enter OLS regressions at a time to identify the determining factors of the 
estimated MWTP. The bivariate analyses reveal that age, duration-of-stay, and 
legal status in NZ are potential determinants of MWTP. Therefore, we 
successively examine the effect of each of these variables with one control 
variable at a time. The estimated coefficient for age is significantly positive 
regardless of the control variable in the regression, unless duration-of-stay is 
controlled for. Similarly, the estimated coefficient for duration-of-stay is 




for. Notably, the effect of the importance of institutional quality is stat istically 
significant, when included with duration-of-stay, even though the raw correlation 
(see Table 5.2) with MWTP was not statistically significant. The estimated 
coefficient for legal status in NZ is significantly positive across all regressions, 
unless age, duration-of-stay, or integration is controlled for. The importance of 
institutional quality also has a significantly positive relationship with MWTP 
when included with legal status. Drawing from these multivariate analyses, we 
identify four potential determinants of MWTP, i.e. age, duration-of-stay, legal 
status in NZ, and the importance of institutional quality. 
Our final specification examines the effects of these four potential 
determinants. Since the correlation coefficient between age and duration-of-stay 
was 0.66, we exclude duration-of-stay from the final specification to reduce the 
possibility of multi-collinearity issues. Although the estimates are based on a 
small sample, Table 5.4 shows that age and the importance of institutional quality 
each have significantly positive influence on MWTP at the ten per cent level, after 
also controlling for legal status in NZ. The effect of age indicates that older 
respondents were more likely to have a higher MWTP. This finding is plausible 
since there is evidence that older migrants may be more likely to want to 
repatriate (Waldorf, 1995; Carling and Pettersen, 2014; Bilgili and Siegel, 2017; 
Paparusso and Ambrosetti, 2017, Tran et al., 2018b). The effect of the importance 
of institutional quality reveals that those respondents who placed more importance 
on institutional quality in VN when considering repatriation were more likely to 
have a higher MWTP.29 
 
                                                   




Table 5.4: OLS Regressions of MWTP 
Age 5.033* 
 (2.657) 
Legal status in NZ 91.538 
 (58.771) 




Prob > F 0.022 
RMSE 207.056 
Notes: N = 64. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 * p < 0.1. 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
This study conducts a pioneering exercise to measure the intensity of 
preference of international migrants for home-country institutional quality by 
means of the CVM, showing that the quality of institutions is important to their 
migration decisions. Since our research design involves comparing individuals, 
migrants in this study were assumed to face the same net migration costs and have 
the same marginal utility of the available amenities. Based on this assumption, we 
estimate that Vietnamese migrants living in NZ would be willing to pay, on 
average, NZD 79.80 per week for the rest of their working lives for a one-unit of 
improvement in institutional quality in VN benchmarked against institutional 
quality in NZ as per their perception of the institutional quality gap between the 
two countries. The estimated willingness to pay is positively associated with the 
respondent‟s age and the importance that they place on institutional quality in VN 
when considering repatriation. By showing that migrants are willing to give up 
part of their economic benefit for better home-country institutional quality, the 
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Chapter 6: International Migration and Institutional Quality in the Home 
Country: It Matters Where You Go and How Long You Stay30 
6.1 Introduction 
International migration is a global phenomenon that continues to attract 
huge scholarly and policy attention. The question of whether international 
migrants yield net benefits to host countries, or are to their detriment, remains 
under debate, but there is broad consensus about the significant agency role of 
international migrants in improving development in their home countries. In this 
paper, we investigate the influence of diasporas on institutional quality in the 
home country and pay close attention to variation in institutional quality among 
host countries and the length of stay of migrants in those countries. 
Kapur and McHale (2005) and Kapur (2010) developed a framework that 
suggests four channels by which international migration affects home countries, 
namely the prospect channel, absence channel, diaspora channel, and return 
channel. The prospect and absence channels are perceived to introduce negative 
impacts in home countries, because of the potential costs, such as a brain drain, 
borne by home countries as a result of emigration. By contrast, the diaspora and 
return channels are expected to deliver positive effects. The diaspora and return 
channels are notable for their pro-democratization potential that relies on the 
diffusion of norms and political ideas by migrants from host countries to home 
countries. Drawing on extant studies arguing for migration experience as a 
relevant factor for institutional development, migrants are generally recognized 
                                                   
30 This chapter is currently under review: 
Tran, N. T. M., Cameron, M. P., & Poot, J. (forthcoming). International Migration and 
Institutional Quality in the Home Country: It Matters Where You Go and How Long You Stay. 




not only as an advantageous resource for development, but also as “political 
actors and potential agents of democracy” (Piper and Rother, 2015, p.6).  
The interconnection between international migration and democracy has in 
recent years been identified as a novel research agenda (Rüland et al., 2009). 
Some evidence already exists of the positive impacts of international migration on 
institutional quality in home countries generated via the diaspora channel 
(Spilimbergo, 2009; Pfutze, 2012; Beine and Sekkat, 2013; Docquier et al., 2016; 
Karadja and Prawitz, 2016; Li et al., 2016; Barsbai et al., 2017; Rapoport, 2018) 
and via the return channel (Ammassari, 2004; Batista and Vicente, 2011; Chauvet 
and Mercier, 2014; Tuccio et al., 2016).  
Research that investigates the diaspora channel aims to examine the 
feedback of migrant stocks or foreign-educated students on home countries‟ 
quality of institutions. The findings broadly support the role of diasporic 
communities in promoting institutional development. However, international 
migration is a multi-faceted phenomenon that has been increasingly characterized 
by the temporariness of migration decisions. OECD (2008) estimated that roughly 
20 to 50 per cent of long-term immigrants left the host country within five years 
after arrival. In a recent publication on temporary migration, Dustmann and 
Görlach (2016) found that 50 per cent of immigrants to Europe moved again 
within ten years after their arrival. The connection between duration-of-stay and 
the propensity to re-migrate of an individual was grounded in the Cornell mobility 
model of the 1960s, which incorporates the principle of cumulative inertia. This 
well-established principle states that the probability of an individual remaining in 
a residential area increases as his/her length of prior residence in that area extends 




that international return migration is dependent on assimilation in the host country 
and attachment to the home country. Because assimilation and duration-of-stay in 
the host country mutually reinforce, longer duration-of-stay facilitates deeper 
integration, and thereby lowers the tendency for repatriation. Putting it differently, 
shorter duration-of-stay increases the temporariness of migration decisions. 
Dustmann and Görlach (2016) argue that permanent migrants are quite different 
from their non-permanent counterparts in terms of motivations. Hence this may 
trigger heterogeneity, with respect to duration of residence, in migrants‟ behaviour 
and choices. Consequently, in this paper we take into account the temporariness of 
migration when assessing the influence of international migrants on institutional 
quality in their home countries. 
Since the influence of diasporas on home countries is generated from afar, it 
is essential that there are strong transnational links through which diasporic 
communities retain cross-border interactions with their networks back home. 
Previous studies have documented that trans-border social ties and long-distance 
communications between migrants and non-migrants shape the political views of 
those left behind (Pérez-Armendáriz, 2014; Córdova and Hiskey, 2015; Meseguer 
et al., 2016). In the strand of literature on return intentions, migrants who wish to 
repatriate demonstrate stronger attachment to the home country (de Haas and 
Fokkema, 2011; Carling and Pettersen, 2014; Paparusso and Ambrosetti, 2017). 
More specifically, migrants who have return intentions are more likely to remain 
concerned about their home countries as well as to maintain relationships with 
their left-behind networks (see e.g. McCann et al., 2010). For permanent migrants, 
who will have a longer duration-of-stay on average, those links are plausibly 




duration-of-stay is a predictor of the strength of transnational links with the home 
country that channel the diffusion of norms. We believe that this research 
endeavour is timely in the context of the huge growth in temporary migration in 
recent years. Specifically, we answer two research questions: (i) Do diasporas in 
developed host countries have a positive impact on institutional quality in their 
home countries?; and (ii) Does the revealed impact differ by diasporas‟ duration-
of-stay in the host country? 
To answer the first question, we regress institutional quality on diaspora size 
– while accounting of course for the scale effect of home country population. 
Immigrant stocks, calculated from the Database on Immigrants in OECD 
Countries (DIOC) (Dumont and Lamaitre, 2006; Widmaier and Dumont, 2011; 
Arslan et al., 2014), are used to measure the diaspora size in developed countries. 
However, the transnational norm diffusion of diasporas will depend on the 
diasporas‟ absorption of institutions in the host countries, with institutional quality 
varying between these countries. We therefore posit Hypothesis 1: That diasporas 
in higher-institutional-quality host countries have a more positive impact on 
institutional quality in home countries than diasporas in lower-institutional-quality 
host countries. To test this hypothesis, we modify the measure of diaspora size by 
replacing the simple immigrant stocks with institutional-quality-adjusted 
immigrant stocks. This augmented measure is theoretically more meaningful and 
empirically more robust than a simple migrant stock variable. 
With respect to the second research question, duration-of-stay in host 
countries is utilized as an indicator of the strength of interactions with the home 
country. Since migrants with shorter duration-of-stay are more likely to maintain 




characterized by shorter duration-of-stay have a more positive impact on 
institutional quality in home countries than that of diasporas with longer duration-
of-stay. To test this hypothesis, we split the sample of international migrants into 
two sub-samples distinguished by shorter versus longer duration-of-stay. Then, by 
comparing the magnitude of the estimated coefficients associated with diaspora 
size obtained from regressions for these sub-samples, we test Hypothesis 2. 
To account for the endogeneity of migration and reverse causality (clearly, 
lower institutional quality might trigger more emigration), our cross-sectional and 
panel analyses use instrumental variables. Our results reconfirm the positive 
impact of diasporas on institutional quality in home countries. We also find 
significant evidence that supports the two hypotheses stated above. The remainder 
of this paper is structured as follows. Section 6.2 reviews the literature on the role 
of international migration in the evolution of institutional quality in home 
countries. Section 6.3 presents the applied research method. Section 6.4 describes 
the data. Section 6.5 reports the results and Section 6.6 concludes. 
6.2 Literature Review 
In the extant literature on economic development, international migration 
has been identified as a crucial transmission channel of institutional quality, 
thereby potentially contributing to better economic performance (Bertocchi and 
Strozzi, 2008). International migrants, especially from less developed countries, 
are believed to experience and acquire norms and traits of the population of 
developed host countries. They are argued to be able to transfer the absorbed 
norms to their home countries via the diaspora and return channels. Hence, in this 
regard, international migrants are claimed to be agents of change in their home 




of democratic institutions who help strengthen democracy in their home countries 
(Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow, 2010). Rüland et al. (2009) mapped out three 
pathways of norm diffusion: changes of attitudes at the individual level, collective 
action, and institutional change at the national and global levels. Scholars in this 
field have contributed empirical evidence supporting these claims at both the 
micro and macro levels. 
At the micro level, researchers have explored the behaviour of individual 
migrants by means of case studies. Ammassari (2004) carried out a survey of return 
migrants in Ghana and Côte d‟Ivoire to explore the socio-cultural and political 
change brought by economically active elite return migrants to their home 
economies and societies. Based on quantitative and qualitative analyses, this study 
found that Ghanaian and Ivorian elite migrants acquired significant human capital 
abroad, and that its transfer through the return channel has positive development 
impacts on both the public and private sector in these West African countries. Other 
micro level studies have applied quantitative methods to assess the contributions of 
migrants on political institutions in their home countries via migrants‟ voting 
behaviour. Batista and Vicente (2011) conducted a voting experiment to measure 
the demand for political accountability in Cape Verde. By regressing the voting 
decisions of respondents on local emigrant stocks, they found a positive impact of 
emigration on the demand for improved political accountability. Especially 
migrants who returned from countries with better governance were found to trigger 
a significantly stronger impact. A number of studies in this area have utilized real 
electoral outcomes as a proxy for the demand for better political institutions. By 
regressing the electoral outcomes of municipal elections on the proportion of 




migration and the probability of voting for the opposition party in Mexico (Pfutze, 
2012) and in Mali (Chauvet and Mercier, 2014). Barsbai et al. (2017) found a 
negative effect of emigration on the share of votes for the Communist Party in the 
Moldovan elections in 2009-2010. Tuccio et al. (2016)‟s work on return migration 
in Morocco suggested that return migration, especially from Western countries, not 
only has a positive impact on the political attitudes of return migrants, but also 
alters their behaviour, as reflected in a positive correlation between regional 
returnee shares and participation rates in the 2011 political elections. Generally, 
these studies show the presence of democratic spill-over effects from developed 
countries to less developed countries through migration. 
At the macro level, researchers have conducted cross-national analyses to 
examine the role of migrant stocks in institutional improvement. Spilimbergo 
(2009) carried out a dynamic panel analysis to explore the relationship between 
foreign education and democracy. The regressions showed a positive relationship 
between foreign education acquired from democratic countries and democracy 
promotion in home countries. Docquier et al. (2016) augmented the model of 
democracy‟s determinants by adding the emigration rate as an independent 
variable, and found robust positive impacts of the emigration rate on democracy 
and on economic freedom in home countries. Beine and Sekkat (2013) evaluated 
the effect of the emigration rate on institutional quality in home countries as 
measured by six indicators that are included in the World Governance Indicators 
(WGI) reported by the World Bank. Their findings confirmed direct positive 
impacts of the total emigration rate on five out of the six indicators. The only 
indicator that was negatively affected was “Voice and Accountability”. Instead of 




predetermined levels of human capital measures on ex-post institutional outcomes. 
They found a positive effect of emigrant human capital on political institutions in 
home countries, but a negative effect on economic institutions. 
Most of these studies encounter a potential endogeneity problem due to the 
two-way relationship between international migration and institutional quality: 
past migrants may impact on institutional quality, but institutional quality is also 
one of the determinants of migration. Researchers have handled this problem by 
investigating dynamic panels or by employing an instrumental variable strategy. 
A thorough discussion of these solutions to the endogeneity problem can be found 
in Docquier et al. (2016). They combined external instruments, including a 
gravity-model-based predicted emigration rate and climatic variables, with 
internal instruments using a system GMM estimator. In light of the robust results 
generated by different specifications and identification methods, Docquier et al. 
(2016) conclude that emigration to liberal democracies has an important and 
positive role to play in institutional change in home countries. 
Macro-level studies have also pondered the heterogeneity of the stock of 
migrants. Empirically, education is almost the sole attribute of migrants that has 
been taken into consideration in the literature to date. The conventional strategy is 
to run regressions contrasting migrant stocks characterized by different education 
levels, i.e. high-skilled migrants versus low-skilled migrants (e.g. Beine and 
Sekkat, 2013; Docquier et al., 2016; Li et al., 2016). However, other attributes that 
might extend our knowledge of how diasporas impact on institutional quality have 
been left untouched. Given the growth of temporary migration, it is important to 
investigate the role of duration-of-stay in assessing the transmission of host 




migrants between host countries of varying institutional quality may matter too. 
As noted in the introductory section, we carry out both extensions of the current 
literature in this paper. 
6.3 Research Method 
We assembled a panel of data by pooling data on immigrant stocks in 
selected OECD host countries at three points in time (2000/01, 2005/06 and 
2010/11) to analyse the impact of diasporas on institutional quality in home 
countries, while controlling for known important determinants of institutional 
quality in the extant literature. To account for unobserved factors, the following 
econometric model was estimated: 
                                         (1) 
where     is institutional quality of home country i at time t,     is a vector of 
time-varying economic and demographic control variables for home country i at 
time t,    represents country-specific time-invariant control variables for home 
country i,    is a set of dummy variables denoting time fixed effects, and      is an 
error term. The variable of interest            is the natural logarithm of the 
aggregate immigrant stock (the diaspora) from home country i residing in selected 
OECD host countries at time t. This aggregate immigrant stock is given by: 
         ∑         
 
   
 (2) 
where           is the number of immigrants from home country i residing in 
host country j at time t. Authors of the extant empirical work in this strand of 
literature have tended to use rates rather than stocks to quantify emigration. The 
reason is that the diffusion of norms is expected to be dependent on the size of 




logarithm of the migration rate,                 ⁄  , is equal to the logarithm of 
the diaspora stock,            , minus the logarithm of population,        , such 
a specification imposes a constraint that the coefficient on population as a 
determinant of institutional quality is the negative of the coefficient on diaspora 
stock. Given that the population stock proxies for the native-born population, 
which is the natural denominator of the migration rate, and given that the 
magnitude of a population scale effect is a priori uncertain, imposing such a 
constraint on the coefficients is unnecessarily restrictive. Hence by using the 
natural logarithms of the aggregate immigrant stock and the population stock as 
two separate variables, we provide a flexible way to measuring the impact of 
diasporas and population scale on institutional quality in the home country. 
 Existing empirical studies have identified a wide range of determinants of 
institutional quality, encompassing economic, demographic and geographic 
factors (e.g. Alesina et al., 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004; Acemoglu et al., 2005, 2008; 
Castelló-Climent, 2008; Djankov et al., 2008; Spilimbergo, 2009; Brown, 2010; 
Docquier et al., 2016). In this paper, we include income, trade openness, and 
education as time-varying control variables, besides the population variable 
discussed above. Additionally, we also consider unearned foreign income, i.e. 
international aid and remittances, based on recent findings on the negative impact 
of such income on institutional quality (Ahmed, 2012, 2013). We also control for 
a wide range of country-specific variables that are assumed to be time-invariant – 
including ethnic fractionalization, latitude, land area, being a landlocked country, 
legal origin, colonial heritage, violent independence, and being an oil exporter. 
All of these could potentially affect institutional quality. Time fixed effects are 




 We initially estimate the econometric model by means of pooled-data 
ordinary least squares (OLS). However, this estimator is likely to produce biased 
estimates due to the problem caused by the widely recognized potential reverse 
causal relationship between institutional quality and diaspora stocks. 
Consequently, we also apply a two-stage least squares (2SLS) strategy with an 
external weather-based instrumental variable, as employed by Batista et al. (2017) 
and Docquier et al. (2016). Our instrumental variable is the home-country-specific 
number of natural disaster occurrences, rather than the impact of natural disasters 
(lives lost, property damage, etc.), which is a credibly relevant and plausibly 
exogenous instrument. Often the validity of instrumental variables is questioned, 
since the exclusion restriction is likely to be violated in many empirical situations. 
In our case, it could be suggested that natural disasters may have a negative 
impact on institutional quality, directly – as in the recent case of Haiti, for 
example – or indirectly, through income shocks (Brückner and Ciccone, 2011). 
Therefore, we perform sensitivity analysis of potential violation of the exclusion 
restriction to check the robustness of the 2SLS estimates when a direct impact of 
the instrumental variable on the dependent variable (labelled  ) is allowed for. We 
adopt the bounds methods developed by Conley et al. (2012) that relax the strict 
exclusion restriction, i.e.    . The first method, the Union of Confidence 
Interval (UCI), produces confidence intervals on the coefficient associated with 
diaspora size in an assumed range of   [     ]. The second method, the “  
Local-to-Zero” (LTZ) approximation, generates bounds of the coefficient of 
interest when   is assumed to follow a distribution. These methods have been 
successfully employed by empirical researchers as a test for the validity of 




 We then carry out a panel analysis using the random effects instrumental 
variable (RE-IV) estimator to capture both within and between variations while 
also controlling for reverse causality. We also consider the alternative fixed 
effects (FE) estimator, but according to Allison (2009), the FE estimator is likely 
to yield imprecise and insignificant estimates if the variables of interest vary 
greatly across countries, but have little within variation over the available time 
span of the data, as is the case for institutional quality and the size of migrant 
stocks. In any case we find, by using the Wald test recommended by Allison 
(2009), that the FE model is rejected in favour of the RE model and therefore we 
discard the FE estimator in subsequent regressions. 
 Given the variations in institutional quality between host countries, it can be 
argued that using the simple immigrant stock to measure diaspora size, irrespective of 
the distribution of immigrants across host countries, is a less meaningful concept than 
an institutional-quality-adjusted migrant stock. Therefore, besides the immigrant 
stock (        ) in Equation (1), we also consider a measure of institutional-quality-
adjusted immigrant stock (         ) which is defined as follows: 
                    ∑(     
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Hence 
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where     is the institutional quality index for host country j at time t and  ̅  is 
average value of the institutional quality index for all countries at time t, given by: 
 ̅  
 
 
∑   
 
   
 (6) 
The idea to account for institutional quality variation across host countries 
when considering the stock of diaspora or international students from a home 
country has been implemented previously (see e.g. Spilimbergo, 2009; Beine and 
Sekkat, 2013). However, the attractiveness of our institutional-quality-adjusted 
immigrant stock approach is that it relates to the diaspora size by simply 
multiplying an adjustment factor (or equivalently, adding an adjustment factor 
after taking natural logarithms). If the calculated adjustment factor is greater than 
one (or zero in logarithmic form), a country‟s diaspora live disproportionally in 
higher institutional quality host countries. In this scenario, the institutional-
quality-adjusted immigrant stock becomes greater than the simple immigrant 
stock. The opposite is true if the adjustment factor is smaller than one (or negative 
in logarithmic form). 
By comparing the estimated coefficients of             and           , 
we seek evidence supporting Hypothesis 1. As a robustness check, we also divide 
the selected OECD host countries into sub-samples of higher-institutional-quality 
and lower-institutional-quality countries made up of those above and below  ̅  
respectively. Then we run regressions contrasting the effects of immigrant stocks 
related to these two sub-samples on institutional quality. The estimated coefficient 
of            in the sub-sample of higher-institutional-quality host countries is 
expected to be larger than the coefficient in the sub-sample of lower-institutional-




Duration-of-stay is the key factor for answering the second research 
question, i.e. testing Hypothesis 2. A threshold of ten years living in selected 
OECD host countries was chosen to establish two sub-samples. We isolate 
immigrant stocks with duration-of-stay of less than or equal to ten years (shorter 
duration-of-stay) from those with duration-of-stay of more than ten years (longer 
duration-of-stay). The choice of this threshold was guided by previous literature, 
e.g. Dustmann and Görlach (2016), as it has been found that this split effectively 
separates the stock into predominantly temporary and predominantly permanent 
migration. 31  By simultaneously running regressions contrasting institutional-
quality-adjusted immigrant stocks characterized by shorter duration-of-stay with 
those characterized by longer duration-of stay, we seek evidence supporting the 
second hypothesis, namely that the impact of temporary migrants on institutional 
quality in home countries is larger than that of permanent migrants. 
6.4 Data 
6.4.1 Institutional Quality 
We use the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)32 reported by the World 
Bank as our primary measure of institutional quality. The WGI were initially 
developed by  Kaufmann et al. (1999) to quantify six dimensions of institutional 
development at the country level, namely: Voice and Accountability; Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism; Government Effectiveness; 
Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; and Control of Corruption. Each indicator at the 
country level is measured in percentile rank terms ranging from zero to 100, with 
                                                   
31 These authors combined evidence from several academic studies to illustrate the temporariness 
of a considerable share of migration. They found that out-migration rates of traditional immigrant 
receiving countries and Europe are highest during the first decade since arrival. As a robustness 
check, we calculated the average duration-of-stay of immigrant stocks in the selected OECD host 
countries across the three points in time. The calculated average value of 9.312 reinforces our 





higher values corresponding to better governance. Principal component analysis 
(PCA) showed that the first principal component of the six WGI indicators accounts 
for 84 per cent of the overall variance. The six WGI indicators have quite similar 
factor loadings in the first principal component (see Tables 6.5 and 6.6 in the 
Chapter Appendix). Hence we use a simple average score across the six WGI 
indicators (labelled awgi) as an appropriate overall measure of institutional quality. 
To test the robustness of our results, we also use alternative measures of 
institutional quality, including the Political Rights Index, the Civil Liberties Index, 
the Economic Freedom of the World Index, and the Polity2 Score. The Political 
Rights Index (pr) and the Civil Liberties Index (cl) are reported in the Freedom in 
the World data set published by Freedom House.33 In this data set, each country is 
rated on these two dimensions by a score that ranges from one (the most free) to 
seven (the least free). Because we wish to consistently signal with each indicator 
that higher values correspond with greater institutional quality, the Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties Indices are re-scored to a range from one for the least 
free to seven for the most free countries. The Economic Freedom of the World 
Index (efw) has been calculated by the Fraser Institute.34 This index is scored out 
of 10, with higher scores representing a higher degree of freedom. The POLITY 
IV data series provide a set of variables measuring cross-country authority 
features.35 We use the Polity2 score (polity2), a combined score that ranges from 
+10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). For convenience in 
comparing and interpreting results, all the alternative institutional quality 
indicators are rescaled so that their data values fit within a uniform scale ranging 
from zero to 100. 
                                                   






6.4.2 Immigrant Stocks 
International migration can be measured as either flows or stocks of migrants. 
While migrant flows embody the dynamism of transnational mobility, migrant 
stocks – particularly immigrant stocks – represent diaspora size. In this paper, we 
use data on immigrant stocks extracted from the DIOC database.36 This database 
contains rich information on the demographic and labour market attributes of 
immigrant stocks residing in OECD countries. Specifically, the information on 
duration-of-stay of the foreign-born population aged 15 and over has been under-
utilized in migration studies to date, but is an important variable for this paper. 
The DIOC database covers the 2000-2010 time frame in five year intervals. 
In other words, we have data on immigrant stocks at three points in time, 
pertaining to 2000/01, 2005/06 and 2010/11. Since the number of OECD 
countries has changed over this decade, we exclude those countries for which 
immigrant stocks are not available at all three points in time. We also drop OECD 
countries that have been relatively minor recipients of immigrants, such as 
Mexico. These restrictions generate a consistent sample of immigrant stocks 
residing in 21 OECD countries, by country of origin. However, immigrant stocks 
are not reported for all home-host country pairs. To remedy this shortcoming in 
the data, we imputed missing immigrant stocks by means of linear interpolation or 
extrapolation. The home countries have been restricted to those in which at least 
in one of the three periods there are no less than 1,000 diaspora in the selected 
host countries in total (        ≥1,000). This restriction leaves out small island 
nations, and thereby eliminates some undesirable heterogeneity. The resulting 
immigrant stock matrix is a two-way table reflecting migration from 131 home 





countries to 21 OECD host countries (see Tables 6.7 and 6.8 in the Chapter 
Appendix). Table 6.1 summarizes various counts of the immigrant stock for the 
diasporas. The total immigrant stock as defined above increased by roughly 
between 40-50 per cent over the decade, dependent on the selected measure. 
Table 6.1: Summary Statistics of Immigrant Stocks 
Period Obs. Sum Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Immigrant stocks 
2000/01 131  45,121.17   344.44   834.21    1.79   8,326.61  
2005/06 131  59,291.36   452.61   1,087.09    2.23   10,783.20  
2010/11 131  66,540.16   507.94   1,166.84    2.68   11,312.32  
 
Institutional-quality-adjusted immigrant stocks 
2000/01 131  44,330.24   338.40   822.06    1.77   8,213.02  
2005/06 131  57,689.57   440.38   1,052.21    2.27   10,383.15  
2010/11 131  63,354.22   483.62   1,095.70    2.74   10,495.08  
       
Immigrant stocks in higher-institutional-quality host countries 
2000/01 131  11,444.22   87.36   224.05    0.08   1,631.67  
2005/06 131  15,094.69   115.23   295.06    0.04   2,061.02  
2010/11 131  16,168.38   123.42   289.83    0.02   1,875.22  
       
Immigrant stocks in lower-institutional-quality host countries 
2000/01 131  33,676.94   257.08   770.19    0.42   8,282.43  
2005/06 131  44,196.67   337.38   998.41    0.48   10,719.69  
2010/11 131  50,371.77   384.52   1,064.98    0.55   11,220.84  
       
Institutional-quality-adjusted immigrant stocks with shorter duration-of-stay 
2000/01 131  16,166.18   123.41   341.43    0.68   3,577.95  
2005/06 131  20,918.09   159.68   393.68    0.76   3,861.25  
2010/11 131  20,756.93   158.45   328.07    0.54   2,643.37  
       
Institutional-quality-adjusted immigrant stocks with longer duration-of-stay 
2000/01 131  26,712.87   203.92   492.58    0.30   4,687.63  
2005/06 131  33,814.07   258.12   637.52    0.50   6,232.58  
2010/11 131  41,074.57   313.55   802.76    1.48   8,135.39  
Notes: Numbers are in thousands of migrants. Higher-institutional-quality host 
countries (those above the mean institutional quality in this sample): AUS, AUT, 
CAN, CHE, DEU, DNK, FIN, IRL, LUX, NLD, NOR, NZL, and SWE. Lower-
institutional-quality host countries (those below the mean institutional quality in 
this sample): BEL, ESP, FRA, GBR, GRC, ITA, PRT, and USA. Shorter 
duration-of-stay relates to the immigrant stocks with duration- of-stay of less than 
or equal to ten years, while longer duration-of-stay relates to immigrant stocks 





Categorical data on duration-of-stay in the DIOC database varied across 
time and (host, home) country pairs. However, it was possible to consistently split 
the migrant stocks into those in the host country for less than or equal to ten years 
and those in the host country for longer than ten years. As discussed above, it is 
reasonable to expect that temporary migrants are a large proportion of the former 
category. 
6.4.3 Time-Varying Control Variables 
Income, measured in the natural logarithm of per capita GDP in constant 
2010 U.S. dollars (lngdp), enters the econometric model as a conventional, but 
important, control variable. However, although income per capita and institutional 
quality exhibit an unquestionably positive correlation, academics provide mixed 
results for the statistical significance and causal direction of the relationship 
between these two variables. While Acemoglu et al. (2008) found no causal effect 
of GDP per capita on democracy, a number of other studies have identified a 
positive and statistically significant effect (e.g. Brückner et al., 2011; Heid et al., 
2012; Benhabib et al., 2013). Further consideration of this causality issue is 
beyond the scope of the present paper. 
Unearned foreign income consists of foreign aid and remittances received 
by households. This income accounts for a large sub-category of international 
capital flows, and it has recently been alleged that greater dependence on 
unearned foreign income leads to lower institutional quality. For instance, 
Djankov et al. (2008) found a negative impact of foreign aid on political 
institutions. Ahmed (2013) provided empirical evidence that remittances cause 
institutional quality decay in poor countries with less democratic institutions. 




government survival in autocracies (Ahmed, 2012). To gauge a country‟s 
dependence on unearned foreign income, we consider the sum of foreign aid and 
remittances as a share of GDP (remit_oda). 
Trade openness has been customarily considered to be associated with 
institutional improvement, since the process of engaging in international trade is 
likely to impose requirements of reforming domestic institutions to comply with 
international standards. The idea that openness to international trade is positively 
correlated with institutional quality is supported by a number of recent empirical 
studies (e.g. Rodrik et al., 2004; Brown, 2010). We control for the degree to 
which a country engages in international trade by including the ratio of total 
imports plus exports of goods and services to GDP (openness).  
The natural logarithm of population size (lnpop) is commonly employed as a 
control variable in most empirical studies on determinants of institutional quality. It 
serves two functions. On the one hand it addresses the issue of whether the diaspora 
stock or rate is the appropriate migration variable. On the other hand, population 
size may also have an intrinsically negative relationship with institutions such as 
democracy (Acemoglu et al., 2005, 2008; Benhabib et al., 2013). 
Education may be expected to be correlated positively with institutional 
quality. However, the question of whether education can causally influence 
institutional quality remains controversial. Acemoglu et al. (2005) challenged the 
common expectation of a causal effect of education on institutional quality. They 
found that the effect of average years of schooling on democracy disappears when 
accounting for country-specific factors. However, Glaeser et al. (2007) proposed a 
model that suggests that countries with higher levels of education are more likely 




of education on institutional quality (e.g. Bobba and Coviello, 2007; Castelló-
Climent, 2008; Murtin and Wacziarg, 2014). To capture variation in levels of 
education across countries, we employ the Education Index (edu), an indicator of 
the Human Development Index calculated by using Mean Years of Schooling and 
Expected Years of Schooling. The index is standardized within a range from zero 
to one, with higher values corresponding to more education. 
Table 6.2: Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables and Time-Varying 
Control Variables 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Average of WGI 393 42.83 23.10 1.29 98.30 
(awgi)      
Political Rights Index  390 55.38 34.69 0.00 100.00 
(pr)      
Civil Liberties Index  390 56.88 27.73 0.00 100.00 
(cl)      
Economic Freedom  279 66.13 8.89 29.30 90.50 
(efw)      
Polity2 Score  360 64.76 30.81 0.00 100.00 
(polity2)      
GDP per capita 393 7,420.25 10,915.45 196.78 70,870.23 
(constant 2010 US$)      
Foreign aid and  393 2.86 4.73 0.00 40.87 
remittances (% of GDP)      
Trade openness 393 88.96 55.47 0.00 432.95 
(% of GDP)      
Population 393 41,029.56 152,503.85 69.68 1,337,705.00 
(thousands)      
Education index  393 0.56 0.17 0.12 0.88 
Note: The observations pool the years 2000/01, 2005/06 and 2010/11. 
 
Data on GDP, GDP per capita, remittances, total imports and exports of 
goods and services, and population size were assembled from the World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank.37 Data on ODA disbursements were 
collected from the OECD International Development Statistics (IDS) online 





database.38 Data on the Education Index were extracted from the UNDP Human 
Development Reports.39 Table 6.2 provides summary statistics for the measures of 
institutional quality and the time-varying control variables. 
6.4.4 Other Variables 
With regard to the variables that are assumed time-invariant, there is a 
growing consensus in the academic literature that country-specific cultural, 
geographical and historical variables matter for institutional quality. In this paper, 
we control for ethnic fractionalization, country latitude in absolute value (i.e. a 
measure of distance from the equator), natural logarithm of land area, and dummy 
variables for landlocked countries, legal origin, colonial heritage, violent 
independence, and oil-exporting countries. The ethnic fractionalization index was 
developed by Alesina et al. (2003). Geographic data and data on colonial heritage 
were taken from the French Centre for Research and Studies on the World 
Economy (CEPII) database.40 Data on legal origin were collected from La Porta et 
al. (2008). Violent independence status was drawn from the Issue Correlates of 
War (ICOW) Colonial History Data Set.41 A dummy variable for being an oil-
exporter was derived from the global data set of oil and gas production and 
exports, 1932-2011 (Ross 2013). 
Finally, the instrumental variable that we use to account for the potential 
endogeneity of diaspora size consists of the natural logarithm of the number of 
occurrences of natural disaster, comprising animal accidents, droughts, 
earthquakes, epidemics, extreme temperatures, floods, impacts, insect infestations, 
landslides, mass movements (dry), storms, volcanic activity, and wildfires since 








1900 at each of the three points in time in the panel. This information was 
gathered from the International Disaster Database (EM-DAT).42 
6.5 Results 
Table 6.3 reports the results derived from different estimating methods, 
related to the role of diasporas as a determinant of institutional quality. The left-
hand block of Table 6.3 reports regressions in which diaspora size is measured by 
the aggregate number of immigrants residing in the selected OECD countries. In 
the right-hand block of regression results, the diaspora stock is quality-weighted 
by the institutional quality of the selected OECD countries. 
First, an F-test was used to choose between FE and pooled OLS estimators. 
The test rejects the null hypothesis that all the fixed effects intercepts are jointly 
zero, therefore FE is preferred. The Breusch-Pagan LM test was then employed to 
decide between the RE and pooled OLS estimators. The test rejects the null 
hypothesis that there are no country-specific random effects, thus RE is preferred. 
To choose between FE and RE estimators, a regression-based test – the Hybrid 
Model (Allison, 2009) – was used as an alternative to the conventional Hausman 
test, since the latter test is too restrictive for applications with known time-
invariant control variables (Wooldridge, 2010). Moreover, in the case of a short 
panel, the Hausman test is biased towards the FE estimator due to relatively large 
standard errors on the fixed effects. The Hybrid Model combines the FE and RE 
approaches into a single model by decomposing each time-varying variable into a 
within-country component and a between-country component, and then fitting a 
RE model with both components. The between-country component is the country-
specific mean of each variable. The within-country component is the deviation 





from that country-specific mean. Conventionally, a RE model assumes that the 
deviation and the mean coefficients are equal. To test this assumption, we apply a 
Wald test for equality across the pairs of coefficients after running the Hybrid 
Model. This regression-based test provides evidence in favour of the RE estimator, 
accepting the null hypothesis of equality across the pairs of coefficients. 
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test provides evidence of the endogeneity of 
diaspora size. Therefore, the instrumental variable – the natural logarithm of the 
number of natural disasters – is employed to handle this problem. The Kleibergen-
Paap Wald rank F-statistic confirms that the chosen instrumental variable is not a 
weak instrument. Comparing the coefficients of diaspora size obtained with the 
pooled OLS estimator reported in columns (1) and (6) of Table 6.3 with those derived 
from the 2SLS strategy reported in columns (4) and (9) respectively, we observe 
much larger coefficients generated by the latter method. These differences signal a 
reverse causality bias nested in the pooled OLS estimation (Docquier et al., 2016). 
Consequently, we focus our attention on the results of the pooled cross-
sectional analysis using a 2SLS strategy, and a panel analysis using the RE-IV 
estimator. The first-stage regressions for the 2SLS models are reported in Table 
6.9 in the Chapter Appendix. As reported in Columns (4), (5), (9) and (10) of 
Table 6.3, diasporas in selected OECD countries (measured as either the 
immigrant stocks or the institutional-quality-adjusted immigrant stocks) have a 
positive influence on institutional quality in their home countries, as measured by 
awgi. More specifically, one per cent change in the diaspora stocks would 
increase the average score across the six WGI indicators, of which scale ranges 
from zero to 100, by roughly 11 to 12 points. Given that the standard deviation of 




Table 6.3: Impacts of Diaspora Size on Institutional Quality, Using Different Estimators 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Diaspora size measured as 
Immigrant stocks 
 Diaspora size measured as 
Institutional-quality-adjusted immigrant stocks 
 
OLS FE RE 2SLS RE-IV  OLS FE RE 2SLS RE-IV 
Diaspora size 0.270 1.387 0.925 11.693** 11.955**  0.325 1.459 0.976 11.659** 12.016** 
(1.008) (1.615) (0.967) (5.086) (4.675)  (1.019) (1.600) (0.969) (4.922) (4.700) 
lngdp 9.059*** 11.148*** 9.388*** 8.653*** 9.556***  9.057*** 11.167*** 9.394*** 8.651*** 9.641*** 
 (1.565) (2.794) (1.346) (2.052) (1.626)  (1.565) (2.794) (1.344) (1.994) (1.615) 
remit_oda -0.380** -0.135 -0.149 -1.025** -0.252  -0.383** -0.134 -0.149 -1.006** -0.240 
 (0.180) (0.119) (0.113) (0.508) (0.225)  (0.181) (0.119) (0.113) (0.487) (0.221) 
openness -0.017 0.025* 0.015 -0.011 0.010  -0.017 0.025* 0.015 -0.011 0.010 
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.012) (0.027) (0.015)  (0.020) (0.014) (0.012) (0.027) (0.015) 
lnpop 0.140 0.446 -0.581 -7.911** -7.696**  0.101 0.424 -0.616 -7.905** -7.746** 
 (1.198) (4.279) (1.184) (3.750) (3.339)  (1.204) (4.283) (1.184) (3.640) (3.364) 
edu 21.761 -13.186 0.541 -7.676 -23.455  21.621 -13.482 0.365 -7.594 -24.591 
 (13.388) (17.525) (12.381) (19.457) (16.179)  (13.381) (17.537) (12.381) (18.914) (16.391) 
R-sq 0.669 0.480 0.639 0.429 0.455  0.669 0.479 0.639 0.434 0.456 
F-test  0.005      0.005    
B-P   <0.001      <0.001   
Wald   0.397      0.391   
DWH    0.002 0.001     0.002 0.001 
KPW    14.233 20.268     14.436 20.268 
Notes: The dependent variable is awgi. Robust standard errors clustered by home country are reported in parentheses. Time-invariant variables and time-fixed 
effects are included. N = 393. F-test: test for the joint significance of the fixed effects intercepts, p-value reported, null hypothesis = all of the fixed effects 
intercepts are jointly zero. B-P: Breusch-Pagan LM test for random effects, p-value reported, null hypothesis = country-specific or time-specific error variance 
components are zero. Wald: Wald test for fixed vs. random effects after the Hybrid Model regression, p-value reported, null hypothesis = pairs of mean and 
deviation score of each time-varying variable are jointly zero. DWH: Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test, p-value reported, null hypothesis = diaspora size is 
exogenous. KPW: Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F-statistic to be compared with Stock-Yogo weak instrument test critical values.  




 in diaspora stocks is about half a standard deviation increase in institutional 
quality. As presented in Columns 7 and 14 of Tables 6.10 and 6.11 in the Chapter 
Appendix, this positive impact is robust across alternative measures of 
institutional quality given by pr, cl, and polity2. The magnitude of the coefficients 
associated with a one per cent change in diaspora size are roughly one standard 
deviation of the dependent variables measured using these indices (see also Table 
6.2). The exception is efw, which has statistically insignificant effects. However, 
there is no evidence in favor of the RE-IV estimator in the case of these 
alternative measures; i.e. the post-Hybrid-Model Wald test rejects the null 
hypothesis of equality across the deviation-mean coefficient pairs. The positive 
and significant coefficients associated with diaspora size in most specifications 
are robust when we exclude developed countries from the list of home countries 
to establish a sub-sample of diasporas from developing countries only (see Table 
6.8 in the Chapter Appendix).43 
The sensitivity analysis results for the 2SLS estimates for awgi using the 
adjusted measure of diaspora size are shown in Figure 6.1. This figure depicts the 
95 per cent confidence bounds of the coefficients associated with diaspora size, 
using Conley et al. (2012) approaches. In this figure, once the bounds encompass 
the zero-line, the institutional effect of diasporas obtained by the 2SLS estimator 
is nullified at the five per cent level of significance. Figure 6.1a plots the UCI 
bounds in the assumed range of   [    ]. These bounds do not include the zero-
line at a negative value of  . Figure 6.1b plots the LTZ bounds when   is assumed 
to follow a simple normal distribution:            These bounds do not 
surround the zero-line at some negative values of   either. These illustrations 
                                                   





imply that the 2SLS estimates are significant at the five per cent level, given a 
negative effect of the instrumental variable on home-country institutional quality. 
In general, the sensitivity analysis results provide evidence that the 2SLS 
estimates are robust to possible violation of the exclusion restriction. The 
sensitivity analysis results for the 2SLS estimates for pr, cl, efw, and polity2 are 
shown in Figure 6.2 in the Chapter Appendix. Those results also support the 
robustness of our 2SLS estimates. 




Notes: This figure presents 95 per cent confidence intervals for the estimated 
coefficients associated with diaspora size under the assumption that the instrumental 
variable has a direct effect on home-country institutional quality, captured by  . 
Figure 6.1a shows the Union of Confidence Intervals (UCI) bounds drawn from 
varying values of   under the assumption that   [     ]. Figure 6.1b depicts the   
Local-to-Zero (LTZ) approximation bounds drawn from varying value of   under 
the assumption that          . The estimates are generated by using the STATA 
command plausexog by Clark (2014). 
With regard to the coefficients for the time-varying control variables, we 
find significant effects of income and population on awgi. The significant 
negative effect of unearned foreign income found in the 2SLS regressions 
supports the argument of the perils of foreign aid and remittances. Although the 
literature generally supports the role of trade openness and education as 
determinants of democracy, the effects of these variables are not strong enough to 




variables might pose concerns about collinearity and endogeneity. Therefore, we 
run specifications without these time-varying control variables, and then control 
for one variable at a time. As reported in Columns (1)-(6) and (8)-(13) of Tables 
6.10 and 6.11 in the Chapter Appendix, the presence of these control variables in 
the model does not affect the sign of the coefficients associated with diaspora size. 
They even improve the significance of the institutional effect of diasporas when 
the dependent variable is measured as awgi, pr, cl, and polity2. 
The use of institutional-quality-adjusted immigrant stocks is more 
meaningful for incorporating the norm diffusion idea. However, in terms of 
magnitude, the coefficient of the institutional-quality-adjusted immigrant stock in 
Column (10) of Table 6.3 is only slightly larger as the coefficient of the 
immigrant stock in Column (5). In the case of 2SLS, the institutional-quality-
adjusted immigrant stock has a slightly smaller effect (Column 9) than the 
immigrant stock effect (Column 4). We therefore carry out an alternative strategy 
to identify the host country institutional quality effect by running regressions 
contrasting immigrant stocks in higher-institutional-quality host countries with 
those in lower-institutional-quality host countries to find evidence supporting 
Hypothesis 1. As presented in Table 6.4, the coefficients of immigrant stocks in 
higher-institutional-quality host countries are larger than those of immigrant 
stocks in lower-institutional-quality host countries. Welch‟s t-test (Welch, 1938) 
rejects the null hypothesis of equal regression coefficients (at the 0.1 per cent 
level), but only when using the 2SLS method. Given that this is the preferred 
estimator within the scope of this research, this result does provide tentative 
statistical evidence that having diasporas in higher-institutional-quality host 




Table 6.4 also reports the results of regressions contrasting diasporas with 
different durations-of-stay. The coefficients of institutional-quality-adjusted 
immigrant stocks characterized by shorter duration-of-stay (≤10 years) are larger 
than those of institutional-quality-adjusted immigrant stocks with longer duration-
of-stay (>10 years). Moreover, regardless of which estimator is used, Welch‟s t-
test rejects the null hypothesis of equal regression coefficients at the 0.1 per cent 
level. Accordingly, the diffusion of advanced institutions from developed host 
countries to less developed home countries through the international migration 
channel is stronger when diasporas are characterized by shorter duration-of-stay. 
These are immigrants who have a higher propensity to re-emigrate. This distinct 
effect might be due to the expected stronger links with the home country among 
these diasporas. This finding is robust at the 0.1 per cent level to the alternative 
institutional indicators pr and cl in both pooled cross-sectional and panel analyses 
and polity2 in pooled cross-sectional analysis (see Table 6.12 in the Chapter 
Appendix). Theoretically, whether diasporas with shorter duration-of-stay or those 
with longer duration-of-stay are more able to transmit the institutional effects to 
home countries is controversial. It is plausible to argue that assimilation in host 
countries lessens the connection with home countries. Therefore, diasporas with 
longer duration-of-stay, i.e. deeper integration, would be less able to transmit 
host-country norms and practice to home countries, whereas those with shorter 
duration-of-stay would be more able to do so through their strong homeland 
linkages. By contrast, the transnationalism and social network theories suggest 
that integration depth consolidates homeland linkages. Accordingly, diasporas 
with shorter duration-of-stay would be less able to generate the transmission 




diasporas with shorter duration-of-stay on home-country institutional quality. 
Given the global trend of increasing temporary migration, this finding suggests a 
greater role for cross-border norm diffusion by means of international migration 
in the future than in the past. 
Table 6.4: Estimates for Diaspora Size with Sub-Samples 
 
Higher versus lower-institutional-quality host countries 









lnmstock 14.756* 12.468** <0.001  12.875** 12.560** 0.424 
 
(7.845) (5.695)   (5.715) (5.311)  
DWH 0.002 0.003   0.001 0.001  
KPW 5.024 10.914   7.777 14.374  
 Shorter versus longer duration-of-stay 
 2SLS  RE-IV 







lnqmstock 13.474** 9.760**  <0.001  12.178** 9.720*** <0.001 
 (6.291) (4.241)    (5.128) (3.660)   
DWH 0.001 0.003   0.001 0.004  
KPW 11.071 14.227   15.835 18.840  
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by home country are reported in 
parentheses. N = 393. DWH: Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test, p-value 
reported, null hypothesis = diaspora size is exogenous. KPW: Kleibergen-Paap 
Wald rank F-statistic to be compared with Stock-Yogo weak instrument test 
critical values. Welch‟s t-test: test for the significant difference of regression 
coefficients, p-value reported, null hypothesis = regression coefficients associated 
with diaspora size are equal. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
Our paper re-confirms the positive role of migration in promoting 
institutional quality development in home countries. This explicit influence is 
generated by the spill-over effects of migrants from less developed countries 
transmitting and spreading attitudes and behaviours back home that they absorbed 
in developed host countries. These spill-over effects depend on the quality of 




likely to maintain links with their home countries. Consequently, our use of 
institutional-quality-adjusted immigrant stocks in the analysis not only re-
confirms the impact of migration on institutional quality, but also attests that 
where migrants move to does matter. 
In the wake of increasing temporary migration, this paper provides a fresh 
insight into the link between migration and institutional quality by digging deeper 
into the intensity of norm diffusion from developed host countries to less 
developed home countries, conditioned on temporary versus permanent migration. 
The temporariness is entrenched in diasporas characterized by shorter duration-of-
stay and higher propensity to re-emigrate. Interestingly, we find that diasporas 
with shorter duration-of-stay demonstrate a stronger norm diffusion effect.  
In sum, our findings suggest that policy makers in both home and host 
countries should support temporary migration as an approach to promote global 
convergence in institutional quality. Although migration decisions are primarily at 
the discretion of migrants, there are areas where governments can control the 
temporariness of migration, such as in the case of labour migration and the 
migration of international students. Bilateral agreements should be established or 
re-negotiated to facilitate the flows of fixed-period guest workers and 
international students from less developed home countries to developed host 
countries. It is also necessary to design a mechanism of inter-country cooperation 
to increase the chance of their return, especially the return of home-government 
scholarship holders. Given that institutional quality has recently been a central 
concern of the development discourse, our findings advocate for a bottom-up 
approach to intensify development through institutional improvement via 




Lastly, we note that while important advances have been made in the earlier 
papers and the estimations reported in the present paper, the precise quantification 
of the role of institutional quality diffusion by means of diasporas remains 
challenging. One potential problem still to be investigated is that of migrant self-
selection. Migrants can be self-selected along different dimensions, such as 
education, destination choice, etc. (Lodigiani, 2016). As documented in the 
literature, high-skilled migrants are more sensitive to weak institutions (Olesen, 
2002; Dimant et al., 2013; Cooray and Schneider, 2016), hence they are attracted 
to countries with high quality institutions. This self-selection problem might cause 
biased estimation of the direct norm diffusion effect. Consequently, future 
research should control for potential self-selection biases to distinguish the direct 
norm diffusion effect from other channels. 
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Table 6.5: Eigenvalues and the Proportion of Variation Explained by the 
Principal Components of the Six WGI Indicators 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 5.015 4.621 0.836 0.836 
2 0.394 0.066 0.066 0.902 
3 0.328 0.196 0.055 0.956 
4 0.132 0.059 0.022 0.978 
5 0.073 0.016 0.012 0.990 






Table 6.6: Component Factor Loadings on the Six WGI Indicators for the 
First Principal Component 
WGI indicators Component 1 Unexplained 
Voice and Accountability 0.380 0.276 
Political Stability, Absence of Violence/Terrorism 0.370 0.314 
Government Effectiveness 0.426 0.090 
Regulatory Quality 0.415 0.137 
Rule of Law 0.431 0.068 







Table 6.7: List of Selected OECD Host Countries 
No. Code Country 
 Higher-institutional-quality host countries 
1 FIN Finland 
2 DNK Denmark 
3 LUX Luxembourg 
4 NZL New Zealand 
5 CHE Switzerland 
6 SWE Sweden 
7 NOR Norway 
8 NLD Netherlands 
9 AUS Australia 
10 IRL Ireland 
11 AUT Austria 
12 CAN Canada 
13 DEU Germany 
   
 Lower-institutional-quality host countries 
14 GBR United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
15 BEL Belgium 
16 USA United States of America 
17 FRA France 
18 PRT Portugal 
19 ESP Spain 
20 ITA Italy 
21 GRC Greece 
Notes: Country codes follow the International Standards Organization (ISO) 3-








Table 6.8: List of Home Countries Included in the Sample 
No. Code Country No. Code Country No. Code Country No. Code Country 
1 AGO Angola 34 ECU Ecuador 67 LAO Lao 100 RWA Rwanda 
2 ALB Albania 35 EGY Egypt 68 LBR Liberia 101 SAU Saudi Arabia 
3 ARE United Arab Emirates 36 EST Estonia* 69 LBY Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 102 SDN Sudan 
4 ARG Argentina 37 ETH Ethiopia 70 LCA Saint Lucia 103 SEN Senegal 
5 ARM Armenia 38 FJI Fiji 71 LKA Sri Lanka 104 SGP Singapore 
6 AZE Azerbaijan 39 GAB Gabon 72 LTU Lithuania* 105 SLB Solomon Islands 
7 BDI Burundi 40 GEO Georgia 73 LVA Latvia* 106 SLE Sierra Leone 
8 BEN Benin 41 GHA Ghana 74 MAR Morocco 107 SLV El Salvador 
9 BGD Bangladesh 42 GIN Guinea 75 MDA Moldova 108 SVK Slovakia* 
10 BGR Bulgaria* 43 GMB Gambia 76 MDG Madagascar 109 SVN Slovenia* 
11 BHR Bahrain 44 GNQ Equatorial Guinea 77 MEX Mexico 110 SWZ Swaziland 
12 BHS Bahamas 45 GTM Guatemala 78 MLI Mali 111 SYC Seychelles 
13 BLR Belarus 46 GUY Guyana 79 MLT Malta* 112 TCD Chad 
14 BLZ Belize 47 HKG Hong Kong 80 MNG Mongolia 113 TGO Togo 
15 BOL Bolivia 48 HND Honduras 81 MOZ Mozambique 114 THA Thailand 
16 BRA Brazil 49 HRV Croatia* 82 MRT Mauritania 115 TJK Tajikistan 
17 BRB Barbados 50 HTI Haiti 83 MUS Mauritius 116 TTO Trinidad and Tobago 
18 BWA Botswana 51 HUN Hungary* 84 MWI Malawi 117 TUN Tunisia 
19 CAF Central African Republic 52 IDN Indonesia 85 MYS Malaysia 118 TUR Turkey 
20 CHL Chile 53 IND India 86 NAM Namibia 119 TZA United Republic of Tanzania 
21 CHN China 54 IRN Iran, Islamic Republic of 87 NER Niger 120 UGA Uganda 
22 CIV Côte d'Ivoire 55 IRQ Iraq 88 NIC Nicaragua 121 UKR Ukraine 
23 CMR Cameroon 56 ISL Iceland* 89 NPL Nepal 122 URY Uruguay 
24 COG Congo 57 ISR Israel 90 PAK Pakistan 123 UZB Uzbekistan 
25 COL Colombia 58 JAM Jamaica 91 PAN Panama 124 VCT Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
26 CPV Cape Verde 59 JOR Jordan 92 PER Peru 125 VEN Venezuela 
27 CRI Costa Rica 60 JPN Japan* 93 PHL Philippines 126 VNM Vietnam 
28 CYP Cyprus* 61 KAZ Kazakhstan 94 PNG Papua New Guinea 127 WSM Samoa 
29 CZE Czech Republic* 62 KEN Kenya 95 POL Poland* 128 ZAF South Africa 
30 DJI Djibouti 63 KGZ Kyrgyzstan 96 PRY Paraguay 129 ZAR Democratic Republic of the Congo 
31 DMA Dominica 64 KHM Cambodia 97 QAT Qatar 130 ZMB Zambia 
32 DOM Dominican Republic 65 KOR Republic of Korea 98 ROM Romania* 131 ZWE Zimbabwe 
33 DZA Algeria 66 KWT Kuwait 99 RUS Russian Federation    







































lngdp 0.083 0.083 -0.063 0.119 0.091 0.109  
 
(0.721) (0.725) (-0.408) (0.972) (0.904) (0.784)  
remit_oda 0.047 0.045 0.004 0.063** 0.063** 0.034  
 
(1.567) (1.529) (0.122) (2.087) (2.224) (1.066)  
openness 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001  
 
(0.383) (0.405) (0.447) (0.057) (-0.116) (0.436)  
lnpop 0.551*** 0.552*** 0.735*** 0.557*** 0.624*** 0.546*** 
 
(5.875) (5.924) (6.543) (5.088) (7.916) (4.508)  
edu 2.144** 2.143** 3.779*** 1.607 2.222** 2.371**  
 
(2.381) (2.383) (3.083) (1.623) (2.538) (2.283)  
lndisaster 0.374*** 0.375*** 0.296** 0.351*** 0.325*** 0.448*** 
 
(3.773) (3.800) (2.241) (3.304) (3.327) (3.772)  
adj. R-sq 0.664 0.665 0.631 0.618 0.688 0.609  
F-statistics 26.010 24.640 35.645 21.529 25.473 26.531 
Prob > F <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Notes: Robust t-statistics clustered by home country are reported in parentheses. N=393. Time-invariant variables 
and time-fixed effects are included. F-test for the null hypothesis that all slope coefficients are jointly zero. 






Table 6.10: Coefficients Associated with Diaspora Size Measured as Immigrant Stocks 
Control 
variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 







awgi  0.843 4.404*** 2.508** 1.274 5.522* 1.038 11.693**  0.795 5.168*** 1.124 0.950 5.477 1.375 11.955** 
  (1.214) (1.033) (1.259) (1.158) (2.860) (1.029) (5.086)  (2.207) (1.943) (2.229) (2.182) (4.984) (1.939) (4.675) 
N  393 393 393 393 393 393 393  393 393 393 393 393 393 393 
KPW  133.992 133.779 123.250 150.346 45.932 139.118 14.233  48.849 46.360 48.167 53.188 19.665 52.271 20.268 
pr  10.511*** 14.496*** 13.049*** 9.308*** 29.992*** 10.964*** 33.326***  12.298*** 14.905*** 12.829*** 12.662*** 27.642*** 12.774*** 29.543*** 
  (2.401) (2.396) (2.647) (2.341) (5.443) (2.209) (11.085)  (4.422) (4.444) (4.602) (4.220) (8.694) (4.196) (8.758) 
N  390 390 390 390 390 390 390  390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
KPW  117.865 116.019 102.402 139.865 43.878 123.534 13.854  42.681 39.727 41.763 49.559 18.463 45.911 21.845 
cl  7.619*** 10.723*** 9.684*** 6.866*** 25.690*** 7.999*** 28.752***  9.155** 12.202*** 9.536** 8.880** 23.790*** 9.758*** 25.284*** 
  (1.980) (1.965) (2.133) (1.887) (4.402) (1.804) (8.878)  (3.660) (3.762) (3.714) (3.480) (7.065) (3.399) (7.038) 
N  390 390 390 390 390 390 390  390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
KPW  117.865 116.019 102.402 139.865 43.878 123.534 11.592  42.665 39.619 41.753 49.347 18.785 45.804 21.934 
efw  1.718** 2.556*** 1.920** 1.920*** 3.659** 1.904*** 4.690  1.634 2.802** 1.773 1.697 3.298 1.964 4.550 
  (0.714) (0.653) (0.763) (0.681) (1.639) (0.692) (3.082)  (1.285) (1.163) (1.341) (1.245) (2.976) (1.222) (2.917) 
N  279 279 279 279 279 279 279  279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
KPW  86.261 83.326 87.482 87.708 39.866 89.612 8.864  29.566 28.166 30.032 30.773 13.115 31.116 12.334 
polity2  11.738*** 13.265*** 12.728*** 11.270*** 37.285*** 12.072*** 40.001***  13.633*** 13.566*** 13.797*** 13.922*** 26.995*** 13.829*** 23.411*** 
  (2.283) (2.146) (2.437)    (2.283)    (7.610)    (2.145)    (14.989)  (4.098) (3.889)    (4.208)    (3.942)    (8.834)    (3.853)    (7.719) 
N  360 360 360 360 360 360 360  360 360 360 360 360 360 360 
KPW  124.548 127.186 105.861 146.938 25.543 132.862 9.052  47.662 44.528 46.517 54.559 15.175 51.943 20.188 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by home country are reported in parentheses. Time-invariant variables and time-fixed effects are included. KPW: Kleibergen-Paap 
Wald rank F-statistic to be compared with Stock-Yogo weak instrument test critical values. 





Table 6.11: Coefficients Associated with Diaspora Size Measured as Institutional-Quality-Adjusted Immigrant Stocks 
Control 
variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 







awgi  0.844 4.402*** 2.504** 1.274 5.539* 1.039 11.659**  0.796 5.178*** 1.124 0.951 5.527 1.376 12.016** 
  (1.214) (1.029) (1.255) (1.157) (2.865) (1.028) (4.922)  (2.210) (1.945) (2.228) (2.183) (5.032) (1.940) (4.700) 
N  393 393 393 393 393 393 393  393 393 393 393 393 393 393 
KPW  134.938 135.140 124.429 151.725 46.101 140.288 14.436  49.092 46.663 48.500 53.654 19.439 52.727 20.268 
pr  10.519*** 14.492*** 13.022*** 9.303*** 30.096*** 10.971*** 33.176***  12.321*** 14.943*** 12.829*** 12.667*** 27.919*** 12.785*** 29.736*** 
  (2.399) (2.387) (2.636) (2.337) (5.457) (2.208) (10.980)  (4.424) (4.447) (4.594) (4.212) (8.791) (4.194) (8.804) 
N  390 390 390 390 390 390 390  390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
KPW  118.616 117.170 103.418 141.525 43.989 124.509 14.148  42.867 39.945 42.039 50.097 18.249 46.282 21.924 
cl  7.624*** 10.720*** 9.664*** 6.862*** 25.779*** 8.005*** 28.623***  9.173** 12.235*** 9.536** 8.883** 24.044*** 9.782*** 25.362*** 
  (1.978) (1.959) (2.124) (1.882) (4.405) (1.801) (8.776)  (3.660) (3.767) (3.707) (3.473) (7.154) (3.402) (7.058) 
N  390 390 390 390 390 390 390  390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
KPW  118.616 117.170 103.418 141.525 43.989 124.509 14.148  42.847 39.812 42.025 49.878 18.537 46.193 22.042 
efw  1.717** 2.554*** 1.915** 1.918*** 3.675** 1.903*** 4.695  1.636 2.802** 1.772 1.698 3.335 1.964 4.590 
  (0.714) (0.651) (0.760) (0.680) (1.646) (0.691) (3.079)  (1.285) (1.160) (1.339) (1.245) (3.009) (1.221) (2.941) 
N  279 279 279 279 279 279 279  279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
KPW  87.227 84.475 88.377 88.680 40.033 90.807 11.732  29.846 28.544 30.295 31.127 13.029 31.545 12.356 
polity2  11.732*** 13.249*** 12.681*** 11.251*** 37.452*** 12.066*** 39.729***  13.647*** 13.593*** 13.781*** 13.921*** 27.370*** 13.832*** 23.756*** 
  (2.279)    (2.138)    (2.425)    (2.276)    (7.659)    (2.141)    (14.802)  (4.098)    (3.889)    (4.198)    (3.936)    (8.998)    (3.851)    (7.819) 
N  360 360 360 360 360 360 360  360 360 360 360 360 360 360 
KPW  125.664 128.726 107.244 149.050 25.473 134.354 9.052  47.970 44.846 46.942 55.205 14.773 52.521 19.944 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by home country are reported in parentheses. Time-invariant variables and time-fixed effects are included. KPW: Kleibergen-Paap 
Wald rank F-statistic to be compared with Stock-Yogo weak instrument test critical values. 





Table 6.12: Estimates for Institutional-Quality-Adjusted Immigrant Stocks Using Alternative Measures of Institutional Quality: Shorter 
versus Longer Duration-of-Stay 
 2SLS  RE-IV 
 pr cl efw polity2  pr cl efw polity2 
 Shorter duration-of-stay 
lnqmstock 37.444*** 32.305*** 5.421 48.575***  27.900*** 23.686*** 4.691 18.709**  
 (8.572) (6.899) (2.119) (13.439)   (9.062) (7.139) (2.860) (7.762)  
N 390 390 279 360   390 390 279 360  
DWH <0.001 <0.001 0.014 0.001  <0.001 <0.001 0.019 <0.001 
KPW 11.593 11.593 8.474 6.574  21.310 21.465 10.630 19.253 
          
 Longer duration-of-stay 
lnqmstock 27.315*** 23.566*** 3.830 33.621***  24.190*** 20.214*** 3.889 19.931*** 
 (5.396) (4.319) (1.520) (7.676)   (6.967) (5.499) (2.460) (6.554)  
N 390 390 345 360   390 390 345 360  
DWH <0.001 <0.001 0.007 0.001  <0.001 <0.001 0.020 <0.001 
KPW 14.688 14.688 12.799 8.844  20.430 19.946 13.029 15.091 
          
Welch‟s t-test <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.023 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by home country are reported in parentheses. DWH: Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
endogeneity test, p-value reported, null hypothesis = diaspora size is exogenous. KPW: Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F-statistic 
to be compared with Stock-Yogo weak instrument test critical values. Welch‟s t-test: test for the significant difference of 
regression coefficients, p-value reported, null hypothesis = regression coefficients associated with lnqmstock are equal. 













Notes: This figure presents 95 per cent confidence intervals for the estimated 
coefficients associated with diaspora size under the assumption that the instrumental 
variable has a direct effect on home-country institutional quality, captured by  . Figure 
6.2(a)-(d) show the Union of Confidence Intervals (UCI) bounds drawn from varying 
values of   under the assumption that   [     ]. Figure 6.2(e)-(h) depict the   Local-
to-Zero (LTZ) approximation bounds drawn from varying value of   under the 
assumption that          . The estimates are generated by using the STATA 




Chapter 7: Conclusions 
Migration is not a new phenomenon. The first evidence of modern human 
migration can be dated to 15,000 years ago or earlier (King, 2010). Over this time, 
people have been on the move within or across borders in response to economic, 
political, humanitarian, environmental and other reasons. Since migration has 
taken on new characteristics in the era of globalization and become a major factor 
shaping the world, academic and policy attention has increasingly been paid to 
migration. Worldwide, the picture of migration has been changing at a rapid pace, 
revealing new patterns that include the temporariness of migration (Dustmann and 
Görlach, 2016). Moreover, the growing politicization of migration has recently 
been identified as a prominent feature of contemporary international migration 
(Castles et al., 2014). These emergent tendencies require fresh insights into the 
link between international migration and institutional quality. It is essential to 
understand the role of institutions in explaining temporary migration, in particular 
return migration, and to take into account the distinction between temporary and 
permanent migration in assessing the institutional effects of international 
migration.  
This thesis is dedicated to expanding knowledge of the two-way relationship 
between international migration and institutional quality in light of the emergent 
global dynamics of migration. Conventional wisdom holds that return migration is 
a phenomenon of growing importance. Return migration generates enormous 
externalities that might benefit countries of origin through investment, remittances, 
and transmission of skills, knowledge, political and social norms. Yet our 
understanding of return migration is limited. Through four interconnected studies, 




institutional quality in the home country matter for return migration decisions?; (ii) 
does institutional quality in the home country matter for return migration 
intentions?; (iii) given that institutional quality in the home country is important to 
migrants when they considering or deciding repatriation, what are migrants 
willing to pay for better home country institutions?; (iv) do international 
migration to developed host countries have a positive impact on institutional 
quality in home countries?; and (v) does the impact of international migration on 
institutional quality in home countries differ by migrants‟ duration-of-stay in host 
countries? 
7.1 Main Findings and Policy Implications 
Chapter 2 reviewed two decades of economics research on the importance 
of various types of institutions to the migration decisions of international migrants. 
This strand of literature has identified the salience of institutional quality in 
migration decisions. More specifically, spatial inequality in economic and 
political freedom is a significant push and/or pull factor that shapes the migration 
decisions of international migrants. Migrants are prone to emigrate from countries 
governed by weak institutions to search for opportunities in countries with 
favourable economic institutions and stable political institutions. Lessons from 
two decades of examining the role of institutions in migration decisions call for 
institutional improvement, particularly in developing countries where institutions 
are presently still deficient, to retain domestic human capital and attract external 
inputs for national development. The chapter also pinpoints the distinction 
between economic and political institutions in terms of the extent of their 
influence on migration decisions, with economic institutions having generally 




Chapter 3 conducts an empirical exercise that looks at the role of institutions 
in return migration decisions. The empirical strategy of this study showed that 
institutional quality at the local level acts as a pull factor for these migration 
decisions. More importantly, the revealed effect of local institutional quality is 
dependent on the relative quality of institutions in host countries. Regions with 
higher local institutional quality are more attractive to migrants from host 
countries with better institutional quality. This finding reveals the norm diffusion 
effects reflected in the preference of migrants returning from institutionally 
developed countries for the quality of institutions pertaining to regions in their 
home country. This chapter extended the literature on the role of institutional 
quality as a pull factor in the migration decisions of return migrants.  
Chapter 4 investigates the role of institutions in return migration intentions, 
a necessary condition for voluntary return migration. The regression results 
revealed that those migrants who attach greater importance to institutional quality 
in Viet Nam are less likely to have the intention to return than other Vietnamese 
migrants, given their perception that institutional quality in Viet Nam has been 
relatively lower than that in OECD countries. In other words, strong institutions in 
the home country act as a pull factor for return migration. Given that institutional 
quality is shown, in Chapter 3, to be important to return migration ex post, i.e. 
observed return migration decisions, this chapter complements Chapter 3 by 
providing novel evidence that institutional quality also matters for return 
migration ex ante, i.e. return intentions. 
Chapter 5 further investigates the importance of home-country institutional 
quality found in Chapters 3 and 4, by means of the contingent valuation method. 




income for better institutional quality back home. Older migrants, who are more 
prone to return as documented in the literature, are more likely to have higher 
willingness to pay. Also, the greater the importance of institutional quality in Viet 
Nam to Vietnamese migrants, the higher their willingness to pay. 
The previous three chapters set up the empirical investigation of the two-
way relationship between international migration and institutional quality by 
looking at the role of institutions in shaping return migration, Chapter 6 provided 
a macro study tackling the institutional effects of international migration on home 
countries. The results of cross-sectional and panel analyses attest to the significant 
positive impact of immigrant stocks living in OECD countries on institutional 
quality in home countries. This general effect of international migration on 
institutions is explained by norm diffusion effects, i.e. migrants may transmit their 
absorbed social, economic and political values and norms to their home countries. 
Being guided by norm diffusion effects, the chapter developed measures of 
institutional-quality-adjusted immigrant stocks to incorporate variations in 
institutional quality between host countries into the measure of diaspora size. The 
chapter also found that migrants characterized by shorter duration-of-stay are 
more likely to maintain strong homeland linkages and have higher propensity to 
re-emigrate. Based on the results of these extensions, the chapter concluded that 
the distribution of migrants in host countries and the length of their stay matter for 
the intensity of the norm diffusion effects.  
Chapters 3 to 6 provided empirical evidence at the micro and macro levels 
of the two-way relationship between international migration and institutional 
quality. The quality of home-country institutions act as pull and/or push forces 




international migration induces norm diffusion effects, and thereby alters home-
country institutions. From a policy perspective, the following conclusions can be 
drawn. Based on Chapters 3, 4, and 5, improving the quality of institutions at the 
national and local levels is a suitable approach for attracting external inputs for 
development. The quality of institutions shapes the comparative advantages of 
provincial, regional, and national destinations for potential immigrants and return 
migrants. Better national institutions contribute to the effectiveness of local 
institutional improvement and policies that aim to boost return migration for 
development. Therefore, national institutional reforms are of pivotal importance 
in the migration and development nexus. These policy implications are 
particularly relevant for developing countries, where there are still constraints in 
creating pro-development economic and political institutions. Next, given that 
international migrants are again found to be development agents for their pro-
institutional quality role, policy makers in both home and host countries and the 
international communities should include migration as a key d iscussion in their 
social, economic and political agendas. Since temporary migration is found, in 
this thesis, to have strong norm diffusion effects, policies that facilitate and 
govern temporary migration to promote global convergence in institutional quality 
should be discussed at the national and international levels. It is also worth noting 
that the institutional development role of diasporas poses challenges to some 
nation-state leaders who desire to push for unchecked power and retain their 
autocratic rule. To deter the proliferation of imported institutional norms from 
developed countries in their countries, those leaders might restrict ties with their 
diasporas to only allow such transmission as remittances, or even turn their back 




7.2 Future Research 
International migration is a prominent feature of the world today, and the 
global trend is increasingly towards temporary migration. There is no doubt that 
temporary migration, particularly return migration, is important. Despite the 
attention of scholars and policy makers to the causal effect of institutions on 
emigration, the current state of our knowledge of the influence of institutions on 
return migration remains limited. The largest impediment is that data on return 
migration are not consistently recorded or not even available, making it difficult 
to measure the size and characteristics of return migrants. These constraints are 
due to the fact that data on migrant outflows are often absent in many countries. 
Moreover, re-emigration does not necessarily mean going back to countries of 
origin, which provides further challenges to empirical research on return 
migration. Essential steps towards better quality of return migration data include 
systematically recording the arrival and departure of the foreign-born population 
and matching these administrative datasets across different countries. Although a 
number of datasets have been built for research on temporary migration (see 
Dustmann and Görlach, 2016), progress in precisely measuring return migration 
requires increasing national efforts and international collaboration. The 
availability of better data on return migration would facilitate researchers to 
conduct more case studies and analyses at the cross-country level, which are 
urgently needed to enrich the literature, and to provide inputs for evidence-
informed policy formation and implementation regarding migration for 
development. 
A promising extension of this thesis may be research on the role of 




seekers. While there are no precise statistics on the number of irregular migrants, 
refugees and asylum seekers were estimated to account for 10.1 per cent of 
international migrants by the end of 2016 (United Nations, 2017). The surging 
flows of these types of migrant in recent years have moved to the forefront of 
debate, especially in the European Union countries. Given that political 
institutions were found to be less important in explaining migration, compared 
with economic institutions, expanding the investigation on the role of various 
types of institutions in shaping irregular and forced migration might be 
worthwhile. 
In regard to assessing the causal effect of international migration on 
institutional quality, it is not an easy task to identify the direct institutional effects, 
because there are several problems that can influence the estimations (Lodigiani, 
2016). First, the presence of reverse causality has induced researchers to employ 
an instrumental variable strategy. So far, the conventional instrumental variables 
for migration, such as natural shocks, migration costs, and historical events, are 
suspect for the possibility of having direct impacts on institutional quality, thereby 
failing to satisfy the exclusion restriction (see Angrist and Pischke, 2008). 
Therefore, more effort needs to be put into identifying instrumental variables for 
migration that satisfy the exclusion restriction but are nonetheless statistically 
satisfactory exogenous determinants of fluctuations in migration. Second, 
migrants are more likely to be positively self-selected in terms of skills when 
choosing destination countries. As discussed previously in this thesis, high-skilled 
migrants are more sensitive to bad quality institutions; thus, they are more likely 
to migrate to institutionally developed countries. The self-selection problem raises 




selection bias. Consequently, controlling for potential self-selection biases in this 
field of study is worth being pursued, to disentangle the direct norm diffusion 
effects from other channels. 
Finally, although this thesis has provided evidence at the macro-level on the 
causal effect of international migration on institutional quality, we need more 
evidence at the micro-level to understand the mechanisms behind this relationship. 
To date, researchers have suggested possible micro channels through which the 
actions of migrants and their social networks become agents of institutional 
change, such as the transfer of political norms, voting and lobbying activities from 
abroad, financial remittances, and return migration. Future research could 
investigate in more detail the suggested channels and explore new ones to answer 
the question of how migrants trigger institutional change in the home country. 
In sum, this thesis has provided new insights into the two-way relationship 
between international migration and institutional quality in light of the prevalent 
trend of temporary migration. Although there still remain unresolved issues in the 
field, the thesis has contributed new knowledge to our understanding of how 







Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2008). Instrumental Variables in Action: 
Sometimes You Get What You Need. In Mostly Harmless Econometrics: 
An Empiricist’s Companion (pp. 113–220). Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Castles, S., Haas, H. de, & Miller, M. J. (2014). The age of migration: 
international population movements in the modern world (Fifth edition). 
New York: The Guilford Press. 
Dustmann, C., & Görlach, J.-S. (2016). The Economics of Temporary Migrations. 
Journal of Economic Literature, 54(1), 98–136. 
King, R. (Ed.). (2010). The atlas of human migration: Global patterns of people 
on the move. London: Earthscan. 
Lodigiani, E. (2016). The effect of emigration on home-country political 
institutions. IZA World of Labor: 307. 
https://doi.org/doi:10.15185/izawol.307 
United Nations. (2017). International Migration Report 2017: Highlights 
(ST/ESA/SER.A/404). Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Population Division. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
179 
 
Thesis Appendix 
 
 
  
 
180 
 
 
  
 
181 
 
 
  
 
182 
 
 
  
 
183 
 
 
  
 
184 
 
 
 
185 
 
 
186 
 
 
187 
 
 
188 
 
 
189 
 
 
190 
 
 
191 
 
 
192 
 
 
193 
 
 
194 
 
 
195 
 
 
196 
 
 
197 
 
 
198 
 
 
199 
 
 
200 
 
 
201 
 
 
202 
 
 
203 
 
 
204 
 
 
205 
 
 
206 
 
 
207 
 
 
  
 
208 
 
 
209 
 
 
210 
 
 
211 
 
 
212 
 
 
213 
 
 
214 
 
 
215 
 
 
216 
 
 
217 
 
 
218 
 
 
219 
 
 
220 
 
 
221 
 
 
222 
 
 
223 
 
 
224 
 
 
225 
 
 
226 
 
 
227 
 
 
228 
 
 
229 
 
 
230 
 
 
231 
 
 
 
 
